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THE SOCIOLOGICAL WORK OF LEONARD HOBHOUSE:
by Victor Branford.

I.

THERE was a dramatic turning point in the sociological career of Leonard Hobhouse. It occurred about the close of the first decade of his tenure of the Martin White Chair. But before speaking of that, something must be said as to how Hobhouse came into the sociological movement. His passage from the Oxford tradition of political philosophy, and the somewhat arid field of Teutonic epistemology, marked by the publication in 1901 of *MIND IN EVOLUTION*, was no doubt deflected in a more sociological direction during the following years, when preparations were being made for the public launching of the Sociological Society in 1903. The result of those prolonged preliminaries were summed in a statement "On the Origin and Use of the Word Sociology; and on the relation of Sociological to other studies and to Practical Problems."¹ To the ideas and proposals in that statement Hobhouse gave his hearty adhesion. And when, following its wide circulation amongst representatives of the scientific, philosophic and practical interests concerned, a public meeting was held in June, 1903, for considering ways and means to launch the projected Society, Hobhouse warmly seconded a resolution, moved by Oscar Browning, for the appointment of a committee to formulate the scope and aims of the Society and to draft its constitution. Incidentally it may be worth recalling that Oscar Browning, on that occasion, made a memorable statement. He recalled the fact that Sir John Seeley had frequently said to him that in founding the Historical Tripos in Cambridge he had intended that it should develop into a Sociological Tripos, and Mr. Oscar Browning considered that the Historical Tripos had been successful in so far as it had been sociological and had been unsuccessful in so far as it had not been sociological.²

¹Printed in *SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS*, Vol. I., 1904, at the special request of Hobhouse himself.

²From Report of the Meeting in *THE TIMES* of July 6th, 1903.

II.

HOBHOUSE became an active member of the formative committee whose Report, having been accepted without amendment at the first general meeting of members (November, 1903), may be taken as the substantive basis of the sociological movement in Great Britain. And this document affirms that, "the aims of the Sociological Society are scientific, educational, and practical. It seeks to promote investigation, and to advance education in the Social Sciences in their various aspects and application."

"ITS field covers all the phenomena of society. The origin and development, the decay and extinction of societies, their structure and classification, their internal functions and interaction have to be observed and compared; and all this with increasing precision and completeness. The many standpoints from which social phenomena may be considered have all to be utilised. In this way the Society affords the common ground on which workers from all fields and schools may profitably meet—geographer and naturalist, anthropologist and archæologist, historian and philologist, psychologist and moralist, all contributing their results towards a fuller Social Philosophy, including the natural and civil history of man, his achievements and his ideals."

"THIS conception of social evolution involves a clearer valuation of the conditions and forces that respectively hinder or help development, which make towards degeneration or towards progress. The physician and the alienist, the criminologist and the jurist, have here again their common meeting-ground with hygienist and educationist, with philanthropist, social reformer and politician, with journalist and cleric."

"SUCH mutual understanding among different workers must obviously tend to promote a clearer delimitation of respective fields, and a mutual suggestiveness towards methods of cultivation also—in other words, an extending division of labour, an increasing co-operation. But these fields are the aspects or sub-divisions of Sociology, both pure and applied; these methods with their corresponding nomenclature and notations, have to be compared and unified to furnish the methods of Sociology."

"THE place of Sociology among the Sciences thus comes more clearly into view; and the growing body of organised social knowledge may thus claim its place not only in the scheme of the logician and the synthesis of the philosopher, but in the education of the liberal professions and in the councils of the practical world."

THE early meetings of the Society were, very deliberately in 1904 and 1905, less so in 1906,³ organised to illustrate and develop the view of sociology, its scope and aims, as set forth in the above constitutional

³See SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS, Vols. I., II. and III.

definition. And Hobhouse's own personal views on the subject may be instanced by reference to a discussion on two papers jointly presented to the Society in 1904 by Emile Durkheim and the present writer, under the common title "On the Relation of Sociology to the Social Sciences and to Philosophy." That discussion was closed by a notable speech from Hobhouse⁴ in which the following passages occur: "The question, What do you mean by sociology? is not easy to answer without going at once into very disputed matters. I think the two papers endeavour to give a simple and clear answer to that question. They endeavour to say what is sociology at the present moment, in what form does it exist, in what sense is it a realised science and not a future science, not merely what hypothesis, but what actual realised scientific matter is in existence sufficient to form a basis for a sociological society? They tell us that there is such a body of truth in a number of specialisms, and they go on to say that these specialisms are suffering from the want of co-ordination. All that seems to me to be a matter of considerable value, and I think it is distinctly a fruitful line of thought to lay before the Sociological Society. I believe that any one who wishes to study the subject will proceed on the method of the papers before us. He will endeavour to acquire such competent knowledge of a certain number of specialisms as to enable him to bring them together for the purpose of comparison. He will study them, and in the process he will find much irrelevant detail, which will detach itself, and a great core of relevant matter will remain; and the student will soon find himself led by the subject itself to concentrate on that part of it which is necessary to bring the diverse special studies into relation."

"... I DO not agree with every word of the papers, but it does seem to me that they have indicated in a way that certainly deserves our thanks, what sociology claims to be at the present time, and therewith have indicated the next steps which investigation ought to take."

III.

IN 1907 Hobhouse was selected from four names submitted by the present writer for the first holder of the permanent chair of sociology founded in the University of London by J. Martin White, the Treasurer of the Society, it being the hope and intention of the benefactor that an academic Department of Sociology might grow up in active co-operation with the Society. In the same year occurred an opportunity for initiating such a co-operation. For the Society then began the publication of a quarterly organ—the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*—in succession to the annual volume of *SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS*, which had embodied its Proceedings during the previous years. Hobhouse was offered the editorship of the *REVIEW* and accepted on certain conditions.

⁴Reported in *SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS*, Vol. III., 1904, pp. 215-216.

He stipulated for the same unconditional editorial control, as had been in the hands of the present writer as editor of *SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS*. The editorial Committee already in existence as a consultative body was continued as such but with a modified *personnel*. Hobhouse edited the *REVIEW* for about three years, and then relinquished the post, partly through pressure of other work, and partly on account of a criticism that, though his direction of the *REVIEW* had brought it contributions from many eminent writers and thinkers in the social field, yet his general line of editorial policy tended to depart from the scope and aims of the Society as defined in its constitution and exemplified in its earlier publications. This criticism was discussed at a meeting of the Society's Council, and gave occasion for a characteristically self-abnegating action on the part of Hobhouse himself. When the motion for a reversion to the earlier line of policy was put, it was carried by one vote. Hobhouse himself refrained from voting. Had he done so the numbers *pro* and *con* would have been equal, and the motion lost, for the then chairman of the Council (S. H. Swinny) was a supporter of Hobhouse's policy in conducting the *REVIEW*, and would have given a casting vote against the motion. It is possible, however, that Hobhouse would in any event have resigned from the editorship, for he was much overworked at the time.

IV.

YET there was another factor in the situation. Allusion was made at the outset of this memoir to a turning point in what might be called the sociological atmosphere of Hobhouse's mind. This event was the writing of the article (an essay of over 12,000 words in length) on *Sociology in Hastings' DICTIONARY OF RELIGION AND ETHICS*. The article appeared in the eleventh volume, which was published in 1920. But the article was written, revised and finished, by Hobhouse in the early years of the war. Vividly there stands out in one's memory the jubilant tone in which, during a conversation about the year 1916, he spoke of this achievement and its invigorating reaction on his own mind. The effect was transformative. Previously he had been wont to speak despondently about his own lectures on sociology, complaining of his failure to get the field of studies and research clear. And he went so far on one occasion as to indicate some thought of resigning the chair. But all doubts vanished after his struggle to survey and present the field of sociology in that systematic and encyclopædic way necessitated by the arduous task of preparing and writing the important article for *Hastings' DICTIONARY*. A veritable regeneration of his mental powers followed. Apart from a work of general philosophy (*DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE*) published in 1913, his remarkably fertile powers had lain somewhat dormant during the decade between the publication of *MORALS IN EVOLUTION* (1906), and the successful

struggle with that general presentment of sociology involved in the writing of the article for Hastings. But now with his outlook over the sociological field clarified, there followed a period of renewed fertility. In the five years between 1918 and 1923, there appeared in startling sequence the four volumes which (as he said in a letter to the present writer in 1924) together constitute his presentment of the principles of sociology. These volumes are *THE METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE* (1918); *THE RATIONAL GOOD* (1921); *THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE* (1922); and *SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT* (1923). Here, assuredly, was a magnificent sequel to the encyclopædic effort of 1916.

V.

THE four volumes cited above are naturally an amplification and development of the vision achieved through the stress and strain, with consequent ecstasy of illumination, endured and enjoyed, during the preparation and writing of the encyclopædic article. The shortest way, therefore, to an understanding of the principles of sociology as conceived by Hobhouse may presumably be attained through an analytical study of his essay in Hastings' *DICTIONARY*. Let us therefore cite, and put together as well as may be into one view, the salient ideas and passages of that essay. The essay is divided into the following five sections: (1) The Field of Sociology; (2) Social Science and Social Philosophy; (3) The Social Structure; (4) The Development of Community; (5) Complete Development and the Ethical Ideal.

UNDER the first of these five headings Hobhouse makes clear his view of the scope and aims of sociology. He emphasises two things. One is the distinction between "*society*" (in general) and "a society"; the other is a definition of the purposes of sociology, and their inter-relation. As regards the first point Hobhouse affirms of society (in general) that it "is something universal and pervasive, a tissue of relations of which it is difficult to find the beginning or the end." And again "all parts of society interact and no pre-eminence can be claimed *a priori* for any one element of social life." On the other hand, over against "society" Hobhouse puts "a society." And of "a society" he affirms that it "is a definite collection of people united by certain special relations with one another, and in some way marked off by these relations from others who do not enter into them, possessing in fact unity and, in general, a structure, and what, for want of a better metaphor, we may call a life of its own."

As to the scope and aims of the science, Hobhouse declares that "ultimately sociology is a synthesis of the social studies." But that being a goal more ultimate than immediate, he says "meantime the business of the sociologist is to discuss and expose the central conceptions from which a synthesis may proceed, to analyse the general character of society, examine the action of social development and

distinguish the permanent factors on which society rests and from which social changes proceed. In a wider sense sociology may be taken to cover the whole field of sociological specialisms. In a narrower sense it is itself a specialism having as its object the discovery of the connecting links between other specialisms."

VI.

Now let the above citations from Hobhouse's presentation of sociology and its field be compared with the scope and aims of the Sociological Society as defined in its original constitution (quoted on p. 274), and with Hobhouse's own summary of the two papers by Durkheim and the present writer (mentioned on p. 275). The latter must be included in the comparison, because the two papers thus epitomised are to be taken as amplifying the statement of scope and aims given in the constitution of the Society. Notable similarities, and yet also differences, emerge. The essential similarity resides in the common conceptions of: (a) sociology as a synthesis of specialised social studies; (b) the need for a co-ordinating hypothesis (reflecting the very nature of society and consequently adapted to the service of studies specialised upon different aspects of society), whereby workers in the specialised fields might labour together as a team with one another and also with those at work in the general field of sociology. For an adequate study of the difference between the standpoint and mode of approach represented respectively by Hobhouse and the Sociological Society it would be necessary to compare in some detail the four subsequent sections of the encyclopædic essay (taken as representing the *corpus* of Hobhouse's sociology), with the characteristic work done, and publications issued, by the Society since its foundation more than a quarter of a century ago. But that comparison would range beyond the limits of this memoir.

VII.

YET a brief analysis must be submitted of the remaining sections (2, 3, 4, 5) of Hobhouse's essay. His second section deals with the relation of social science to social philosophy, and therein he follows, in the main, the conventional antithesis of "facts" (the special concern of science) and of "values" (the concern of philosophy). But he says that "a complete sociology would embrace both a social science and social philosophy"; for the sociologist has to deal with the "values" concerned in the relations of: (a) Law and Freedom; (b) Individuality; and (c) Law and Will.

PASSING on (in section three) to the consideration of SOCIAL STRUCTURE, Hobhouse treats this under the following headings and sub-headings:—

- (a) TYPES OF SOCIETY; declared to comprise (1) *Kindred Societies* such as family, clan and tribe; (2) the *Community* (defined as "the entire society occupying a certain territory"); (3) the *Association* (e.g., trade and professional organisations, churches, etc.).

- (b) THE COMMUNITY. He affirms that a civilised community is always organised as a State.
- (c) THE ORGANIC PRINCIPLE ; a discussion of which centres on the relation of State and Individual.
- (d) THE PRINCIPLE OF FORCE.
- (e) THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-INTEREST.
- (f) THE BLENDING OF DISTINCT PRINCIPLES.

UNDER section four the central topic is the Development of Community ; and this development he says is measured by : (a) EFFICIENCY ; (b) SCALE OR SCOPE ; (c) SPONTANEITY in the base or principle of organisation ; and he declares that "the most developed community would be that which effectively achieves the most complete synthesis of the widest range of human activity, including within its membership the largest number of human beings, but in such wise as to rest most completely upon their free co-operation, thus expressing the whole of their vital energies as far as these are capable of working together in harmony."

THE final section (No. 5) of the encyclopædic essay deals with "Complete Development and the Ethical Ideal." We are told that "In fundamental principles, development in social organisation considered in its fulness coincides with ethical development as conceived by a rational system." And "a rational system" is defined as "one applicable to all humanity in all the varied relations of its life ; and its demand is for a practical consistency in character and conduct." Further, and, as it were in final conclusion, Hobhouse makes this statement : "For a rational ethics the good life of activity realised in society would form a perfectly organic unity of the widest possible scope."

VIII.

WITH the foregoing brief presentation of the science as conceived by Hobhouse (which may fairly be claimed to indicate, if not to summarise, alike his encyclopædic article and the four subsequent volumes which expanded it into his Principles of Sociology), should be compared the output of the Sociological Society in so far as guided and determined by those more immediately concerned with the original formation of the Society and its subsequent development. Such a comparison is needed to elucidate the puzzling situation which most Continental and American observers (and not a few at home) find, when they survey the state of British Sociology. They find two schools, an academic one which pursues the science on the lines of Hobhouse, and an extra-mural one represented by the more characteristic work of the Sociological Society. And these same observers usually remark upon the contrast, and even antagonism, of the academic

school and the extra-mural one. Now an adequate comparison would need a considerable essay, nay, indeed a well-documented volume. But here at the close of an appreciative memoir of Hobhouse's work, it must suffice to say that, to one who has been in close touch with both schools from their beginnings, there is far more of harmony than discord between them. They have the same large ends in view and they differ essentially only in method. The academic school proceeds mainly by the abstract and dialectical method, and appertains therefore to the tradition of philosophy and its generalities. The other proceeds more by the method of observation in the concrete (and open-air observation as far as possible) leading by means of verifiable hypothesis towards widening generalisations. In a word, the two schools may roughly be termed philosophical and scientific. The one concentrates on the study of "society" and its "principles," partly by the aid of the specialised social studies, but in the main, by the light of ideas derived from philosophic tradition. The other, also utilising (and, moreover, systematically) the social specialisms, studies "societies," i.e., cities, towns, villages and the wider regional communities, in the living concrete, and, by comparison and generalisation of observed data, works, in the light of verifiable hypothesis, towards a theory of societies in evolution, in degeneration, and in regeneration.

IF detailed examination of their characteristic outlook and ideas be made, the two schools can be shown to be strictly relevant and complementary. Does not this suggestion inevitably follow: that the most fitting memorial to Hobhouse would take the form of deliberate and organised efforts to bring the two schools into an effective working co-partnership. Could that be effected, it might well be that British Sociology would again take the lead as twice before in the history of the science it has done, once, conspicuously, in the days of Herbert Spencer, and again, in a sense, when the Sociological Society was formed in 1903, a date which gives it seniority in time over all the similar national societies.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

I. THE attention of readers is specially desired to an appeal for funds towards a Memorial to Hobhouse, which appears amongst the *Communications* in the current number of the REVIEW. Reference in the same connection should be made also to the paper entitled "Suggestions for Research in Brain Structure and Development," by Miss A. C. Sewell, printed in this number of the REVIEW.

II. FOLLOWING the above memoir of Hobhouse there is here printed an old Presidential Address to the Regional Association (which is now merged in Leplay House), delivered some ten years ago, but hitherto unpublished. It is here given as expounding and illustrating (though quite inadequately) aspects of sociology, pure and applied, which, in the memoir, are affirmed as complementary to the more philosophic treatment in Hobhouse's *Principles of Sociology*.

MAN AND NATURE : A Study in the relation of the Sciences and the Humanities : * by Victor Branford.

I.

THE contrast of Man and Nature, conceived as a philosophical tenet goes back to Greek thought. But its time of greatest vogue was during the void that came between the decay of scholasticism and the rise of modern evolutionary doctrine. The sophists of the late Renaissance took pains to saturate with this idea the colleges and universities. Under the influence of the Romantic Movement, it crystallised into our current educational antithesis of Literature and Science.

THE nineteenth century extension of what was believed to be "the scientific method" into the realm of mind, morals and society, might have been expected to bridge the gulf between humanist learning and naturalist science. Instead it tended rather to add a third irreconcilable to the existing pair. For Psychology, Ethics and Sociology are, customarily and in the main, rated as aliens alike by the cultivators of natural science and the students of literature and history.

II.

A GENERATION or so ago, it was indeed commonly assumed that the doctrine of evolution had brought the sciences of nature and of man into a close and harmonious working together. But the fruits of that co-operation, though abundant in detailed knowledge, have been woefully disappointing in larger issues. The cause of this sterility is now becoming apparent. It is increasingly recognised that the nineteenth century conception of evolution was overweighted with a mechanical bias. That conception faithfully reflected alike the qualities and defects of the age of machinery and competitive commerce, in which its originators and exponents were born and grew up. Herbert Spencer began as a railway engineer, and his working out of the evolutionary theory during fifty years of "compulsory leisure," was, as an Italian philosopher has acutely remarked, the occupation of "an unemployed mechanic." Spencer's famous phrase, "survival of the fittest" quaintly described the drama of living creatures, in terms of Watt's boast, uttered a generation before Spencer, that his steam-engine was fitted to survive against all competitors. Similarly it is now recognised that the substitution of Darwin for Paley as the authoritative interpreter of the order of nature was not the displacement of an anthropomorphic view by a purely scientific one, as its advocates claimed, but the inevitable giving way of the anthropomorphism of the eighteenth century to that of the nineteenth. The theory of natural selection, as both Darwin and Wallace confessed, was suggested to each of them by the reading of Malthus, the philosopher of competitive industrialism. The Malthusian "law of population" was

*Presidential Address to the Regional Association (a former organisation composed mostly of teachers).

but the generalisation of that intenser struggle for existence which the system of Machine Production introduced into our modern world. The doctrine of Natural Selection thus naively projected upon Nature (to be sure with profound illumination) was but a "rationalised" application of the competitive industrial regime.

THE eminent professor of philosophy chosen to write the article on Evolution for the ninth edition of the *ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA* (perhaps the most ably edited since Dugald Stuart co-operated in the editing of the first) was yet allowed to define evolution as a "mechanical process." That half-truth was pardonable in the last generation of the nineteenth century. Its repetition and endorsement in the eleventh edition, professing to speak for the opening twentieth century is excusable only on the plea that encyclopædias, like universities and learned academies, as they grow older, tend to get fossilised.

III.

Now the great War notwithstanding, there are many things to remind us that human societies are gradually learning to master the machine and the competitive process instead of being mastered by them. With this new phase of the modern mind a new interpretation of the order of nature begins to appear. The triumph of life over matter is its dominant note. Its most appealing voice, as yet, speaks in the philosophy of Bergson. Here evolution is neither Spencer's demiurgos fashioning matter with unresting energy, nor is she Lachesis, the Darwinian Fate cutting the thread of Life with the Shears of Selection. She is rather Clotho with her spindle, who not only spins the thread of life, but carries it tirelessly into utmost recesses of the material universe. And contending ceaselessly against the inertia of matter she develops undreamed qualities and potencies in the vital stuff, so that M. Bergson, gazing in awe upon the mystery of this drama, is moved daringly to endow Life, invincible Protagonist, with prospects of ultimate victory over the supreme material obstacle, death itself. Defined in the phrase *Evolution créatrice*, the essential characteristics of this *Vita Victrix* contrast sharply with the mechanical evolution, which in Victorian days was supposed to have given the *coup de grace* to creative conceptions of life. Indeed if this be evolution, that was but its preparatory or pre-evolutionary doctrine.

HANDICAPPED by the prevailing mechanical conceptions of life, the naturalist of the passing pre-evolutionary era was ill-equipped to deal with the higher manifestations of life. He was thus instinctively and rightly shy of penetrating the domain of mind, morals and society. He was inclined to leave this field for the most part to scholars, jurists and historians, whose very lack of training in observational science made them the more easily overlook those aspects of mental and social life to which the doctrine of evolution in its mechanistic and competitive form gave little or no clue. Thus their rash efforts to unlock

every door with the Darwinian key were little more than a *tour de force* in mental burglary.

BUT now with the growing subordination of the sciences of mechanical causation to the sciences of creative life (of the "lower" to the "higher" sciences) we have entered upon a period in which the naturalist's reluctance is being replaced by an eager exploration of the whole human sphere. Investigators of the naturalist habit and outlook are invading the social domain not only singly, as pioneering amateurs, but in organised bands of trained observers. They march under the banner of that Regional Survey, which has grown up as the logical instrument of naturalists determined to push on their field work into the sphere of social phenomena.

IV.

THE same mode is also being widely adopted by teachers desirous of carrying their pupils forward from Nature Study to Social Study. The nature-study movement gave the elementary schools an impulse towards seeking in the open air a vision of Nature viewed as a dramatic unity. The natural sciences could thus be drawn upon by pupils and teachers alike; the results and methods of all these many specialisms could be utilised, without risk of being drowned in their detail. And now in easy sequence, analagous modes of open-air study are bringing the specialisms of the social sciences, within reach of the elementary school. The resulting humanist vision of Man's creative drama played on the stage of Nature, will thus come to crown the curriculum and saturate it with a sense and feeling of mastery; and so will supplement and correct the veiled determinism implicit in the "lower" or materialist sciences. In a real sense, therefore, the natural sciences become, for youthful minds so trained "preliminary" to sociology, as Comte speaking both historically and ethically designated them.

THROUGH the activities of such teachers and their pupils and even more perhaps by the younger naturalists who are practising and thereby developing this method of Regional Survey, there is being prepared, we may hope, a body of investigators who in the coming generation will bring sociology more into line with the observational sciences, than it has hitherto been. The long discredit of sociology, as an abstract study alien to the natural sciences, will give place to common understanding and co-operative activity between the humanistic and the cosmic branch of science, as there develops an observational method common to both. Sociology will benefit by growth in actuality, with consequent increase of practical value and moral prestige. What may be even more significant, sociology will begin to react on the whole body of the cultivators of the "preliminary" sciences, who will come in time to see in it the crown and culmination of their own work.

V.

THE sociologist, as regional surveyor, may already claim kinship with a large, growing and influential fraternity amongst the students of physical and biological sciences. The learned societies and museums of geologists and geographers, naturalists and anthropologists, are so many winter shelters, in which respective groups of these regional surveyors tell their tales, compare their observations, and display their trophies. Therein their generalisations, similarly founded, are built up. Each of many groups, has, it is true, its own separate museums and societies. But a growing community of method and notation, of interest and purpose, is bringing all of them together. Their common purpose is an increasingly full and accurate record and vision of the world and man in their being and becoming, their mode of working, their whence and their whither. The method common to all these diverse investigators is necessarily that of survey, for it rests on observation of the concrete; and it is necessarily regional, for it starts from the here and now. Hence all these naturalist students are Regional Surveyors in fact if not in name. May we not go further and say that, unconscious of their greatness, they are divisions in the incipient army of sociologists, who labour in one mood for pure science, and in another contend for its practical application to the bettering of Places and the enhancement of their People's lives.

NONE, to be sure, would deny that the study of Nature is justified for its own sake. But it may as a matter of fact be observed that the naturalist himself, as he grows older, becomes increasingly influenced by the desire to learn the ways of nature, in order to control her in the service of Man. Galton with his eugenics and Pasteur with his vaccines are supreme representative types. From this point of view the whole body of scientists, from mathematicians and physicists to psychologists and sociologists, is to be regarded as the advance guard of an army engaged in a ceaseless campaign for the making, on this planet, of peace and a home for the human species. But the march to the terrestrial paradise is unduly retarded because the equipment of social science needed for the higher command is, so far, not forthcoming. Unfortunately it cannot be said of the *grande armée* of science that its recruits carry each of them a marshall's baton in his knapsack. The Royal Societies and the Learned Academies, who should furnish its General Staff, were founded before sociology came into being. Of these august institutions, a historical critic might observe with equal measure of truth and cynicism, that many of them remain anchored to the desiccated dogmas of seventeenth century Refusals and eighteenth century Conceits; and that few of them, if any, have advanced in social philosophy beyond the utilitarianism of the Victorian Age.

THE combined army of humanist and natural science thus lacks as yet its General Staff, or Council of Campaign Planning. The realisation of that ideal will come nearer, the more the schools and universities can be imbued with the militant mission of providing Officers' Training Corps, not for nationalist armies, but for the subjugation of the world by mankind. The planning of campaigns for this—the most stupendous and ambitious of all warfare—manifestly implies an intimate unison of the natural with the social sciences.

VI.

THE very possibility of such far-reaching projects rests upon the discovery and development of a method of research capable of holding together naturalist and sociologist (and maybe also savant and scholar) all the way from simplest observations to widest interpretations. Such a conception of method is indeed ambitious. It implies a taking up of the gage thrown down by the writer of Ecclesiastes, in his challenge to the prophets and philosophers of his day and ours. "Who," he sceptically asks, "knoweth the interpretation of things?" Who indeed? Yet is not each of us driven by the impulse of life and the pressure of personality ceaselessly to seek such interpretative knowledge? How to find out the meaning and significance of things for life, their uses and values for civilisation? Is not that the ineluctable riddle forced upon each of us by the ever-vigilant sphinx?

EACH age and generation gives its own answer in its own terms. For our age and our generation one of the answers must surely be in terms of the verified and verifiable knowledge we call science. Now this body of accumulated and tested experience, already rendered inaccessible to the public by the calamity of its historic divorce from humanist learning, has aggravated that inaccessibility by certain defects of its own. This knowledge is scattered through innumerable specialisms, continually growing and multiplying, now diverging, now intertwining, but rarely coming together to exhibit a pattern of comprehensive singleness in design. Hard to do and slow of progress is the task of organising these specialisms, that they may be brought to bear as a unity, and made to avail for the harmonising of interests, the enhancement of life, the advance of civilisation. This obstacle to a progress at once spiritual and material, cultural and technical, is, as already said, nowhere more forcibly illustrated than in the social field. Springing from many sources of more or less independent origin, an ill-defined group of unruly specialisms, overlapping wastefully because ignorantly, compose the formless body of sociological science. This lack of co-ordination amongst these specialisms is doubtless the cultural reflex of our recent and present state of cross-purposes in social endeavours and of conflicts in political measures. Comparing sociology with sciences of more advanced technique (such as physiology, and even psychology), one may draw certain conclusions. It is hardly deniable that the field

of political, economic, and social action remains under the blind rule of empiricism, for want of a sociology capable of advancing into the laboratory stage of science. But, is it not also a fair deduction from the history of science that this arrestment at its apex is deeply associated with an impulse, scarcely less exigent in the scientist than in other men, blindly to accept the social order to which he is habituated by birth and training? It would seem therefore that the deadlock is at bottom a moral, or rather a spiritual, one. It apparently follows that we should look forward to developing and co-ordinating our specialisms by deliberately working simultaneously towards a harmonising of practical interests in the body of the community. Do we not lack unity of thought because we are narrow in sympathies and partisan in action? Are we not driven to pursue social harmony by a politics of force because we are without that intellectual insight, which is indispensable to sympathetic understanding? How to break through this vicious circle, in which savants and scientists, politicians, philosophers and plain men alike tend to revolve? All doubtless agree that the impulse must spring from some vision of unity. But where is it to be sought, and how found, a vision of unity sufficiently catholic and compellant?

VII.

It is the good fortune of the Regional Surveyor that his observations and researches wait upon neither the abstract unity postulated by philosophers nor the fleeting unifications contrived by politicians. In his survey of any rural region, the field observer perceives an integration of man and nature, schooled to attainment through the experience gathered by an immemorial tradition. In every city-community of his survey, he discerns a long-continuing life evolving towards an approximate perfection of human mastery, or degenerating towards the subjection of man by the accumulated evils of the past. Here, in these two complimentary products of man and nature, in town and country, are the concrete living unities of civilisation, which the regional surveyor tries to observe, compare, understand, correlate and interpret. But how in detail does this study of actual village and city-regions tend to bring about the needed co-ordination of scientific specialisms? Well, let the observer persist with sufficient ardour in his open-air study of rustic and urban communities, making personal contact with them, village by village, town by town, city by city, applying himself ceaselessly to unravel their modes of life and working, their origins, history and tendencies, then surely will the specialisms of science and the resources of learning be drawn one after another into his net of research. For what are all these knowledges and eruditions but specialised modes of life of those very unities, the concrete living wholes of Peoples with their Industries and Places, their Cultures and Arts? In his endeavour to observe and intrepert these living unities,

the regional surveyor succeeds in the measure that all the specialised notes of science and learning compose, for him, into a voluntary of thought.

VIII.

ILLUSTRATIONS are here needed lest we seem to be offering mere counsels of perfection. It is fitting to draw examples from the chronicles of those Edinburgh Summer Meetings of a generation ago, which make a landmark in the development of the Survey Method. There, during excursions and rambles, Professor Geddes, the creator of the Regional Survey as an integrated mode of sociological observation and research, exhibited the method in action. In perambulating Fife, for example, he showed Adam Smith's economic individualism rooted in the soil of Kirkcaldy (Adam Smith's home), one of those petty trading ports, homes and foci of personality, which line the coast of this mysterious peninsula, "like a fringe of gold on a beggar's mantle." Then, generalised in the world mart of Glasgow, polished in the keen society of eighteenth century Edinburgh, regional thought passed into the creative doctrine, called by the grander name of Political Economy; and this, in its expansion, generated a human breath that reacted on civilisation like a tornado, sweeping through the western mind with an elan now divine, again diabolic. Or again, the romance of the same intense individualism in adventurous exploit is seen in the story of Alexander Selkirk, a son of Fife and the original of Robinson Crusoe.

SIMILARLY by visits to Jedburgh, Melrose and Dryburgh, Walter Scott was made manifest as child of the Border Ballad, before, in his later life, alternating between the mediæval Old Town of Edinburgh, and its pseudo-classic New Town, he became the father of literary Romanticism. Analogous growths and transformations of regional fruitage into world-shaping forces were sought and found in visits to Glasgow and the Western Highlands. At one moment, in the evolution of a "Viking forge" on the Clyde, a Watt appears as supreme mechanic among the shipwrights, and at another Kelvin. Again, the Glasgow School of Art emerges, first in the contrast and reaction of its regional mysticism and pageantry of colour against the dull squalor of an industrial inferno, and then maturing, bursts into glowing beauties of imagination which flame through the studios of Europe. In final illustration, think of David Hume, the "stickit" Edinburgh barrister, for a lack of briefs turning his inquisitorial habit of mind on to the philosophers of his day, and rousing the world to new thought by his pillory of the witness box.

IX.

HERE then are examples of interaction between Folk and Work and Place (the Triad of the Regional Survey) that exhibits philosophies, sciences, literatures, arts and inventions, as demanding, for their understanding and appreciation, a certain definite knowledge of lowly origins

linked to high facts of creative deed. The student who practices this method can hardly fail to arrive at the conception of man and nature as engaged in an unending evolutionary drama in which each is alternatively to the other as hammer to anvil. Using the figure of a less mechanical art, the regional surveyor may claim that he more and more comes to a vision of man and nature, of folk and place, as bound in a rhythm of beats, running from the lower notes of environment and tradition to the higher ones of art, literature and polity. Begin the study of your region with its geography and geology, go on with its natural and civil history, rise to its social psychology and its sociology; make your survey in this order and you play the melody of nature, mounting, swelling, to a climax, in man. Again, start afresh in the reverse order. Begin now with cities and their temporal governments and spiritual powers, their arts and literatures, descend through economic to physical facts; make your survey in this sequence, and you may strike the chords of those richer harmonies which the soul of man plays upon the grand organ of nature.

METAPHOR apart, advocates of the regional and civic survey contend that the correlation and unity of multifarious and growing "subjects" in school and college curriculum may thus be achieved by their reference to a complex but single objective, which in one aspect is nature and another man. The long and bitter controversy over the respective cultural claims of the natural sciences on one side, and "the humanities" (i.e., literature and history, and with these we may associate philosophy) on the other, is effectively side-tracked by making fullest use of both approaches. It will be observed that this quest of unity is based on no mere artifice of logic, or mechanical putting together of diverse things. It reaches out towards a unison of the natural and the human that is grounded in the realities of life, instinct with common sense and quickened by purpose.

X.

YET most who cultivate this method have too much of the realist in their composition to be under any illusion as to the possibility of fully penetrating the inner life of any community by the intellectual avenue alone. What other avenues are palpably open? One, and doubtless the main one, perhaps the only really effective one, is suggested at once by modern biology and ancient theology. In the realms of animate nature, plant and animal develop to the norm of their species by repeating, each individual in its own life, the typical interaction of organism and environment that, in the past, has gone to the making of the species, and continues to sustain its being. So it is for Man. The ethics of evolutionary science repeats in its own way the sacred maxim. To know the doctrine one must lead the life. There are moods of mind and modes of body with their respective environments and traditions so interdependent that each is needed to fertilise and enrich

the other. That which nature and social evolution have joined together let neither logic nor convention tear asunder. Such inseparable pairs are town and country ; school and workshop ; cloister and forum ; or, less concretely, thought and action ; sympathy and synergy ; or again, the life of industry and the industry of life. Here are at once aspects of personality and phases of community. True education seeks and finds a method of study which is also a way of life. Thus the study of method, taken in its largest extent, must envisage the widest and deepest possibilities of interaction between man and his milieu.

PUTTING, in another way, this need of fullest interaction of individuals and groups with environment and tradition, one may say that Regional Survey, even for its efficiency as science, implies an opulent measure of Regional Service. Unless moods of survey alternate with modes of service, the fulfilment of each is arrested. Now, the world to-day is quickening with such endeavours (doubtless based for the most part on hasty and unsystematic survey) ; and they are most manifest where the regional spirit is most alive. Everywhere undergoing rebirth, that spirit increasingly grows conscious of its manifold self ; and so becomes informed by clearer knowledge of aims and more definite purpose in action. That purpose, in a word is the development of the region, its folk, work and place together, towards fullest fruition of rural and civic life. But the pattern and the texture of this life are to no small extent determined by a network of threads that bind each region, not only to its neighbours, and its neighbours' neighbours in the present : but, it may be, to remote parts of the world in the past. Thus, parish church, theatre, flag of empire, art-gallery, are each respectively a link with ancient Jerusalem, classic Athens, Imperial Rome, renaissance Florence, and all that those stand for in the fluctuating ascent of man. The development and enriching of regional and civic life is therefore an affair of complexity running all the way from the parish pump to the confines of history and back again. The parts of geographer, economist and anthropologist in this problem are assuredly fundamental and indispensable. But they are (it cannot be too often repeated) merely first steps to comprehensive grasp of the conditions of attainment. We need also succour from the whole circle of the sciences and their applications, the entire gamut of the humanities and their corresponding arts. But in actual life, men touched by vision do not wait upon the conditions of a rounded perfection. Rather do they masterfully create such a situation by moving forward through trial and error, through failure and success, in facing the constraints of custom and the resistance of impeding interests. From this standpoint of initiative and endeavour, the Regional Movement is seen as a vast experiment of relief and renewal on which are embarked the peoples of Europe, and indeed of the world. They are seeking, one may say, in broad purview, relief from the inhibitions and

repressions of the Industrial Era, and its over-centralised Governments, which have everywhere sown their crops of dragons' teeth. Simultaneously is being sought a renewal of spiritual life in communities depressed by long subservience to the utilitarian habit of mind. And from the concurrent reawakening of dormant personalities, a new florescence of genius may be anticipated in natural sequence and vital reward.

XI.

HERE then is an immense and varied laboratory of change and transition crowded with busy experimentalists not only of individuals and groups, but communities and populations. At one spot, the lesson and resultant are of what to do : at another of what not to do. Thus at one pole of the European laboratory is ranged the historic achievement of Switzerland in adjusting the rival claims of regional freedom and national co-ordination, and so reaching a harmonious living-together in neighbourliness, of peoples differing in race, language and religion. At the opposite pole lie the war-worn fragments of Balkan towns and villages over which have passed and repassed the juggernauts of centralising capitals, urged by the fever of imperial dominion. Polarised in these sharp contrasts are visible processes at work throughout Europe and beyond. From Ireland to Armenia, from Finland to Egypt, may be observed the flow of tendencies that are helvetic in kind, and of countering tendencies that make for the balkanic. Here they clash into open strife, actual revolution, or even civil war, there they merely smoulder into the heat of local friction.

To supplement localised surveys of town and country, and ensure their widening orientation, there is needed study and comparison of all these general movements revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, progressive and reactionary, vitalist and traditionalist, being played on the chessboard of Europe and of the world. In no other way can the sociologist gather evidence for that realist presentation of our western civilisation which science, literature and philosophy alike demand. And the regional student at least will expect to find, in the resultant, a picture of renewing rustic and civic life struggling (more often perhaps instinctively and vaguely than with deliberate judgment and informed intention) everywhere towards wide-ranging autonomous federations against centralising tendencies, and all that these stand for in the way of repressions and parasitisms, overt and covert. Beyond this realism of the present, the sociologist gains the prospect of a brighter future in the measure of his knowing what and how things have been in the past, and his verifiable vision of what and how they may become. In other words his test of verifiability in vision has to be searched and measured in a delicate balance of history, science and philosophy. The idea of oneness and continuity in Past, Present and Future bequeathed to sociology by eighteenth-century philosophy of history, as an article of fatalistic faith in a too

absolute and uncritical "Progress," is seen in the light of further analysis to be the formula of an Art, which, because it embraces all other human arts, offers for good and ill, the widest range of choice in the selection and compounding materials for the making of the future. How then to attain to a vision of the coming times, charged with hope yet workable because compact of the real and ideal, woven into a feasible design? That is the supreme problem and the urgent task that confront the sociologist.

XII.

Now to bring to a sharp point the implication of all this as regards Method. It means that the student-observer, as he pushes on from the field of nature to that of man and nature combined, must increasingly become the student-interpreter. And the advance moreover must be, as it were, cumulative. The student must gather and pile in his knapsack a compound interest of impulse, knowledge and insight in his advance from observation through comparison and classification up to generalisation, and then onwards to interpretation. Formidable indeed is the difficulty of selecting what is significant to the purpose in view from the vast repertory of science, philosophy, and learning available to supplement outdoor investigation by indoor study and reflection. Under the circumstances, the best advice, per chance is *solvitur ambulando*. Yet it has to be emphasised that the task is not only of selecting significant data, concepts, formulæ, notations, but even more that of translating their "values" from one science and erudition to another. It is here, therefore, that we are most sharply faced with the need of developing—one might almost say of inventing—an Interpretative Method. Once instituted, such a method would have more than a merely scientific use. It should yield the requisite basis of that comprehensive reassessment of "values" for which the moral anarchy of our times cries aloud. The vaunted "transvaluation of values" so far as it may be realisable, will proceed maybe from no mythical "superman," but from the plain observer of nature turned commonsense interpreter of evolutionary tendencies in man. And the hope arises, that from his activities, in concert with practising idealists of other orders, might issue, an interpretative service that shall not only link and unify the traditional knowledge of man with the scientific knowledges of nature, but also indicate its practical application towards guiding the future evolution of our species. The latter claim will doubtless seem, to some, the mere incursion of an arrogant methodology into the realm of the fantastic. And it must be confessed that as yet this goal is remote. For indeed in the matter of life-guidance, individual and social, it has to be allowed that the current life-theory of the biologist is not accepted by the deeper psychologist as sufficient for his end of the scale. And, beyond the psychologist, there is the

poet, the savant, the historian, the philosopher, whose particular notions and experiences of life have to be reckoned with. And even if these were incorporated into a life-theory acceptable by all students and thinkers of this order, other requirements would still remain to be met. For the concept of life is central also to a tradition of knowledge and thought that long antedates modern science and modern philosophy. As custodian of this vitalist tradition, the theologian is also concerned with the requirements of a life-theory. The ups and downs of theology throughout the ages have doubtless been dependent on the adequacy of its life-doctrine to meet contemporary tests of validity, as these have changed from time to time.

XIII.

ABOUT the present theological phase of vitalist speculation, there would seem to be three views current. Some see it as the *pons asinorum* of the vitalist, others as their slough of despond, while others again treat it as a mirage of the vitalist desert. This confusion of speculative views is doubtless associated with the divergence between sociologist and theologian as these stand to-day. Their approach to unity is hindered more by traditional bias than by the facts and processes they handle. The life-theory of the sociologist, so far as he has a definitely formulated one, is derived from biology. But this provenance carries a certain handicap. It means an excessive concentration on the origins of the lower manifestations of life. And moreover, the biologist, having been unconsciously biased towards a mechanistic interpretation of life by the circumstances of his time and tradition, has been not only inhibited from pushing on to observe and interpret the higher expressions of life, but more or less blinded to their reality as phenomena that come within the range of his science.

STARTING from the opposite pole to that of modern biology, the theologian works with a life-theory whose qualities are, in a sense, defects of the rival one, and *vice versa*. Yet as men and citizens, both theologian and biologist are concerned to direct the course of human life towards its highest expressions. But practical questions of ends and means of control manifestly stand in the closest relation to the problem of a valid life-theory. Hence, preliminary to the long over-due co-operation of religion and applied science in practical issues, must be brought about a certain concurrence of biologist and theologian in respect of their life-doctrines. Here the philosopher may intervene as reconciler, but in the last resort the harmony of religion and science must be reached through each testing, and thereby correcting, its own defects by reference to the qualities of the other. It is here therefore that psychology and sociology should prove true mediators, by sympathetic association with biology and philosophy.

SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH IN BRAIN STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: by A. C. Sewell.

In his preliminary remarks to *THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES*, Darwin told the world that: "After five years' work [in observing and collecting data] I allowed myself to speculate." Now, though there can be but one Darwin, his method is open to all thoughtful people, and the following study pretends to be no more or less than the work of a student alive to this method. Obviously it is not the work of a specialist. Obviously, too, specialist literature has been consulted, where opportunity allowed, and where the subject seemed to be enlightened thereby. But it is felt that no apology is needed for an effort, which in the nature of the case must suffer from limitation, but which yet may carry a vital spark.

It is proposed to treat the subject under discussion as follows:

- I. The nature of the observations on which the proposed research is built up.
- II. Interpretation of instances adduced.
- III. Suggestions as to possible lines of research.
- IV. Selection, training and enrolment of a section of the public to co-operate in this research.
- V. The endowment of research and under whose trusteeship?

I.

It is noteworthy that in the modern work done on "intelligence," no distinction is generally made between what may be called *effective intelligence*, and *mere intelligence* as measured by reaction to tests. One is tempted to ask whether the elaborate devices employed in measuring tests do really measure intelligence. They measure certain reactions, but the nature and value of the reactions are dependent on factors which are not measured.

To illustrate:—

A. in adult life has the most vivid, far-reaching interests, follows the movements of the day with an exceptional keenness, but has a record of school-life too insignificant to mention—could neither spell, read, write or sum till long after thirteen years of age, and never during the whole of life attained any readiness or proficiency in any of these arts.

B. has no interests beyond the daily round—does not even take a newspaper. But *B.* was a brilliant child, read at five years old, and was successful in all examinations. May we not well pause to inquire

which of these two was the least "intelligent." Can it be *A.*, who came out "defective" in nearly all the tests at 30 years of age?

Now it is particularly desired that these two types may be borne in mind, as they will be used for illustration in the subsequent inquiry. It is not enough to dismiss them with the comment that one was backward and the other suffered some form of arrest. For my purpose, the point is what caused these differences in their mentality, their supposed backwardness and apparent arrest? Their heredity was the same. Their material environment in childhood was similar. What was different was the pre-natal and post-natal conditions in each case, and it is the analysis of those conditions which seems to me important.

A. and *B.* were born before the days when alcohol had come to be regarded as harmful to parenthood. They came of a family where its moderate use was taken as a matter of course. There was no known record of alcoholism in the family, but even granting its influence in the case of *A.* (and there is much reason for so doing) that admission does not cover all the ground, since *B.* was not affected.

TURN now to the leading differences in the physical conditions surrounding the early development of *A.* and *B.*

A. was born at the end of the winter, *B.* at mid-summer. This gives a fundamental point, since the mother was a person who had no appreciation of the importance of fresh air and sunlight. A slight affection of the throat together with irregular sleeping habits, led to shut windows and tightly closed blinds. The child born in March would therefore have spent most of its pre-natal period under unfavourable conditions, and the first two or three months of its life in a similarly hampered state. *B.* born in July would have had at least three months of summer conditions for its pre-natal life and all the best summer months for the early period of brain development. And, we must remember, not only is the light and air of note for the child's well-being, but the plentiful vitamins in the diet to be obtained as a matter of course in the summer months. It is sufficiently notable to be mentioned here, by way of a digression, and yet suggestive in this connection, that three of the children of this family—all born in winter—stammered. The fourth child, and this is our summer-born child *B.*, could not speak plainly till a very late age, the inference seeming to be that there is something to be learnt about the period when the speech centres develop and the environmental conditions which affect them. The suggestive nature of the records before us are still further enhanced by noting the curious circumstances through which *B.* finally emerged into healthy childhood. For she was said to be at death's door for the first year of her life through gastric trouble, being pulled through at last in ways the details of which are not recorded.

This may appear to contradict the suggestion made above as to the good effect of summer conditions, but there is no intrinsic contradiction if the matter is looked into closely, and I leave it as merely adding a suggestive factor. The *pre-natal* conditions were the best for our summer-born child, who, in spite of later set-backs, had the best brain of the family, was the only one not slow at school, and who yet, as described in the beginning of these notes, was the one having the most limited interests in adult life. As to the early life of the other babies in this family, it is recorded that they were always sick. There was one exception which had a wet nurse, the inference seeming to be that the dietetic needs of these children were woefully misunderstood. This part of our subject cannot be left without reference to the curious idiosyncrasies and irregular habits of the mother in the matter of diet. These idiosyncrasies were shared by her sister, some of whose children also suffered certain disqualifications for the highest sort of life. One is bound to ask whether these idiosyncrasies combined with other habits of the mother have any significance?

MAY we not ask at this point also whether the cases of alcoholism which subsequently appeared in these families were due—not to hereditary alcoholism, but to idiosyncrasies in the metabolism of the mother, which left in her children those regions of the brain concerned with the higher faculties of the will undeveloped or unsustained?

II.

LET it be taken that the hypothetical interpretation of the main facts are as follows:—

1. Idiosyncrasies in the metabolism of the mother may lead to an unbalanced or faulty supply of nourishment to the embryo.
2. If the defect is in the vitamins it will lead to absence of growth, if in the mineral salts to misgrowth.
3. The minerals are essential for the laying down of the nervous system, and the nervous system controls the mechanism of the brain.

AND here follows a most difficult assumption to state. A far more intricate and subtle mechanism must be required for a *mind* capable of big and far-reaching encounters with the universe, than for one for which, say, home-interests will suffice. For the purpose of this inquiry the question of the influence of education in developing mental quality is left on one side altogether. Our hypothesis requires that the mind of limited type, and that of far-reaching type, should be regarded as hereditary factors in personality, but that the *functioning* of the mind should be regarded as solely dependent on the physical perfection of the apparatus through which it works, i.e., the brain. This apparatus is, it may be claimed, chiefly or even solely conditioned by the minerals supplied to the blood stream *during the period of*

*development.** The inward urge may lead to devices of brain use somewhat analogous to the application of two indifferent batteries to one wireless set. Two may be made to work where one good one ought to suffice. Extra connections between brain centres may be established, long circuits or short circuits may be set up, the apparatus may work sufficiently to indicate that something is going on, but your wireless set will *never* be satisfactory unless it is perfect in all its parts; no more will your brain. These observations gather weight from the fact that cell structure is known to show definite peculiarities in the brain of the defective all through life. And the suggestion that the metabolism of the mother in its power of transmitting available minerals is deeply concerned in this problem, gathers strength from recent researches in regard to dairy cattle and milk supply.† Space forbids a longer reference to this very important department of research.

WE will suppose it is established that available mineral supply (*and what a world of significance is in that word "available"*) and at the precise moment of laying down the brain cells are vital parts of our problem, what else do our illustrations suggest? Surely nothing but the supreme relation of light and air to development.

HERE ends the references to our instances *A.* and *B.* It is not to be supposed that all points have been covered arising out of the study of them, but sufficient has been isolated to justify concentration for the purposes of research, and to this third part of my subject I now turn.

III.

LET it be emphasised at the outset that nothing is claimed for the above observations, but that they suggest a line of research. The interpretation put upon them gives not a theory but a working hypothesis, and suggests a line of investigation as to the causation of the higher human qualities, of which, as Professor Hobhouse points out, very little is known.

LET us then, take two points only arising out of the foregoing study: (1) the influence of air and sunlight on the later stages of pregnancy and early infancy, and (2) the importance of available mineral material in the diet at these periods. These two problems, as is well known, are intimately connected.

BUT is it the parent and child which need to be irradiated or the food that they take? And here we have to pause while an outlying problem intrudes itself. If development is so intimately associated with light and air, why not the health of the germ which gives rise to the structure by which nutrition is carried? And if so, how vital a matter for both parents is the best environment before, and at, the time of conception.

*Chapter IX., THE PRINCIPLES OF ANTE-NATAL AND POST-NATAL CHILD PHYSIOLOGY, &c., by W. M. Feldman, M.B., and others.

†See BRITISH ASSOCIATION REPORT, 1925.

AGAIN, if vegetables and fruit are the chief source of minerals in the diet, is the availability of these minerals due to the sunlight, or to the quality and character of the manures supplied? † It is noticeable in this connection that commercial gardeners employ artificial manures, not only because other is difficult to get, but because natural manures grow a produce too tender and delicate for transport. This is in itself an extremely suggestive fact. What is known as yet concerning the relative dietetic values of mineral material in produce grown on "natural" or "artificial" stimulant? Or again, what is known as to the relation of metabolic idiosyncrasies in the mother to the power of dealing with these vital factors in the diet, *which may be present, but not available to this or that particular individual?*

If it be once realised that the mineral matter in the diet is vital to the development of the nervous system, and that on the nervous system everything else depends, no research in this direction will appear too arduous or too lengthy, or to be carried out at too great an expenditure of personal service on the part of an enlightened section of the public.

IV.

WHEN Galton first launched his appeal for Eugenics before the Sociological Society, it will be remembered that one of the suggestions made was the formation of local societies in which "the best" of a neighbourhood should select themselves and meet to discuss the matter. Obvious difficulties incidental to the carrying out of such a proposition have left the suggestion where it was. Nevertheless, the central idea, i.e., that some sort of society, bound together by a common knowledge and a common aim, is essential for investigation still holds the field. Our first problem, then, is to consider how such a society shall be formed.

It is necessary to make quite clear what should emerge from the foregoing, namely, that the attitude taken up here is one which cuts clear across the acute controversies of former years. The improvement of racial standards by means of selection is not under consideration here: *the study of the mechanism through which qualities function*—that is the aim of the proposed research. As Professor Hobhouse has pointed out, "improvement depends more on the survival of the best, than on the elimination of the worst," and researches on the lines now to be proposed are directed to enlighten our understanding as to what constitutes "the best" and to the improvement of those conditions of survival which may be under human control.

It would seem, then, the first thing to be done is to appeal to the most enlightened section of the public for co-operation. Certain records are needed which may be submitted to statistical investigation, and

†For suggestive work bearing on this matter see JOURNAL OF ECOLOGY (1927) and ANNALS OF BOTANY (1929).

it is required that these records be supplied by persons keenly alive to the social service implied and sufficiently alive to scientific method to appreciate the importance of exact observation and exact statement. Such people would be willing to submit to some short course of training if conscious of being insufficiently qualified, and would conform to plans laid down for them. Closely related to the problems touched on above and to be studied with the co-operation of a trained public is what is known as the "relative infertility of the best stocks." I submit we neither know which are "the best" nor whether those referred to are infertile. This matter would inevitably come under observation within a research organisation such as it is proposed to build up.

ROUGHLY stated, observations directed towards the maintenance of the neuro-somatic, and reproductive balance, would dictate the line of advance, and while it is impossible for the lay student to sketch this line in detail, the Medical Research Council with its committees for child-life investigation is already in existence and might be invited to do it.

THIS Research Council should have at its command gardens for the experimental growth of crops ; places of quiet and sunlight for persons wishing to submit themselves for investigation ; and it should be invested with such dignity and authority as to demand the remission from duties—with its appointments kept open—for persons whose experience under its direction might enlighten the problems to be investigated.

IN conclusion, lest this section of my paper should appear too vague to command the attention hoped for it, one or two points might be selected as likely to come within the requirements of the Research Council :—

1. That the affairs of married life should be submitted by all members of the proposed society to the requirements of research.
2. That any idiosyncrasies or peculiarities in parents or children should be notified.
3. That a system should be devised—by degrees—perhaps taking several generations to develop—for keeping records in a uniform manner.
4. That members should assist in finding and recording information as to heredity in the most useful way.
5. That members should realise the importance of, and be willing that they themselves and their children should be the subject of *post mortem* examination.
6. That a religion of service in this matter should gradually be built up, using the old method of the Church, whereby the responsibility for the child is undertaken by the parent, until reaching years of discretion, he shall be so instructed that he takes it upon himself.

So may we not come to a Religion of the Race, which, while doing no violence to human personality, will guide it to its highest ends ?

V.

It now remains to indicate a method by which an enlightened public might be assisted to meet the problems which have been brought forward.

It is proposed to create a Trust for the endowment of Research. To this fund a substantial sum has been earmarked as a nucleus, and interested persons are invited to contribute. Interested persons are also invited to suggest the best method of control and choice of Trustees. One or two considerations seem pertinent to the making of this choice :—

1. The movement is to be a *social* effort, not primarily a department of medicine.
2. Though any dogmatism as to "the best" in human stock is to be deprecated, the *type* which emerges—or ought to emerge—as great statesman, or public servant—is sorely needed, and is at the same time likely to be alive to the aims of the Trust.
3. It would therefore be appropriate that the London School of Economics should be represented upon the Trust.

It is proposed then, that the holder, for the time being, of the Martin White professorship in Sociology should be invited to act as one Trustee. And this with a double motive : First, as a tribute to the late Professor Hobhouse—the first occupant of that chair, who has invested it with an unforgettable dignity and importance—and second, for the unrivalled opportunity it affords for bringing the aims of the Trust to the notice of young people.

For other Trustees, it is hoped that the Chairman, for the time being, of the Medical Research Council might consent to be one, and that the holder of the Chair of Dietetics, for the time being, might consent to be a third. There is, however, little doubt that, if a public were ready, the services of Specialists and Experts would be readily given to forward the aims of the Trust.

NEW WAYS AND OLD TO TALK ABOUT MEN :

by Arthur F. Bentley.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

WE are glad to print Dr. Bentley's lucid and able essay dealing with some of the fundamental categories of mathematics on the one hand, and of philosophy on the other, in their relation to sociological concepts. But with all its freshness and concrete illustration, Dr. Bentley's line of analysis nevertheless follows in the main the traditional approach by dialectics. Yet the sociologist, if he would win through to ultimate goals, must start with the elemental and essential concepts of his own science and work (as it were) downwards towards the categories of the physical and mathematical sciences, and upwards towards those of philosophy. Taking sociology as the general science of Man's Life in all its aspects, processes and forms, we may assume as essential elements those of (a) Individual and Group ; (b) Past, Present, and Future Possibilities ; (c) Structure and Function. Now note that the relation of Individual and Group applies not only to man in society, all his products and activities, but also to plants and animals, and equally crystal rock, atom and electron, and to these moreover throughout our own solar world and to the stellar systems. Compelled therefore towards generalising to utmost extent this human relation of individual to group, we arrive at a phenomenal presentment which is no less than that of Being in Space. So are we driven to invent these large categories of philosophy and mathematics were they not already in existence as historic data. Similarly proceeding from the concept of Past, Present, Future (possibilities) of man and his societies we reach first the generalisation of Life in Time and, in still more general terms, the philosophic categories of Being as Becoming. And finally from the concepts of Structure and Function we are driven by successive steps first to the generalisation of Static and Dynamic, and from that to the concept of Energies in Equilibrium or in Movement. These instances of an ineluctable logic of sociology are cited as but illustrations of a coming reorientation in modes of general thought when sociological pressure begins to tell in the other sciences and in philosophy.

I.

FROM the reader of this essay I beg a simple and kindly, nay even an unsophisticated consideration. I shall discuss ways of talking about men : and from time immemorial ways of talking about men have been the broideries of human trouble.

IT is not that I shall concern myself with racial hates, religious scorns, industrial loathings, or other hostile ways in which men in masses regard one another : it is rather with ways of speech about individuals, and very technical ways at that, ways of speech about individuality or personality as such. The need of a kindly approach is nevertheless just as great, for this field involves immortality and the mortal, minds and bodies, ideas and realities, powers and capacities, intelligences, geniuses and originalities—in short an entanglement of speculations, beliefs and faiths concerning which prejudices may be as deep and arguments as bitter, though issues rarely so bloody, as in other and more immediately practical fields of human struggle.

KINDLINESS ? yes : all serious effort to disentangle involved problems, no matter how faulty, deserves that. But what of a request for a simple, an unsophisticated, a naïve, consideration ? I should like to write a preface on the importance of being naïve when one starts to study the life of men in society—the importance of being so extremely naïve that all the professionally wise men of the world will laugh one to scorn : how it is because of the very plague of the age-old wise, with their brains a-spin, that one must become as a simple child if one wishes to learn of society : how the spider-webs of the wise must be torn, if the little one is ever to spread his wings. But instead of arguing in a preface, I shall exemplify in the essay. I shall be naïve. You may judge of the import.

THIS naïveté will be signalised by its attitude towards intellectual sophistication, for it will regard all sophistication and all intellectualism as merely a passing aspect or phrase of the social life of men at such and such a time and such and such a place. The wisdom of absolutes, realities, verities, facts, will be regarded as present before us in society, but not as potentially the master of knowledge or of life. Yes, even "facts" must lose their sophisticated claim to dominance. My naïveté will regard everything as fact, even a wrong theory : and will admit no claim to independent actuality for any fact whatever as opposed to any non-fact whatever. But how indeed can a sociologist do other, when the world and life and mind are all his jumbled field ? This openness to all presentation, all phenomena, all description, I shall choose to regard, for the purposes of this paper, as scientific : and I shall uphold it for our subject-matter, not with the thought we of our science-proud generation are finally telling the world the truth about itself : but instead with the frank admission that while our new science now seems the most useful frame for our knowledge, nevertheless that very science may well be looked down upon by future generations with much the same condescension that the wise of to-day show for the animisms of the savage.

II.

THE *soul*, the *mind*, the *body*, *life*, *society* : these in their ramifications of terminology are all ways of talking about men. As such we shall examine them.

THE soul is a way of speech about men, and indeed not merely one way but many ways. Some souls present themselves with beginnings, but no endings : others with no more a beginning than an ending. Some are rigid and awful : others merge gently with Deity in mystic union. Some anticipate physical torments or blisses : others foresee spiritual joys or sufferings. We never can tell. Souls are ways of speech. We may believe, but belief is a way of speech. Are souls

facts or not facts? Fact is a way of speech: and no well assured way at that, since the dogmatism of fact is often the most dangerous dogmatism of all. Indeed, to assert either that soul is fact or that it is not fact, is to attempt to specify the more certain by the less certain. Nothing is less certain than "fact" in that sense in which it claims to dominate knowledge: the sense of "fact as such." The physicist can differentiate fact from non-fact tentatively for certain specified purposes, but no longer may he claim to be the interpreter par excellence of fact: too bitterly has he been taught his lesson over and over again in the last generation. The practical man or the theologian may make fact-assertions about soul, but both the theologian and the practical man, along with the souls and the ideas about souls in their thousand-fold variations, are all parts of the field of sociology: all alike facts-fragmentary, facts-claimant, but none facts-dominant.

CONSCIOUSNESS, mind, is a second way of speech about men. It is that way of speech, I take it, in which soul is inspected in its earthly surroundings in the durations of a lifetime. It is that way which is used when investigators wish to inspect those same human problems, otherwise talked of as soul, apart from the particular purposes and stresses commonly brought acutely to attention when the term soul itself is used. Mind is taken as the man himself, as character, as individuality, as personality. With mind goes a family of terms of psychic or mental character, for which it stands as symbol, or synthesis or locus. Sometimes mind is taken broadly to cover all of personality: sometimes more narrowly for only a portion of it, as, when, for example, to consciousness is annexed the sub-conscious. It is characteristic of Mind that it and its terms are used as though directly offset against Matter, as phenomenon of correlate standing, provisionally or permanently, in varying degrees. With soul this was not so much the case, for to soul and its problems, matter was at most transitory, and always insignificant except perhaps as experience or as trial for soul in its earthly career.

THE body that is correlated with mind is itself merely another way of speech about men—the third way: and under the naïve approach of this paper it has no independent claims to fact value of higher degree than have the preceding ways of speech, those of soul and of mind.

LIFE is a fourth way of speech about men. Life, as distinguished from body, at times presents itself as a special vitalistic way of speech with values of its own intermediate between the mind way and the body way. At other times body and life tend to fuse into one type of speech: and in this respect some real progress towards harmonisation and reorganisation has been given us by the physical and biological sciences. The way of speech in terms of life stretches out, it is true, to include animal and vegetable phenomena beyond the phenomena

of human beings, and the way of speech in terms of body stretches still further, passing into the regions of the inanimate : but in this lies no radical distinction from the other ways of speech, for we shall find that there is also some stretching in our understanding of individual mind as it runs across the field of the social. All the ways of speech stretch, and stretch confusedly, not coherently : that is indeed the great difficulty with them all for the would-be scientific investigator. " Life " as fixed " fact " has no separate and firm definition upon which all workers can rely, any more than has mind or soul : and it is coming more and more to be realised that the same is true of body, that it is indeed only by delimitation in an arbitrary Euclidean space that the limits of a single body, a single organism, may be specified. Sunlight and interstellar rays are in the body processes, and, if they are there in full operational value, then the Euclidean boundaries of the single body are assuredly arbitrary, mere terms of convenience for certain practical purposes and nothing more.

UP to two generations ago these four ways of speech, the ways of soul, of mind, of life, and of body, all of them operating in a background of posited realities, truths or actualities, provided the full working equipment of the philosopher, psychologist, economist and political scientist. It was out of this equipment that was produced all that structure of wisdom which now at least temporarily must be disregarded and cast to one side, if one wishes to make progress in understanding. The defect in it all was that one additional great range of fact had not yet been clearly identified, that one additional great way of speech about men, the social way, had not yet appeared. It is from the observations of Sir Henry Maine and LePlay, and from the generalisations of Comte that this later development can best be dated.

SOCIETY is a way of speech about men. I emphasise. Discussion of men in social terms is to-day just as direct, just as immediate, just as inevitable, just as fully implied in whatever investigation we make, as in discussion in terms of life or mind or body. Was it not with social eyes that LePlay looked out upon the world ? Is this not the value of " regional " in regional studies ? Does not the very existence of such a title as " The Sociological Review " imply it ? Does not the formula Place-Work-Folk use it directly in preference to the older speech forms ? When we use the term " institution " what have we but such a direct description, no matter how desperate our struggles may be to formulate in terms of one or more of the older systems of speech exactly what it is which we are attempting to describe ? " Institution " cannot be expressed adequately in terms of soul, nor of body, nor of individual life, nor of mind or personality. It needs its own language. And in this field it is that the language of mind reaches out beyond the ranges of individual minds in some mysterious way, much as the

ranges of body and life language run beyond the individual man in their respective fields.

THE great problem before sociology is the reconciliation of these various speech forms as technical tools of investigation: and with them of course the reconciliation of any others that may appear. This is sociology's primary scientific concern. The scientific approach I have chosen to regard as being that of openness to all phenomenal presentation. It is the willingness to let every fact-claimant have its chance, the stern determination to let no fact, however firmly it may pretend to be established, dominate rigidly and finally the study of other facts. The great scientific technique is, of course, mathematics, and mathematics is nothing but language with the insistent requirement of maximum definiteness of meaning in all terms used and in the manner of their use. Every great stage in the progress of science is marked by new definiteness of terms, and some of the greatest stages have been signalled by what at first sight appeared to be merely a slight variation of old values for fundamental words. Even where the terms used are not given mathematical formulation this requirement of definiteness is vital: indeed, sometimes more vital outside of such formulation than within it. If this be the case, then surely sociology will continue to have difficulties with its claim to scientific standing until it can make sound progress towards the reconciliation, the functional co-ordination, of its five conflicting and confused speech forms.

III.

OF these five ways of talking about men, those of soul, of mind, of life, of body and of society, I shall examine three: namely life, mind and society. I shall omit consideration of soul, partly because certain of its claims to absoluteness run beyond scientific technique, and partly because all that part of its field which may be scientifically treated falls within the language of mind. I shall omit body, considered as matter, inert, quiescent, because the established sciences are ever more centering on active processes, operations, events, to such extent that their discoveries are tending to become fully expressible in operational terms without need of any rigid substratum of inertness to bear them. Light and electricity parted early from the old field of matter, and electrons and the newer gravitational studies have completed the divorce. I have no single word of opposition to offer to discussions in terms of either soul or matter, except that they are no longer pertinent to the particular purposes of the present examination.

THE examination is into ways of speech: but it is not terminological in the old sense of an attempt to establish whether or not a particular expression is adequate for a particular fact taken as apart from the

expression. It assumes that facts as facts are not definitely known until they are definitely expressed: it assumes that the expressive values of a particular term are never definite except as we take them in the full system of expression to which the term belongs: it therefore proceeds to inquire into the nature of the conflict that exists between the three great ways of speaking that have been named, in the belief that if these expressive systems can be rid of internal confusions and can be harmonised, a richer comprehension of their fact values will immediately follow.

LET us select for first consideration the relations of the two ways of speech that run in terms of mind and of living body. The attitude of the man in the street is something as follows: "I am a person, and I have a body. My body I regard as materially spread out in space. But I, the person, am not material in that sense and I am not spread out in space so that I can be measured by the aid of a rule. Just what I am I do not pretend to understand any too clearly: but I am sure that I am mind, I am a person, I am I, and not mere matter, despite the fact that my personality stays close by my body while I live, and that I cannot get rid of my body during life. Though I reside in my body I myself am other than that body." Here now in the face of this situation enters the older wisdom. On this basis, taken as presented fact, the older metaphysical, philosophical and epistemological theories have been constructed to explain the relations of mind and body and outer world: and on the same basis appear the newer psychological, physiological and neuro-psychological theories. Under the present approach we discard all of these theories for the simple reason that none of them make any substantial progress towards reconciling the two systems of language, the systems of mind and of body. Whether as monisms, dualisms or parallelisms: whether as correlating particular ideas with particular brain cells, idea systems with neurological systems, or personalities with single organisms: their effort at harmonisation is not by direct treatment of the values of the terms in the two systems, but by the construction of speculative theories of a connective nature: speculative by this very test that harmonisation, co-ordination, functioning of terms is not secured.

TAKE next the mental and social ways of speech, and the constructions offered to connect them. Philosophers of the absolute and their apprentices have offered us Social Wills and Social Consciousnesses in which the mental as individual wholly disappears. Other experimenters have suggested to us Social Minds set over against individual minds as different and apart from them. Neither form of construction has satisfied investigators. The former distills most of the current values out of the mental, and leaves the bodily form of speech unassimilated. The latter merely adds to the difficulties that formerly existed.

FINALLY, consider the social and bodily ways of speech when brought into combination. Here truly the confusion is at its worst, and the need of better technique of expression becomes clamorous. Describe an institution, say Parliament, in purely bodily language and you have nothing. Describe it as a sum of individuals, or in some peculiar way as a sum of aspects of individuals, and you may perhaps have a speculative interpretation, but you leave out its social immediacy. You get nothing of its trends in durations, nothing of its complex interactions with other institutions.

IN contrast with all such constructions and interpretative systems, let me illustrate again from LePlay. When he roamed the world studying men in society, did he bother with metaphysics? Not at all. True, he had a set scheme of world and man provided by his religion, but he did not let it control and formulate his observations. He saw the people regionally at work. He sensed their experiences in large durations of time, not as instantaneous acts of dogmatic will. He used his scientifically trained eye and mind for their observation, and he made his reports. He took the same simple naïve direct attitude towards the combined facts of mind and body and society that I am advocating here. His followers have made that attitude continuously more systematic and profitable.* Mr. Branford has helped to develop the analysis of societies in terms of Place, Work and Folk; and twenty-five years ago in an American sociological publication, when contrasting "objective, determinist or geographical" studies with "subjective, psychological or libertarian" he wrote: "These two approaches are just opposite sides of a hill that has to be traversed on the way to sociology." What did Professor Geddes do when he wrote *THE CHARTING OF LIFE*? Quite frankly to the "everyday material acts of life" he added its "everyday mental facts." Now I shall not come out at the place Professor Geddes came out. I intend to treat those two kinds of facts, not as certainties, but as mere provisional everyday descriptions. I shall attempt to show that there is little value beyond that of a practical rule of thumb in the everyday separation between them. I shall try to determine a way of speech that will cover them both, and with them the social facts as well. But, different as my form of statement may appear from his, I am in full sympathy both with his starting points and with his view of social phenomena in the outcome, though not with his way of telling it. It is an interesting fact that British sociologists have in general been much less inclined to spend time on speculative connective structures than have their fellows of other countries: and whether they are to be congratulated or their case deplored I can hardly say. To their credit is that they have conserved their powers to apply in fields in which they could make substantial direct progress: to their

*I refer, of course, to his scientific followers, not to the school of social reform bearing his name.

debit is the fact that when they do introduce speculative interpretation the results are sometimes peculiarly atrocious, as was evidenced when MacDougal was transplanted to America by his effort to fit himself into the prevailing scheme of things through the setting up of a working mechanism of society in terms of instincts. MacDougal went about it just as though instincts were little concrete "things" which could be picked with forceps out of human life, and made to work like gears in a machine, on a concealed postulate that when you had found the gears you understood the machine, and under the great embarrassment that every month when you looked your gears over anew you saw, or thought you saw, a different set. Professor Geddes, on the other hand, while he talks in terms of the material, the psychic, the extended psychic or social, and finally the objectified socially psychic, giving us Place-Work-Folk, Sense-Experience-Feeling, (Com)Emotion-Ideation-Imagination, EthoPolity-Synergy-Achievement, never is found picking out a master reality like an instinct to explain anything else. He keeps a simple operational purport throughout. He never gets away from the spirit of his two starting formulas: that of life, $\frac{EIO}{OIE}$, and that of Society, $\frac{PWF}{FWP}$, which to my mind are as sound as anyone could want them, providing the terms are all in one general field of knowledge, and none of them mysterious strangers from abroad.

IV.

Now, in our own attempt to function the three speech types, mind, body and society, our first effort must be to locate any terms used in all of them which shift in meaning as between them. Having for our immediate purpose divested ourselves of the realities of soul, and of the actualities of inert matter, and confined ourselves to going operations, to events, to happenings, this effort is simplified. We manifestly have first of all to examine space and time, not in the sense of some assumed actual space or actual time, but in the sense of the terms as we use them to portray the spatial and temporal characteristics of our physical, mental and social phenomena.

TIME is a term which covers two very different kinds of situation, one that of instantaneity, the other that of durations. Instantaneity is a very doubtful term full of implications of reality, of existence, and only by courtesy or confusion, an affair of time at all. Duration, however, is an affair of measurement by clocks and nothing else. Space, in the sense of spatial extension, is, like time, an affair of measurements—of measurement, however, by yard sticks or light rays, instead of by clocks. Apart from this definite value of mensuration, the term space is even more vicious in its implications than is the term time when instantaneity is confused with durations: for in current usage the term space serves to drag in a cloud of obscure suggestions which

may mean anything or nothing, and which certainly means hardly ever the same thing to any two men. We shall confine ourselves to the definite meanings, to the measurable value of extensions and durations, in order to see what import they have for our three ways of speech about men.

THE mental, the physical and the social ways of speech all offer us phenomena in the durations of time. But as for extensions in space it is only the physical way of speech that carries exact spatial values in the sense of measurability. Mental phenomena, indeed, get their very mental specialisation in speech from the fact that they cannot thus be taken as directly measurable spatially. The social phenomena appear under this test as a confused mass of the measurable and the non-measurable, the spatial and the non-spatial.

HOLDING to the standard of measurability we may now characterise the first two types of speech as follows: The way of speech in terms of mind is that collection of words which is taken as capable of measurement in time but not as capable of measurement in space. The way of speech in terms of body is that collection which is taken as capable of both spatial and temporal measurement. The latter we may, by this test, call temporal-spatial, and the former temporal-non-spatial, whether as terms or as phenomena.

GIVEN this much of definiteness in dealing with language our next procedure will be to examine into the respective values of the terms individual and social. Since individuality or personality comes out to approximate clearness of expression only in the temporal-non-spatial terminology, we shall approach the problem first of all in that particular terminology, limiting ourselves precisely to it. To examine we must select some situation which clearly has both individual and social values, which is institutional, and yet which is not so complexly institutional as to be beyond the possibility of direct analysis by the aid of such technical powers as we now possess. We may not start dogmatically with some definition of an individual as we assume to know him in advance, nor with some socially defined construct as if we knew it in advance as fact: but instead, we must just naïvely and simply take a situation that presents itself to us as both social and individual to see what we can get out of it.

LET us start with Jack-loving-Jill as temporal-non-spatial presentation. It is clearly social whatever the term may mean, since both Jack and Jill are involved: and it is clearly institutional, since the manner of their involvement—this being the described phenomenon we are to study—varies greatly in different ages, among different peoples, and under different circumstances, ranging from cavemen lovers to ciccisbeos, and from Victorian families to the ritualistic concupiscence of the East. And it is clearly individual for in it Jack-in-love preens

himself in full glory. Our problem now is to differentiate the pure individuality of Jack out of this full Jack-loving-Jill situation: we must get rid of Jill while still retaining love-in-Jack, or Jack-in-love, or just simply Jack, whatever you choose to call it. And we must do this, remember, without dragging in any elements from the temporal-spatial terminology, but holding ourselves closely at all times within the ranges of the temporal-non-spatial.

THIS project cannot be successfully carried through.* Analyse as carefully as you will we can never succeed in locating Jack-in-love without his Jill. You may knock Jack down physically, you may sentence him to jail from the bench, or consign him to Heaven or Hell from the pulpit, but that will not get rid of the Jill-ness in the particular situation, the Jack-loving-Jill, we have been studying, in the terminology in which we are taking it. The common manner of doing it, or rather of pretending to do it, is to assume Jack as an instantaneously real existence, and then to describe all of his social relations as somewhat less vividly real experiences in a durational world. But we, remember, are proceeding without the right to make any such assumptions. Before us we have Jack-loving-Jill, and that is a phenomenon in durations of time. If we try shortening those durations from, the month, or day, or hour, or minute we have chosen to start with, and if we proceed downwards to split seconds, we never discover Jack without his Jill or his Jill-substitute or his Jill-like content, until we translate him into the instantaneous: but to translate him in that way is to take him out of durations, out of measurable time, and into some field of absolute existence with which we have no concern. Or we may proceed in the opposite direction, increasing durations into enormous periods, into infinities, and pretend to construct an immortal Jack: but that again is outside the range of our chosen terminology, the temporal-non-spatial. If we try the immediate present, we are no better off, for that again is only instantaneity in another form.

V.

It will be evident to anyone who analyses the preceding argument that I have been endeavouring to work in continuities. For such procedure I feel no need of apology. All that continuity implies is "tracing transitions," and there should be nothing shocking in a paraphrase such as: *Societas non facit saltum*. In the physical field of study if an arrow is now at A and later at B, we feel that we can only deal with it as arrow and as event if we can follow its path, or if

*An extended theoretical discussion of the argument that follows in terms of postulates, definitions and theses, will be found in the article, Individual and Social: Terms and Facts, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE. A brief indication of the form of approach in contrast to the dogmatic attitude of "Behaviorism," which limits us to stimuli and reactions has appeared in the article "A Sociological Critique of Behaviorism," ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, Bd. 31, Heft 3-4. 1928.

we can assume a type of path we have experience in following under circumstances that indicate that such a path has been used. When the path disappears, either knowledge disappears, or else knowledge is greatly enriched by the discovery of new types of paths. In our sociological field I refuse to take a magic leap outside of continuities from the Jack-loving-Jill to the Jack-in-himself: though I am perfectly willing to make the transition whenever anyone can show me a path. For the present I am merely asserting that I do not find such path myself.

THERE exists in mathematics a procedure known as determining limits, and if, now, one examines the argument with the theory of limits in mind, it is immediately evident that such descriptions as love-in-Jack or Jack-in-love have the general appearance of limits, in the technical sense, to the full Jack-loving-Jill situation: and if this be true of those descriptions, it is also true of the description Jack-himself.

AGAIN in mathematical analysis there is a device known as deleting the domain by which one gets rid of unmanageable limits and proceeds without any apparent sacrifice of efficiency, indeed with greatly heightened efficiency, since this device is used only where otherwise one could not proceed rationally at all. In sociological investigation, when one centres one's attention on the technique ordinarily in use with respect to mind and matter, it is certainly clear that there is no such thing as rational procedure at all under the old speech confusions: and, because of this long-continuing irrationality, it is my conviction that the time has come when sociologists must delete the domain, and eliminate the unmanageable instantaneous Jack so far as their technical purposes and procedures go. This should be done, not for a moment with the idea that we are asserting ultimate truth, nor indeed with the idea that we are asserting any kind of truth at all, but merely as a technique by which we can handle the full richness of the social situations without sacrificing anything of the equally rich knowledge of individuality which has been conveyed heretofore in the temporal-non-spatial terminology.

No one need be terrorised by this suggestion. However great the restraint one puts upon oneself technically in this respect, one may still give Jack all the æsthetic, religious, emotional or absolute values he will, outside of and beyond the technical procedure. Moreover, within the procedure itself individuality and personality in sound descriptive forms are retained for technical use, under which each Jack is given his own specification in the full individual-social field by the use of limiting statements of a type that can be successfully manipulated in a field of continuities. I regret that from considerations of space I cannot here develop this simple and practical construction.

THE results thus far reached may be formulated somewhat as follows : If we agree to regard as spatial and temporal only that which is measurable or taken as capable of measurement, then if we examine those ways of speech about men which are taken as measurable in time but not in space, we find that we cannot draw a dogmatic line anywhere as between the individual and the social in the durational presentations before us, though we are still able to discuss each individual effectively as an empirically isolated portion of the whole combined social-individual presentation.

VI.

IF now I have perhaps succeeded in presenting the first step towards the reconciliation of speech forms without too repellent an aspect, I fear that when the same manner of examination is continued further, the next result will cause universal horripilation. To get over the shock and to allay the bristling as soon as possible, I shall formulate this result at once as follows : Under our defined meanings for spatial and temporal in terms of measurements the terminological distinction between the spatial and the non-spatial forms of description breaks down, just as the distinction between the individual and the social broke down in the temporal-non-spatial terminology : the social Jack proves to be no longer non-spatial in description, but instead to be as fully and vitally spatial as any other phenomena : and all three ways of speech, those of life, of mind and of society—once we have escaped the limbo of the old vague meanings of space and time—fuse into one common form of expression, in which not so much as one single shading of the sound workable values of the old ways of speech has been lost. The social Jack I propose to show to be a spatial Jack, not however in the sense of some obscure dead space opposed to some equally obscure fixed reality of mind, but in a fused functioning living world of comprehensive experience.

To aid us in this step let us substitute for the term temporal-spatial the term durational-extensional, which is exactly what we have defined temporal-spatial to be : and for the term temporal-non-spatial the term durational-non-extensional. The question before us will then be : Do we anywhere find phenomena which are durational but not extensional, as we search all the phenomena of man's spiritual and mental life, refusing to take these phenomena as instantaneous realities but holding always to them instead as measurable durations in which the social aspect up to the last instantaneous limit clings tight to the individual aspect ? The answer is, No. Jack-loving-Jill is spread out in space in much the same sense as the phenomena of thermodynamics or of electricity or of light rays. You cannot handle any of these phenomena under three Euclidean dimensions, isolated, absolute, dominant, but in truth you cannot handle anything whatever completely under such a frame. When you make use of that frame you

find it covering them for what it is worth : and, I may add, for no more than it is worth, there or anywhere else. For (Jill) in Jack-loving-Jill you may substitute (Jill) ' or (Jill) " : for (Jack) you may substitute (Jack) ' or (Jack) " : for (loving) you may substitute (loving) ' or (loving) " : these last may be hatings or honorings or whatsoever else, as focus of study changes—Jack-craving-to-stand-for-Parliament, Jack-trying-to-reform-the-world. You may take the stone age in Europe, of the Assyrian empire, or Renaissance Art, or modern peace ideals : in every case the object under discussion is composed of social men and is describable in measurable extensions and durations. You may take Jack in his most sublimated spiritual or mental descriptions : in every case the terms are durationally meaningless without their social values, and those social values spread out in durations and extensions.

VII.

THOUSANDS of objections may be raised against talking about men and society in this way : at least I have pried into so many objections that I suspect they can be raised by thousands. But I find none valid as against the purposes of the scientists who study events by the use of frank hypotheses, and who loathe one thing and one alone, dogmatism. When an objection appears, first is to consider whether it is raised for a purpose or under an influence radically different from that which here rules. If the purposes, the assumptions, are the same, one can argue the objection. If they are different, argument of the objection itself must be postponed until one decides whether the new purposes, the new assumptions, are the more desirable. Unless these purposes and assumptions show comparable aims and equal or greater desirability the objections are out of court so far as the present discussion goes. One court of last resort in such issues which formerly had dogmatic authority is now closed, so far as our generation with its given range of power and authority is concerned. There is no appeal to Fact. The critic may no longer fall back upon his own declaration of Fact as the basis of his criticism : all his facts and all ours, except as they develop values in a co-ordinated system of science, are assumptions : to all the dictum, *solvitur ambulando*, to-day applies.

NOT from its power of disputation, but from its ability to do useful work, will the suggested technique of speech receive its test. Without appeal to authority or disputation whatever anyone can make the test and determine for himself, first what his own purposes really are, and, second, providing those purposes be of the type here in mind, whether this technique of speech is comprehensive and helpful. He has but to take whatever bit of social structure he chooses, whether it be religious or æsthetic, economic or political, or otherwise social, and seek the richest possible description, analysis and re-description he can find

for it : under, of course, the one requirement that he starts with it as presented in durations of time, and that he holds to durations until he can through his own investigation and analysis escape from them : under, in other words, the requirement, that he do not set up in advance existent mind and existent body, held apart by mystic barriers in a space-fog, as verbal masters of his study, but that he consent to learn of mind and body, of space and time, from the study itself.

FOR his guidance I offer two warnings : or, perhaps more courteously, for his consideration I present two suggestions.

WHEN an investigator uses the separated forms of speech, those of mind and of body as I have described them at the beginning of this paper, and holds them apart as different realms, his common way of bridging between them is to give Jack's mind pseudo-localisation in Jack's body. I say pseudo-localisation because actual or normal localisation involves measurement, and the attribution of non-spatial mind to spatial body must be done without possibility of measurement in any sense which connects the terms of the two systems together on a measureable basis.* Such pseudo-localisation is a mere assumption of a connection which, it is anticipated, will be somehow understood when the spatial fog clears up. The first suggestion for consideration is this : has such pseudo-localisation any value whatever for our studies, if we determine to use with some definite meaning, with any definite meaning whatever, the terms space and time ?

THE other suggestion has to do with the current construct of a " single " organism—in this special case, the individual body of Jack—taken as living in the world : a problem of which mention was made earlier in this paper. Jack, the anatomical organism, is the outgrowth of germ cells from parents and uncounted ancestors : better said, he is the present durational aspect of the age-long history of those cells : he contains within himself germs of countless descendants, due to appear as aspects of the same history in later generations. Jack, the physiological organism, has sunlight and star-rays in his very living, the very explosion of atoms on the sun is working in him always : and space and time for this light and for these rays and electrons are not what space and time once seemed to be. Jack, the individual, may go to jail, and we can glibly say for practical purposes what body is restrained within what four walls : but jail walls and laws and the conducts of Jack, his comrades and his rulers, are aspects of age-long durations and of territorially-broad extensions of place and work and folk. The " singleness " of Jack, whether body or mind or socius, is a singleness merely in a frame of Euclidean space, a frame we now know to be not a frame of facts apart from speech, but a frame of speech about facts, whatever facts may be. The warning is : take

*The measurements of psychological laboratories are manifestly not in point here, any more than are those of I.Q. scales.

heed to your steps, that you fall not into the pit of Euclid, the pit the common toiler digs with Euclid's tool in which to store his humble mind's belongings.

VIII.

IF, now, by taking definite meanings for space and time—and those meanings, I may add, the very ones which alone for physics and mathematics and the efficient sciences have sound values for their working portrayals of the world—if, now, it is practicable in this way to harmonise our various speech forms about men into one working system, then an immediate benefit of the very greatest importance will result in connection with the use of that very essential term, environment. I do not know a more maddening term in the whole range of sociological writing than this very word, environment. It is often troublesome enough in the biological sciences, but in sociology it is disgraceful beyond measure. Observe what this one term is made to cover: first spatial environments to spatial phenomena (matter to matter): next spatial environments to non-spatial phenomena (the world to the mental man): then non-spatial individual environments to non-spatial individual phenomena (persons to each other): again, non-spatial social environments to non-spatial individual phenomena (society to the person): and with these so many other variations of situation, in terms of races groups and institutions, that coherence, valid meaning, disappears entirely. Could any set of situations, taken in the ways in which they are currently expressed, be more radically different from one another in values than these? And yet it is daily practice for writers flaunting the banner of science—science whose very definition is the humble desire to be exact—to use this one single term with the rankest inexactness for all these various situations. If the old ways of speech about men are to be kept separate and distinct, then assuredly the various environmental situations must be analysed and held separate from the very start, even if, to accomplish it, one has to begin his work again from the bottom and do it all over. But if the harmonisation of speech-ways which has been suggested can establish itself, then we shall have before us one continuity of phenomena in which we may, from time to time, for each specific purpose that arises, isolate organisms or individuals or groups or institutions, name and define them, and by that very procedure define their environments, so that study can intelligently be made. First, isolation, assumed to be of fact, and definition, assumed to be of words—but the two always obverse and reverse of the same social mirror: then search for recurrences, and controlled experiments wherever possible: these are the procedures of knowledge. Words are the tools, the technique, of sociology. The word as tool has power. If the word fails us, if we close our eyes to its failure but still support ourselves on its dogmatism, then and then only are we lost.

MURDER AND SUICIDE AS MARKS OF AN ABNORMAL MIND: by Alice Raven.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

IN the following paper Miss Raven, writing as a psychologist, naturally assumes such terms as "reality" and "social environment" without further analysis. It is here precisely that a working co-partnership is called for between sociologist and psychologist. A social analysis of definite technique is needed to supplement and correct the psycho-analysis which, without correlating the impulses and aspirations of the "mind" with the complex tendencies working for good and ill in contemporary society, leaves such terms as "reality" (i.e., the facts, tendencies, processes, forms of the social situation in which each finds oneself) and "social environment" in vague abstraction. For illustration of the kind of social analysis required to give fullness of content, and therefore adequate concreteness, to the thesis of Miss Raven's paper, may be mentioned the paper of Professor Geddes which, in this number of the REVIEW, immediately follows Miss Raven's paper. And for still better illustration see Geddes' paper "The Interpretation of Current Events" in the April number of the REVIEW (Vol. XXI., No. 2). The technique used in both the above papers by Geddes can claim the epithet scientific in that it is based upon, and grows definitely out of: (a) the biological conception of life as interplay between organism and environment, each alternatively active and passive to the other; (b) the social analysis, on which sociology was founded, that of any given community as exhibiting four types of personality, i.e., those of People, Chiefs, Intellectuals, Emotions (in Comte's phrasing); (c) a systematic application of this fourfold social analysis to the main historic phases and to contemporary western civilisation; (d) a restatement of Comte's Law of the Three Stages, which presents the Theological or Volitional phase, the Metaphysical or Abstract, and the Positive or Scientific, as a recurring series and not as a merely successive development; and finally (e) a simple logic of mathematical precision. The fullest statement of this sociological technique of Geddes, built very deliberately on the labours of many predecessors, will be found in Vols. I., II. and III. of SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS (1904-5-6).

I.

ONE of the most disturbing features of social life at the present day is the outcrop of murders and suicides which appear as an excrescence on current civilisation. The double "murder and suicide" cases occur, moreover, only too often within the ranks of middle-class society, whilst the murderer or suicide himself has often borne the reputation of a respectable married man until some act of violence to himself or another has revealed the destructive forces which must have been long smouldering within.

II.

THESE violent anti-social acts are doubtless the outcome of an abnormal state of mind.¹ But before analysing this state of mind, it is necessary

¹ I call suicide, as well as murder, an anti-social act, not only because of the shame and distress caused to the relatives of the suicide, but because of the emotion of fear aroused in the minds of those who only read of the act by which another member of their own society has confessed his failure in life.

first to attempt a general diagnosis of the mental attitude of a society, which makes possible among certain of its members (by an exaggeration of the prevailing mental attitude) the committal of such extreme and desperate deeds as murder and suicide. This attitude is well expressed by John Galsworthy in a book (*THE SILVER SPOON*) in which he aims at presenting "modern England and the London we know in place of the town and country of our fathers and uncles": in this book we find the hero wondering if humanity has "the will to live as much as it used," or if the English, particularly, have become "so spoiled, so sensitive to life" that they have "weakened on it," having "sucked their silver spoon so long that, threatened with a spoon of bone, they prefer to get down from table." Such an attitude towards life¹ is especially characteristic of the middle classes of society, who have not the fighting tradition of the upper classes behind them, nor the tradition of hard work for little pay of the lower classes. It is the pessimistic attitude of those (in any class of society) who have never achieved success by sheer force of effort, but have passively waited for the rewards of life to fall into their arms.

III.

BEHIND this mental attitude of apathy and passivity which has permeated so much of society at the present day, we must note also a prevailing mental tendency, which, again, in a more exaggerated form, characterises those persons who commit such anti-social deeds as murder and suicide. This is the exaggerated tendency to introspection which appears to mark the present generation. People are so concerned to look within that they forget to observe what is without, and so fail to react efficiently upon their environment. Perceiving within some dim image of power which their lack of adjustment to the external environment prevents them from realising to the full, they, further, project this power-image on to such persons in the outward world as serve, through a relationship of mutual dependency and admiration, to furnish them with that sense of power which they feel should rightly be theirs. By this relationship they are cushioned both from the too insistent urge from within and from the reality which would force itself on them from without. The other person who is the source of this comforting illusion is usually of the opposite sex. Sometimes, however, such a relationship will exist between two members of the same sex, or between a little group of intimates of the same sex (in such a case, however, one or more of the other persons probably always *playing the part* of the opposite sex). The result of

¹ In the last chapter ("Full Close") of the last book (*SWAN SONG*) of the Forsyte Saga, we find the following sentiment put by Galsworthy into the mouth of one of his characters, a man of the older generation (speaking thus, as it were, for Galsworthy himself): "It's what happened to the Age—something broke and it has not yet got its second wind. But it's getting it." The last sentence strikes a more hopeful note.

this psychic partnership for mutual insurance against reality shows itself in each partner in a tendency to ignore the rest of the world when the other partner is present. The effect of exaggerated introspection on character is therefore to produce a more or less defined unfriendliness to the world in general.

IV.

So far we may say that the majority of us are tarred with the same brush. Most of us (like "spoiled children") complain of the weather, fear and resent any illness or misfortune for ourselves or friends,³ and as regards success in life are inclined to wait for "something to turn up," like Mr. Micawber, charging it to the fault of fate if no "plum" comes our way. We thus tend to react passively to life, failing to realise that every act of courage and initiative by which we put the hazard of success before safety is good coin in the unconscious, setting free a corresponding impulse which beyond our conscious knowledge or control moulds events to the victory we desire. Most of us, also, at times, find it far more interesting to look within than without, observing outside things only when they bear the symbolic image of the stirrings and desires within. Most of us, again, are conscious of an exalted sense of power when we are in the presence of certain people, and know that we are apt to neglect other social claims when we are absorbed in this more intimate relationship.

V.

In the normal person, however, such failures of adaptation either to the realities of life or to the social environment represent or reflect defects in education and habit which usually stimulate efforts towards corrective habituation. But in the person of abnormal mentality these defects of mental functioning not only occur in exaggerated form but are characteristic of the individual concerned. The person of abnormal mentality is not so much inclined to exaggerated introspection as marked temperamentally by a deeply ingrained introversion, which in the last resort means habitual response to the impulses of the unconscious mind. Such a person feels vaguely the working of these forces beneath the conscious level, and he is pushed on to explore and dwell with them. To him, the self within is of such deep interest that often he turns to some form of primitive belief and research such as spiritualism or astrology in

³ As regards the fear of misfortune, this attitude is well illustrated by a sentence in a letter from Prince Consort to his daughter the Princess Frederick of Prussia on the occasion of her 21st birthday: "May (this) success not fail you, and may your outward life leave you unhurt by the storm, to which the sad heart so often looks forward with a shrinking dread!" (LETTERS OF THE EMPRESS FREDERICK, p. 34.) It was the typical "Victorian" attitude, which regarded success as a reward from a kind Deity and misfortune as an undisguised evil coming (probably) from the Devil.

order to find an interpretation of these obscure intuitions from the inner world. To illustrate from a case of suicide that occurred last October (and we are taking it for granted here that suicide corresponds with an abnormal mental attitude), we find that a young man of 17 who was found dead on the railway had previously been attending spiritualist meetings, where he was told that a youth of 16 would meet with a terrible accident.⁴ The medium in this case had no doubt sensed the young man's own half-felt intuitions of the coming event, corresponding with his unconscious desire for death, and the confirmation thus offered to the youth of his own premonitions had acted as a suggestive force driving him on to the deed. Similar evidence of dealings with spiritualists was given in the case of a youth who recently threw himself into the river from Cleopatra's Needle. Another boy of 12, who appears to have walked into a motor car in a fit of deep abstraction, had shortly before his death written an essay called "Myself" (which was read at his funeral), showing the intense introversion which had preceded the self-sought death.⁵ The desire for death in these cases of temperamental introversion is merely an expression of the sense which such persons have of intimate contact with the sub-conscious psychic forces. To such an individual death means the opportunity of exploring further those deep secrets of the unconscious which his conscious mind has dimly perceived. There is no bar in his mind between this life and the life beyond; the state of death is for him a continuation of the present life under better conditions, since, as he surmises, even the slight barrier still existing between his conscious mind and the wonders of the unconscious will have disappeared. Thus in the case of the twin doctors (aged 28) who committed suicide in January, 1929, we find in their letter "To the Nation" such a phrase as: "*We pass from this world, a national awakening in radium work having been accomplished,*" and in their letter to their Mother a similar phrase: "We pray that the purity of your heart will inspire us *as we go on our way*. This life is but a phase of the whole life, and we depart this without fear." Again, in the case of "Seamark," the author, who was found with his head in a gas oven last January, we find his vivid sense of the reality of the "other world" expressed in a letter to his wife: "I genuinely hope you will get a better deal in the Great Beyond than I shall."⁶ The external world, in "Seamark's" case, seems to have been correspondingly unreal, for we are

⁴ Inquest at Birtley, co. Durham, on Thomas Kinnair. A verdict was returned of "suicide while of unsound mind." (DAILY CHRONICLE, 25th October, 1928.)

⁵ The boy was Elphin Lloyd Jones. Just before his death he had gone into a bookshop to buy Ibsen's "Brand," a significant purchase when we consider that this play is the tragic drama of an introvert. (The case was recorded DAILY CHRONICLE, 27th December, 1928.)

⁶ This sentence scarcely rings true after several accusing ones to his wife, but one may infer that his hope for her is another side of a fear for himself that in committing suicide he was not taking the way to obtain a "good deal" for himself in the "Great Beyond."

told that "sometimes he would be chatting and telling stories and then, without any apparent reason, he would shoot off and fade right away." This longing of the introvert to learn the secret of the "Great Beyond" is well expressed by Mary Webb in her novel *GONE TO EARTH*: "Men only stammer of it in such words as Eternity, Fate, God . . . The wistful dreams of men haunt this theme for ever; the creeds of men are so many keys that do not fit the lock. We ponder it in our hearts, and some find peace, and some find terror. The silence presses upon us ever more heavily until death comes with his cajoling voice and promises us the key. Then we run after him into the stillness, and are heard no more."

VI.

It is owing to the extreme temperamental introversion which lies at the root of abnormal mentality that the "weakened" attitude towards life and the failure in social adaptation becomes so markedly characteristic of this type of person and also becomes dangerous. As the introversion increases, so the power of adjustment to external reality tends to fail. As the inner world becomes more real, the links with the outer world are snapped and the corresponding sense of responsibility lost or shelved. In another letter written by "Seamark" before his suicide we find the phrase: "Mine has been a terribly empty life, so much so that life itself has become a problem that is not worthy of solving." When such a person gives up the effort to make that adjustment to reality by which alone the problem of life can be satisfactorily solved, he falls increasingly under the influence of the person or persons who embody for him the inner forces of his mind and enable him to enjoy the phantasy of power which he has substituted for his true power urge. His whole vision is filled by the image of this other person (or persons) and his mind is bent on forging such a tie between them that they appear as bound to him for all eternity. The normal individual may sometimes find himself noticing external objects only as they offer a symbol of his own inner strivings and desires; then some chance encounter or associated image will force reality upon him and pull him up to a sense of responsibility. The person of abnormal psychology sees nothing around him but the projections of his own inner phantasy. You can recognise him as he walks, with rapid steps, rigid, unseeing, actuated as regards the outer world merely by an elementary sense of self-preservation: his whole form expressing in its lack of elasticity the mal-adjustment to the external environment. His one obsessive thought is to preserve his phantasy of power, which, translated into

⁷ (TIMES, 19th January, 1929.) The emotional solidarity of "the herd" is shewn in this case by the fact that two others of the band of Bohemians to which "Seamark" belonged also committed suicide by gas poisoning, one immediately after "Seamark" and another within a month.

terms of action, is to find means to maintain unbroken the relationship with the person who embodies his phantasy. In suicide, by a passive act, in murder, by an aggressive act, a bond is forged between the individual himself and the person for whose sake he commits suicide, or the person whom he murders by an act of physical mastery, which can never be set aside.

VII.

ANALYSING further, from the psychological standpoint, the nature of the self-inflicted death we call suicide, we may often interpret this as an act of self-sacrifice by which one person makes a claim on the attention, the interest, the thoughts or the affections of another person which cannot be repudiated. Since this second person embodies for the first the sub-conscious forces in the aspect of an all-powerful controlling Fate, we should expect this other person to wear the form of someone who in the early life of the individual gave him his first idea of power, strength and protection.⁸ In fact, we find in cases of suicide that afford material for psychological analysis someone who actually bears the mother-image, in turn beneficent and sinister, before which the individual regresses to his own childhood: the all-absorbing image of one whom he wishes to propitiate and ally to himself by the gift of his life. Thus we find (1928) a bell ringer in the little town of St. Angel, Mexico, throwing himself from the balcony of the church tower on the feast of the Virgin of Guadeloupe, declaring to the crowd below that he was a "devotee of the Virgin" and wished to make "a sacrifice in her honour."⁹ In the same connection we may notice the so-called "psychic pictures" of the artist Charles Sims, painted shortly before his death by suicide in April, 1928, in which with unconscious self-expression he shows a minute figure in the hands of a gigantic mother-image, representing those forces of the sub-conscious which finally overwhelmed him. We find that following on the removal of his portrait of the King from Burlington House in 1925, Sims had resigned his position as Keeper of the Royal Academy, had gone to America, where he took up the study of spiritualism, and that before his death he had cut himself off from most of his friends. His case affords a clear illustration of the withdrawal from outward relationships which accompanies an abnormal absorption in the inner mental

⁸ The complex of power formed in the mind of the person who feels himself to be in intimate relationship with the mysterious forces of the unconscious (symbolised by "the mother") is shown by the craving for universal knowledge possessed by such persons. Thus we find a young man, a poet, who died at the age of 18 (Anthony Abbott), leaving behind him his recorded resolve "to understand every unit, fragment, atom of life, time, space, movement and rest" (DAILY CHRONICLE, 16th March, 1929). In fiction compare the study of the introvert given by Martin Armstrong in the character of Christopher Brade in his novel *ST. CHRISTOPHER'S DAY*.

⁹ DAILY CHRONICLE, 14th December, 1928.

processes.¹⁰ The case of "Seamark," the author mentioned above, presents similar features. We have noticed his "weakened" attitude towards life shewn by his failure to attempt any more the solution of life's problems, and this although he must have been a man of good physique, having served in the Navy and been heavy-weight champion for the Navy, and although he was said to have been in good health and financially successful at the time of his death; evidently, he, too, had regressed to a state of psychic dependence before an overwhelming mother-image, for we find him signing himself in his final letter to his wife by the name "Smalley," a diminutive formed by a play on his real name, which was "Small," expressing unconsciously his own idea of his psychological status.¹¹ The twin doctors (mentioned above) also appear to have been dominated by a mother-image, for in their last letter "To the Nation" they refer to their mother in these terms: "A more great or noble mother one could not hope to have. We will not attempt to eulogise her—only one who in eulogy could out-Barrie Barrie or out-Burke Burke could do the task justice." The correspondingly "weakened" attitude towards life of these men is shewn by the inadequate reason given by them for their suicide, namely, poverty and misunderstanding. Surely if these two doctors believed that their work for the "advancement of radium in the treatment of cancer" was indeed "a noble service" to their country, they could with normal courage and determination have overcome the difficulties in their way. But they were cut off from the world, receiving and making no friends, maintaining a relationship only with one another and with those mysterious forces with which no doubt they sought a closer union by their death.¹²

VIII.

THE detrimental effect of an obsessive image on the mind of the abnormally introverted person is even more clearly seen in cases of

¹⁰ My account of the death of Sims is taken from the DAILY EXPRESS, 18th April, 1928. It is interesting to observe in the portrait of "Mrs. Jeudwine and her son Wynne," which at the time of his death was reproduced as "a fine example of portraiture by Mr. Charles Sims" (in contrast to his "psychic pictures"), the same *theme* as in the psychic pictures, viz., a naked child in the arms of his mother. In this picture "the mother" assumes more normal proportions than in the psychic pictures, yet even here we may remark that the attitude and dress of the subject of the portrait give an unusual length and size to her figure, whilst in the painting of the child one cannot but catch a glimpse of what Dr. Ernest Jones calls "exhibitionist self-adoration," marking a step in the path of the artist's mental regression.

¹¹ Those who have studied the way in which repressed material from the unconscious finds expression through indirect representation will not smile at this symbolic use of a name. The converse of this tendency to self-belittlement on the part of the man, namely, the treating of him as a small child entirely dependent on her by "the mother," was noticed in my paper "A psychological conception of insanity and its relation to crime." (SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1928.)

¹² My account is taken from THE TIMES, 16th, 17th, 19th January, 1929. According to hearsay the brothers were not in pecuniary want at the time of their death.

murder than in suicide. The murderous impulse corresponds psychologically to the passion of fear and jealousy aroused in the mind of the individual by the thought of losing the person whose image dominates his mind. Through murder he thinks to obtain complete possession of the loved object and so to put out of court all rival claims. Even so, we could not understand such a state of mind, unless we realised that the obsessive image dominating the mental processes of such a person bore more than a surface value and was the external representation of inner forces to which the conscious mind was subordinated. Thus we find in the letter of a murderer, "I am insane with love for Gladys. Revenge is sweet. My love is my ruin. I love her with all my heart. I worship her. I adore her . . . Glad and I will meet again in heaven or hell, the latter for me . . . It is her reputation for breaking hearts. She won't break any more . . . It is best this way." In this case the murderer went to the police station and inquired after the murdered girl, then added "I have done it," and threw the razor away. By giving himself up to the police he evidently hoped to join the object of his adoration without delay, salving his conscience first by the confession of his crime with its obvious sequel of a violent death.¹³

IX.

THE obsessive image dominating the mind of the murderer is perhaps more generally a psychological "sister-image" than "mother-image," the former being more dangerous as the similarity in age gives it more of a sex meaning. This sex meaning is obviously perverted; but the very perversion serves to make the image (either sister or mother-image) a fit representation of the distorted elements in the unconscious mind. The illicit commerce which the individual holds with his own unconscious forces becomes in this way an "incest motive," finding outward expression in the desire to monopolise the admiration and attention of the person who bears the mother-image, or to gain without trouble an initiation into the secrets of life from the person who bears the sister-image.¹⁴ In murder we can thus see a sadistic impulse carried out to the fullest extent in obtaining undisputed possession of the body of the victim. That murderous desires follow as a natural corollary to the setting up of a new obsessive image, containing more sex meaning than the old one, is seen in the letter of a would-be murderer, a married man with four children, to a girl with whom he had become infatuated: "My own darling Mary, I do miss you here . . . I have told you that since you declared your love to me

¹³ The case was that of Alfred Allison (aged 20) recently tried at Newcastle Assizes for the murder of Gladys Jackson at Newcastle.

¹⁴ The "incest motive" as directed towards the sister is clearly revealed in the book called *THE MONK* (by G. F. Lewis), in which "the monk" wreaks his sadistic sexual desires on a young girl, who afterwards turns out to be his sister. This novel, in which the author with unconscious self-portrayed disclosed the incest motive, thus anticipating the discoveries of Freud, had a tremendous vogue in the 18th century.

I have been honest, faithful and honourable to you. I have news—bought a beautiful revolver and 20 rounds of ammunition . . . If you should secretly leave me or do anything underhand I shall take your life and then my own.”¹⁵ Here we have expressed the desire of the murderer to wreak his power on the girl and then to follow her into the other world. A similar motive is seen in the case of an actual murderer, a man who had been married for 22 years and was described as an ideal husband and a very good father. This man induced an unmarried woman, whose acquaintance he had originally made through posing as a widower, to meet him in Hyde Park, where he stabbed her in the neck, afterwards cutting his own throat with a razor.¹⁶

X.

WHETHER the haunting image, with its perverted sex meaning, be a mother or a sister image, in either case it differs from a true sex image in demanding from the individual no working adjustment to reality. Both images represent an aspect of the man's unconscious mind: the mother-image that aspect of it as the seat of deep emotional forces, all-powerful and compelling, the sister-image the aspect of it as containing the æsthetic and creative elements of life. Unconsciously, owing to the facts of his personality, such a man will choose as the embodiment in actual life of the mother-image a person relatively stronger than himself and invested with power and authority, whilst he will choose as the embodiment of the sister-image someone weaker than himself in will power, whom he can dominate and from whom he can wrest by force the valued secrets of life. Whilst, however, in the sister-image, a new and more attractive image is set up in his mind, we must notice that the old mother-image is not entirely displaced, and that it is, in fact, from the image of “the mother,” to whom he is psychologically married, that he obtains a spurious sense of power as her husband and as a father through her (just as Œdipus, in the legend, became King of Thebes in the right of Jocasta, his mother, whom he had married): this spurious authority he then uses in his relations with the person standing in actual life as the sister-image. In this way we can understand the state of mind of the married man who figures as murderer. His wife has become for him the “mother-image,” in whose commanding presence his domestic life may be blameless; armed with the power given him by her regard and affection, he is able to dominate both mentally and physically the woman whose image offers him new and enticing opportunities and towards whom (in psychological terms) his incestuous relationship is both that of brother and father.¹⁷ At the same time something of

¹⁵ DAILY CHRONICLE, 1st December, 1928.

¹⁶ DAILY CHRONICLE, 6th June, 1928.

¹⁷ In *THE MONK* (the novel mentioned above) the monk obtains certain magical objects from “Matilda,” the nun (who represents the “mother-image”), to assist him in satisfying his sexual desires on “Antonia,” the new object of his admiration (who afterwards turns out to be his sister).

the old mother-son relationship clings about the new relation, for the reason that every woman bears some of the characteristics of "the mother." In this way we gain an idea of the thoroughly perverted attitude which marks the person of abnormal mentality and which finds its outward anti-social manifestation in murder. Moreover, from the above considerations we can understand another type of murder, namely the murder by a man of the mother of the girl who exercises an infatuation over the man's mind. In a recent case of this kind, the man, an American University student, aged 21, first murdered the mother of the young girl whom he had been courting, and then attempted to murder the girl herself. It was said that the mother had discouraged his suit. In his own statement read before his trial at Liverpool Assizes the man described how he had pressed the mother's throat "for less than a minute"; how when she had felt herself to be dying she had said to him: "Good-bye, Teddy Bear [apparently his nickname]; you must always take care of your Bouffe [a pet name he had given the girl]"; and how she had "smiled at" him "to her last moment." In this statement he was evidently trying to make out that the mother's resistance had been easily overcome and that she had given her daughter into his care. He then further described how his sole thought after having killed the mother was that he "would never have Bouffe" and that he would kill her also "rather than have her fall into the clutches of that hell fiend detective" (a purely imaginary character, probably a projection of his own violent desires). According to his own account the insane fit which had led to the first murder had passed even before the mother's death; it appears therefore that he realised that in the world of actuality the murder of the mother would not lead to the success of his suit with the daughter and that he then conceived the idea of killing the latter in order to make sure of possessing her in the other world.¹⁸ The psychological motive discernible here in the murder of the mother who discourages a man's suit to her daughter is similar to that which leads to the murder of the man's father (or the person representing the father) in another set of circumstances. "The father" is the guardian of reality as regards a man's attitude towards the external world. He must "kill" this principle in himself (an act which may find its counterpart in an actual murder) before he can shut himself up entirely to the world of his phantasy. On the other hand, the mother of the woman he admires represents the guardian of reality in his relation to his own sub-conscious forces. If he tries to wrest to his use the æsthetic and creative elements of his mind (perceived as a counter personality and embodied in the form of a woman) without any regard for the law regulating the relation between his conscious and sub-conscious mind, he will have first to silence that urge to reality in himself which would keep

¹⁸ The case was that of Joseph Clark (report in DAILY SKETCH, 23rd November, 1928; DAILY CHRONICLE, 26th February, 1929).

that relationship correct. It is noticeable that in the case quoted above the mode of murder was by "stifling" the person who interfered with the man's desires.¹⁹

XI.

SINCE the introvert of extreme type always tends to look upon the persons in his immediate environment as projections of his own personality and to invest them with the intense emotions of the inner "ego" drama, there is the constant danger in such cases of anti-social manifestations. The only person or persons who "count" for such an individual are the persons who embody the forces of his dissociated personality, and these "count" for so much as objects of love or hatred (as they further or oppose the individual's phantasy of omnipotence) that the ordinary rules of conduct do not apply to them. As for the rest of the world, other people count for so little in the estimation of the "abnormal" person that he does not trouble for them to adjust his conduct to the ordinary standards of social life. Hence the motive towards murder or suicide for the satisfaction of such a man's phantasy finds no counteracting motive in a desire for social approval or social success.²⁰

THE danger of the too intimate bond which will make a person in time of inner stress commit any act which will keep that tie unbroken is again illustrated in a case of murder which occurred in October, 1928. The man concerned shot his wife and daughter in their beds and then gave himself up to the police, refusing legal assistance on the plea: "He would only try to get me out of it. I don't want that. I want to be hanged." Evidence was given at the trial that the man had lived with his wife and daughter on the most loving terms. The house in which this family lived was called "Almardith," of which the first syllable stood for the man's name "Albert," the second ("Mar") for "Marian," the name of the daughter, and the third for "Edith," the name of the wife.²¹ A better illustration of the state of mind leading to a murder of this type could scarcely be imagined. The "house" no doubt represented symbolically the man's mind as an entity containing different aspects of his personality. By virtue of the sheltering influence of the wife and daughter shielding him from the onset of reality in the outer world, he was able for a time to preserve

¹⁹ In *THE MONK*, also, the hero-villain strangles the mother of Antonia before (with the magical aid of Matilda) he works his will on the unconscious Antonia.

²⁰ This unfriendly attitude towards the outer world of two persons bound together by a tie of exclusive intimacy is well expressed in the fantastic story by David Garnett called *A MAN IN THE ZOO*. The hero of the story (a man of abnormal psychology as shewn by the fact that he afterwards offers himself to the Zoological Society to complete their collection of the earth's fauna!) says to Josephine, the girl with whom he is in love: "If I am in love with you, and you with me, it means that you are the only person who is not my enemy, and I am the only person who is not yours," and, again: "Other people are all my enemies, necessarily my enemies."

²¹ Case of Albert Spencer Banks (the Minehead Murder Trial), *TIMES*, 25th October, 1928.

a precarious harmony within his mind, shutting himself up to the protective images which fostered a phantasy image of himself; but directly the stress of circumstances threatened to destroy the phantasy and make him face his true self, he had recourse to a deed which would keep the phantasy unbroken by finally arresting the relationships within "the house" at the point at which he wished them to remain.

XII.

SINCE murder is the most anti-social of all crimes (a fact we recognise in attaching a death penalty to this crime alone), it is worth examining a little more closely the psychological motives involved in murder. For this the recent case of Chung Yi Miao, a Chinese law student, convicted of murdering his wife, affords us a good opportunity. Miao was married to his wife in America on 12th May, 1928. They came to England for their honeymoon, and after a few days in Scotland arrived at Grange, in the Lake district, on June 28th, where they took a room in a private hotel. The following afternoon they went for a walk, from which Miao returned alone, saying that his wife had gone to Keswick to shop. The same evening the dead body of Mrs. Miao was found in a wood at a distance of 130 yards from the spot where the couple had been last seen together. Three pieces of cord had been tied round her neck, the clothes were disarranged, suggesting a "crime of lust" as well as murder, and two rings (a diamond ring and a wedding ring) had been taken from her hands. Although there was no apparent motive for the crime, the circumstantial evidence against Miao was so strong that a verdict of murder was returned against him at Cumberland Assizes on 24th October.

On the night after the murder Miao had retired to bed, notwithstanding the absence of his wife, from which he was aroused by a police officer telling him that the dead body of his wife had been found and that he would be detained on suspicion. It is highly significant that although Miao was only told that his wife had been strangled, he exclaimed: "It is terrible! My wife assaulted, robbed and murdered!" showing that unconsciously he definitely connected these three actions in his mind. At Keswick Police Station he said that his wife had had with her a necklace, a pocket book and a diamond ring, and asked: "Has she these with her now?" When his bedroom was searched the key of his wife's jewel case was found in the folds of a dress shirt, this jewel case containing a pearl necklace with other jewellery and money; whilst the diamond ring and the wedding ring were found in cardboard boxes containing spools of photographic films, which were taken from the bedroom to be developed after Miao's arrest.²²

²² It is not clear from the evidence whether the pearl necklace found in the jewel case was the one which the wife was wearing at the time of the murder; nor is it clear what became of the pocket book or the money it contained.

BEFORE examining further the psychological motive for this murder, it is worth noticing one or two facts about the couple. Miao was a man of good birth, who went to college in America and took the degree of Doctor of Jurisprudence. In New York he met his wife, the daughter of a wealthy Chinese merchant, of equal or slightly better social position than himself. The chief point that emerges with regard to the young Chinese wife was her passion for jewellery. When on board the boat, on the way to England, she would invite people to her cabin to see her jewellery, and on her arrival in England she had with her jewellery valued at between £3,000 and £4,000, besides a letter of credit issued in America for about £2,000.

IT seems evident, therefore, that the wife was fitted to form in Miao's mind an image connected with ideas of great riches and value. Doubtless she impersonated for him the riches of his own sub-conscious mind, just in the way that there existed in the mind of the painter Rembrandt (judging from such pictures as "Saskia as Flora" and "Esther and Haman") a woman's image embodying for him the wealth of his artistic imagination. In the witness box Miao said with emotion that he could not describe how much he loved his wife. But the wish to wrest from her by force the secret of beauty and wealth (symbolised by the wife's jewels) became an uncontrollable influence when evoked by suitable suggestions from without. Evidence that temptation had previously assailed his mind is afforded by certain sentences written down on slips of paper and found in his hotel at Edinburgh, which, as translated at the trial, ran: "Arrival Europe again consider"; "Be sure not to do this thing on this ship"; "Be sure of doing it on this ship." Such ideas had been resisted until the mysterious atmosphere of "the wood," to such a mind as Miao's full of suggestions of the secrets of the unconscious, hypnotised him to such depths of introversion that he was forced to commit an act which symbolically fulfilled his desires, though his conscious mind could only repudiate that action when seen in the cold daylight of reality. Psychologically, the point is that he wished to have free access, without trouble, to the creative layers of his own mind; under the influence of a disordered imagination, working on symbolic lines, he thought he could have such access by possessing himself of the key to his wife's jewel case, which he hid in an intimate place known only to himself, whilst the rings of which he robbed his wife he placed among the spools of undeveloped films, as if hoping that they would act as another magic "key" by which to interpret the undeveloped images on the "spools" of the sub-conscious.

IN order to rob his wife of her jewels, Miao had first to render her unconscious. Here we have the association in his mind between "robbing" and "murdering." In the third association of "assaulting" we see a deeper symbolism at work. Again there is the idea of

robbing his wife of something precious ; he would rifle her womb, but this time to find the key to the very secret of life itself. He wished to know the secret of his own existence : his wife, in this connection symbolising "the mother," from whom, with all the enhanced value possessed by her in his eyes as the author of his existence, it seemed that he might be able to gain this knowledge. The desire in his mind was for "re-birth," a recasting and a heightening of all the values of existence. But he thought that he could come to this secret of transvaluation by "stealing," that is by an act of "rape," just as the old philosophers thought they could find the stone which would turn everything into gold. All his symbolism thus worked on the abnormal lines of psychic inferiority, as we should expect in a train of associations which led to an act of murder.

AFTER Miao had committed the murder, his rational mind could not understand or face the deed. By a more superficial train of symbolism he projected the murder on to the figure of two "foreigners," whom he said he had seen at Glasgow and Edinburgh and again at Keswick on the day of the murder. These "strange looking foreigners" doubtless represented those lower psychological forces, so strange to his rational socialised mind, which had overpowered him in the wood.²³ He was even able to persuade himself, aided by the suggestions of his counsel, that these men had actually tracked himself and his wife down with the purpose of stealing her jewels.²⁴ At his trial Miao persistently affirmed his innocence. Yet a part of his mind acknowledged the crime, and if he denied it this was evidently because the crime

²³ The fact that Miao described the "foreigners" as being either Chinese or Japanese suggests that he was identifying this "strange" part of his personality with his own nation and the rational part with the English nation. It seems, therefore, as if he had a sense of inferiority as regards his own nation. Perhaps here we have revealed the *incentive* to his crime (which in such a case needs to be elucidated as well as the *psychological motive*). If Miao had a sense of national inferiority, this could only have applied in the matter of material civilisation ; as regards artistic endowment and culture he must have felt his own nation to be superior. If we take the wife as embodying in his mind the imaginative and creative wealth with which he knew himself and his nation to be endowed, we can imagine some sudden flaming up of the inferiority complex (perhaps through a chance encounter in the hotel), which set in train an overmastering desire to obtain immediate access to these sub-conscious creative layers of his mind, and so to regain his sense of personal and national superiority.

²⁴ We find a similar attempt to explain away the murder in the case of Joseph Clark (mentioned above), who killed the mother of the girl he was courting. He, like Miao, was unable to understand his own motives after the emotional impulse which led to the murder had passed away. Appealing against his conviction, the prisoner made the following statement : "I pleaded guilty to a charge of murder which I had not actually committed. The reasons are because I felt that since it appeared that I was the direct cause of the death of someone who had been most kind to me I must take the full consequences . . . The fact that I had no intention or reason to cause the death of Mrs. Fontaine has convinced me that I made a great error in pleading guilty. When my position became clear I felt it to be my duty to my mother and relatives to rectify the plea I had disinterestedly made." Clark then referred to the fact, disclosed by post-mortem, that Mrs. Fontaine's lungs were unhealthy, arguing that had she been a healthy woman, what he did would not have killed her. Naturally his appeal was dismissed, yet understanding the situation in its psychological aspect, we can see that his plea was not so absurd as it appeared on the surface.

had been committed under the influence of motives such as his rational mind could not understand and as he knew the judge and jury could not understand: asked when found "Guilty" if there were any reasons why sentence of death should not be passed on him, he replied: "Yes, what your Lordship said was right so far as your point of view is concerned, but I have not had a chance to explain from my point of view. I want to explain the situation if your Lordship will let the jury re-consider their verdict." If he had not been interrupted in his statement, he might himself, under the excitement of the moment, have explained the psychological motives for the murder.²⁵

XIII.

It is perhaps reassuring in view of the frequent occurrence of this type of murder (wife or sweetheart or intimate friend) to consider that the victim is not chosen by chance. In the case of Miao the judge stated that "he could not conceive any circumstances in which the robbers could possibly have got so near the woman without her knowing it as to be able to put around her neck a piece of string and strangle her." But, we may ask, would it have been possible for her husband to do it, unless for psychological reasons her resistance had been weak? It is perhaps sometimes overlooked that by a passive endurance of violence it is possible for one person to establish an unshakable claim over another person. The fact that any one has suffered injury for the sake of, or at the hands of, another person strikes an uneven balance in the relations between those two people which by a psychic necessity will have to be adjusted at some time, until when the first person holds an account against the second which binds him with inexorable force. We can only surmise that Miao's wife, in the depths of her unconscious, wanted to be robbed and murdered by her husband, that she wished for a static position in which she would be his and he hers for all eternity, she for ever giving to him of her wealth. But at the same time there must have been scruples in her mind at desiring so false a psychological position. In submitting to the murder she evidently allowed those resistances to be overcome, thus obtaining her end as a victim and so justifying to herself by her death her own illicit desires.

To complete this psychological picture, we must imagine that the woman in such cases is of abnormal temperament, like the man, that is to say, with a tendency to extreme introversion. This is borne out by the evidence of a rather extraordinary case, in which the man first tried to assault and then to strangle a woman in a car, this woman being a friend of some years standing, though the two were not sweethearts. The man, after further trying to poison the girl, himself took a fatal dose of cyanide, which he had evidently stolen from the works where he was employed. At the inquest on the man the young woman

²⁵ My account is taken from *THE TIMES*, 23rd, 24th 25th October, 1928.

described the episode in the following way: "He deliberately placed his two thumbs on my windpipe . . . The moment he touched my throat I had a sensation that he was trying to kill me . . . I could not even give a tiny scream. I think he partly paralysed me." This shows that her resistance was small; but apparently the man's own resolution failed him. She then went on to describe how when she recovered she thought she was in a glass coffin: "All I could see was frosted glass. The first words I said were: 'Where am I, dead?'" It is evident from the question that death was a very familiar idea to her and that the barrier in her mind between the before-death state and the after-death state was, in fact, nothing more than a "frosted window."²⁶ Such a sense of continuity between the present life and the life beyond is, as we have seen, a mark of the extreme introvert, who identifies the state of mind into which he enters in his phantasy, when dominated by sub-conscious forces, with that kind of existence he expects to experience on the other side of death. The willingness of the woman to suffer death at the hands of the man in this type of murder is illustrated again in a recent case, in which a man, who had persuaded a young woman to remain with him for 48 hours in woods, straw-stacks and a shed, without food, during which time he repeatedly threatened to commit suicide, finally attempted to strangle the girl with her own consent. In the words of the prosecuting counsel, "she was so worn out that she told Honeybourne that he had better take her too. Honeybourne first attempted to strangle her with his scarf, but said he had not enough strength in his wrists. He took a piece of rope from his pocket, and put one end round her neck and the other round a beam. She stood on a petrol tin, kicked it away, the rope tightened and she fainted. The next thing she knew was when she found herself lying in a corner of the shed and Honeybourne telling her that his rope had broken. He had cut her down because he wanted to die with her." Although this attempt at murder was unsuccessful, we see here revealed the state of mind both of murderer and victim.²⁷

XIV.

THE need for acquiring an understanding of the real (that is, the psychological) motives behind these crimes of murder and suicide is all the more pressing because the professional legal mind usually only takes into consideration the external evidence in such cases and misses the important psychological data. From the external evidence the fact of a murder may be established, but the state of the murderer's

²⁶ The case was that of Reginald Stewart Rogers and Cecilia Farrow. (Inquest reported in DAILY CHRONICLE, 1st January, 1929.)

²⁷ Case of Thomas Henry Honeybourne and Louisa Edney (DAILY CHRONICLE, 5th January, 1929). Honeybourne was a married man, who had persuaded Louisa Edney (a children's nurse) to marry him on the plea that he was single. The episode took place 5 days before the date fixed for the marriage, to which the girl's father had offered opposition on the ground that Honeybourne was a madman.

mind (which was the cause of the crime) cannot be elucidated. In the case of Miao, the judge, in summing up, said that it was never necessary for the prosecution to establish a motive for a crime, many great crimes having been proved against certain persons where the motives remained in complete obscurity. In a murder case that came before the French courts last February, in which a man first "sold" his wife to a friend, then asked her to return to him and on her refusal shot her, we find "laughter in court" caused by the man saying that "he killed his wife because he loved her."²⁸ Such ignorance of the state of mind of a murderer or suicide may lead to harmful results. Thus in the case of "Seamark" we find the coroner saying that "his wife seemed to have left England against his wish." Evidently he based this remark (which must have made the painful circumstances of the author's death even more painful for the wife) on a letter left behind by "Seamark," in which he said: "If you object to this statement, just tell the coroner where you got the money for the Nice trip. Also, explain to him that you were perfectly willing, despite my repeated and violent objections, to make the trip." Apart from the utter untrustworthiness of statements made by persons in the condition of disordered imagination in which "Seamark" then was, we know that this particular statement was untrue from the evidence of a friend of "Seamark's," who stated at the inquest that the reason why "Seamark" did not go abroad with his wife was because he was intending to go to America on film business. The statement in the letter was indeed a statement made for the coroner! Such statements are made by way of excuse. Thus in the case of a man and woman found shot in the bedroom of their home last March, the man left a letter for his parents in which he wrote: "Try to forgive me for the awful thing I do. [So-and-so] have broken me. They took my business and made thousands out of it for their syndicate." In another letter addressed to one of the persons he was accusing he wrote: "When you get this I shall be no more."²⁹ Thanks mostly to you and your friend . . . you took my business and made thousands out of it. You broke the shares to make more, and then sold them to alien enemies to make more." When this letter was read at the inquest the man to whom it was addressed rose in court and stated that not only was it untrue that he had bought the dead man's business but the truth was that he had provided him with considerable sums of money, to assist him in his financial difficulties.³⁰ It is evident that when the mind of a man or woman is dominated by a retrogressive phantasy, all the facts of external reality are twisted by the phantasy-weaving mechanism to

²⁸ DAILY CHRONICLE, 21st February, 1929.

²⁹ A phrase strangely reminiscent of one in a letter written by the murderer Frederick Guy Browne the night before he was executed, quoted in my article "Normal and Abnormal Psychology in relation to Social Welfare" (SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, April, 1929).

³⁰ Case of Bertram Chapman (DAILY CHRONICLE, 26th March, 1929).

fit in with the phantasy ; the product is then disguised under a covering of logical speciousness and thus a semblance of justification is given to the situation which deceives the person's own conscious mind and may deceive the minds of those who read the situation superficially.

MISUNDERSTANDING of the psychological facts of a case may lead to a verdict or to an expression of opinion on the part of the judge which to the psychologically educated mind savours of the primitive. Thus at the inquest on the young man found dead on the railway (mentioned above), a frequenter of spiritualist meetings, we find the coroner saying : " Someone has apparently been posing as a medium and trying to make out that she had received a message from the deceased to his mother. If people like to believe such nonsense they are at liberty to do so, but they should not pester other people. Fortune-tellers are prosecuted, but these sort of people are not. It is about time they were." To anyone who has studied the working of the abnormal mind, it is obvious that such a person is not malignly influenced against his will by the medium ; nor does the medium give him out of his or her (the medium's) own mind the knowledge which will lead to his ruin, but such a person goes to a medium to receive an interpretation of the occult intuitions of his own mind, the medium being simply one who has the power of reading another person's sub-conscious mind. To prosecute mediums (as to persecute witches) is a task useless as well as retrograde ; since the person who wishes to find the key to the occult forces of his own mind will do so, whether he is acting legally in consulting a " medium " or not.

ANOTHER example of the primitive outlook of the legal world in dealing with crime is furnished by a very different type of case, that of " Colonel " Barker, popularly known as the " man-woman." A sentence of 9 months' imprisonment for causing a false statement to be entered in a marriage register was passed upon her by the justice in these words : " The result I have arrived at is this—that you are an unprincipled, mendacious and unscrupulous adventuress. You have, in the case before me, profaned the house of God, outraged the decencies of nature, and broken the laws of man." Yet even a casual reading of this case would have convinced any student of psychology that this woman had a definite phantasy of herself as a man. It is evident that she was led by physical resemblances and by her ability to play a man's part to imagine that she actually was a man and that her disordered imagination had constructed a story of events in the outer world to fit into and support the phantasy. Finally she had become unable to distinguish between her phantasy and the facts of reality, a state of mind in which she could hardly in fairness be held responsible for her actions. This woman was urgently in need of someone to help her to disentangle the twisted elements of her own personality. Such help she was not likely to receive in prison.

XV.

THE superficial nature of public opinion with regard to crime is perhaps best illustrated from the recently published Blue-book of Criminal Statistics for 1927, in which it is stated, as regards murder : " Observers at home and abroad, whatever their views on capital punishment, agree that the strongest deterrent is the certainty of being found out and dealt with." Even from the evidence of the few cases cited above, it is clear that this sweeping statement is far from the truth. In two cases we have found the man giving himself up to the police and in one case the murderer saying that he wanted to be hanged. From the psychological study of murder cases we rather gain the impression that the murderer desires death. The Blue-book itself shows that 41 murderers committed suicide in 1927 (the number of murders being 99). It would appear that if a man is seized by that uncontrollable impulse which drives him to the irrevocable deed of murder, to render thereby static his relationship with the person who ministers to his phantasy,³¹ he will not be deterred by the punishment of death, which in his mind only serves to send him to the world of his desires.³² In some cases the murderer will actually prefer death by execution : for in suffering death at the hands of his fellow men he more completely expiates his crime to the satisfaction of his own " social " self, thereby ending his account with this world.³³

³¹ In cases where the victim of the murder is not the person who (psychologically) supports the phantasy of the murderer but the person who opposes it, we still find the hope of eternal union with the person who objectifies the phantasy the dominating element in the murderer's mind. For instance, when William Henry Kennedy, one of the murderers of Police Constable Gutteridge, was sentenced to death, he said to the judge : " It is fate, and you, my lord, and the jury who have tried me are mere instruments of fate. It is not in any spirit of bravado that I say that I am not afraid of death, but I meet it willingly because I know I have the certain knowledge that in the hereafter I shall be united to the one darling girl [his wife] who has stuck by me throughout this terrible ordeal." (Sentence of death was passed 27th April, 1928.)

³² This state of mind was exemplified in the case of a man of 70 (Wallace Benton) who was sentenced to death on 6th June, 1929, for shooting a rival in the possession of his property ; the man, being deaf, received the announcement of death through an ear trumpet, on which his only comment was : " I shall get to heaven a bit before my time." (DAILY CHRONICLE, 7th June, 1929.)

³³ Capital punishment represents *objectively* and historically the verdict of society that the murderer is not fit to live among his fellows. A *subjective* recognition of the same fact, namely, that a murderer by his deed *has cut himself off* from his fellows, is to be found in a curious connection, in the reflections of the hero of the novel *A SENSE OF THE PAST* (by Henry James), who, on entering *en rapport* with the spirits of the past, " wondered that a knowledge of anything less than murder could be able to constitute in one's soul such a closed back room." The introvert has always such a " back room " to which he can retire ; the murderer by his own deed and desire has made it impossible that he should ever escape from that " closed back room."

SOCIAL EVOLUTION : HOW ADVANCE IT ?* by P. Geddes.

THE Sociological Society may fairly claim to have arisen and developed with the endeavour to appreciate the varied viewpoints, methods and results, of the many preceding and contemporary social thinkers and their schools, and so has welcomed contributions from all sides as far as obtainable, and these by turns of special interest and of harmonising and synthetic aims. Similarly, too, for applied sociology ; since social science, as it advances, turns increasingly towards socially serviceable applications. Hence a relatively large number of its papers have been concerned with social surveys ; and these concretely regional and civic, yet also increasingly generalised and interpretative of contemporary social evolution. The present paper is one of a series of the latter endeavours, of which enough here to recall the two undernoted.† The first of these started from the noteworthy presidential address of Principal Sir Alfred Ewing, at the Centenary celebration of the Royal Institute of Engineers ; since this, while justly recalling a century's work of amazing material progress, no less clearly recognised that such progress has so far outstripped the ethical progress of the race. " For it is the engineer who, in the course of his labours to promote the comfort and convenience of man, has put into man's unchecked and careless hand a monstrous possibility of ruin."

OF this candid confession, of social disillusionment, the explanation here offered turns on the serious outrunning, by the mechanico-physical sciences and arts, of those directly concerned with life and society, mind and morals. Hence mechanistic advances, with pecuniary developments, out of all proportion to the social advances needed for controlling these, or even utilising them at their best. As the early phases of civilisation, in what used to be called " the Stone Age " have long been distinguished by archæologists into " paleolithic and neolithic " (the latter being associated with the advance from hunting to agriculture, and with the higher status of woman which that brings with it), so in this " Industrial Age " of the economists the sociologist must increasingly distinguish, upon its analogous modern spiral, that increasing advance from paleotechnic to neotechnic, which is now so obviously incipient. Yet this is still requiring far fuller development, in which the still dominant mechanistic and pecuniary culture has to be increasingly guided to biotechnic service and by psycho-biologic thought ; and thus with renewal of

* Abstract of two Papers presented by Professor Geddes to the Sociological Society, respectively on June 24th, at the Rooms of the Royal Society, Burlington House, and on June 25th at Leplay House.

† (1) " Rustic and Urban Thought," SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Jan., 1929. (2) " The Interpretation of Current Events," SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, April, 1929.

that feminine and life-tending advance, which is not only manifest in pre-history, but has been so fundamental in organic and psychic evolution, as from ants and bees to birds and mammals, as every naturalist knows, in spite of pseudo-Darwinian war-sophists.

THE essential endeavour of the second paper is, first of all, to clarify—even to graphic definiteness—our discussions on the main lines of recent and contemporary evolution; and first as fundamentally of military, political, and industrial activities, with their corresponding lines of thought. Yet all these are not practically distinct, as current life and thought are wont to assume them; nor yet so simply in succession, as the modern founder of sociology interpreted them, in his famous LAW OF THREE STATES. For here they are shown as demonstrably interwoven, and into a definite social pattern, and coherent web; that of our essential social formation; and that as still dominant, indeed in many respects still integrating and increasing; in fact so much so as to include, for most minds, all essential fields of contemporary social evolution. But here it is next argued, that within this essentially paleotechnic (yet incipiently neotechnic) order, a further phase of civilisation is struggling for existence, and even towards predominance; and this of character essentially biotechnic. That is, seeking to utilise all preceding mechanical and kindred advances, in action and thought, but these increasingly towards the service of life, in its various aspects, organic and psychic, social and moral.

SUCH activities are, of course, nothing new: health and hygiene, education, social and moral endeavours, with their respective ideas and ideals, have long been more or less familiar to all; as notably also are the many aspirations and endeavours towards peace, and towards constructive progress of many kinds. But it is the second essential argument of that paper to bring out—and also to diagrammatic precision—two general conceptions of importance, each claiming consideration: viz., (1) that this second group of activities and ideas is not merely palliative of such defects here and there as are or may be admitted in the dominant order, but that it is already beginning to constitute a no less definite web of civilisation than that mainly dominant; and (2) that this, in all its main elements, is clearly similar to the former in its coherence—at once practical and rational. In short, Comte's well-known LAW OF THREE STATES is here criticised and extended; and thus seen to yield us main phases, or rather elements, of contemporary social evolution, but these in two clearly distinguished triads, each similarly compounded into a coherent and intelligible system of action and thought; in short, therefore, nothing short of a contrast of two clearly distinguishable types of civilisation.

IF, therefore, these two graphic presentments be found to survive the criticism they so clearly invite, they express a step of further clearness,

(a) towards the definite understanding of the essential lines of our contemporary social evolution, here distinguished as twofold. So correspondingly (b) the latter, especially, should be found of service in social action accordingly ; and thus alike for our individual and collective parts in it, henceforth preferably and increasingly the second. (See April REVIEW, pp. 112 and 123.)

HENCE the present paper has to justify this latter proposition, and after further indication of desirable lines of social action ; and these not only increasingly specialised as hitherto, but also more clearly harmonised towards progress.

RECALLING the study of the elements of contemporary social evolution in the second of these two main graphic presentments, we can readily see that the biotechnic occupations tend to extend, and upon larger and larger scale ; as from a village to its region, its villages to their valley or plain, and thus increasingly to no small extent and importance. Here the regional and civic surveys, and their methods, so often outlined and advocated in this Society and its REVIEW, find place and suggestiveness ; and the older and more general surveys of geographer and geologist, of soil and vegetation by their respective specialists here find place and application. Thus, for concrete instance, Switzerland, with its first-rate cow-pastures up to alpine heights, has long had skilled grass specialists ; while in Scotland, with its poor sheep-pastures, capable of substantial improvement, the agrostologist has too long been unknown, yet might with great advantage be employed over vast areas ; and the like also in England, and even in Ireland, more favoured by nature though it be. Similarly as regards the great art of Forestry—which may be safely claimed as one of the most desirable and practical of all forms of real saving and investment, for well-established families and communities alike—is still but in its infancy : so that a whole paper would not suffice to express its possibilities, for the British Isles alone ; nor yet another for those of the Mediterranean, and so on for other vast regions of the globe. Again, the like for Drainage in many places, and yet more for Irrigation in others ; and on all scales ; as from the old water meadows of Salisbury to the colossal barrage of the Nile, and now of the Indus ; and next to the now realisable renewal of Mesopotamia. Similarly already for various regions of India ; as next, with due reorganisation alike of drainage and irrigation together, for that regeneration of Bengal, for which the supreme experience and skill of its present missionary (Sir William Willcocks) cannot surely be much longer left unemployed.

SUCH in every way productive labours, correspondingly reparative as well, admirably combine the public works of geotechnic engineering with the personal and biotechnic labours of agriculturists ; and so

they find a further place also in our diagram, as of practical Social Service. And this with real advance in economic theory as well; since from its older "political" forms, be these of individualistic or socialistic doctrine, to the social economy which claims to transform all schools alike; as from urban antagonisms of capital and labour, and to constructive rural and vital development, employing, of course, increasingly the mechanical resources of the engineer. And this to his advantage also: witness how the works of Krupp are now constructively instead of destructively employed, and thus needing and building more garden villages than ever.

It is no doubt the custom of financial capitals, and their capitalists, still to seek their fields of investment within the older system, rather than the new, of which they as yet know little, and so care less. In face of the speedily realisable securities and early returns on which they concentrate, the rural improver is apt to despair; but it is therefore for us to devise fresh methods of financing even forestry, slow though its return must be, though not so slow as most think. If this can be done, as is far from impossible, we are passing from the short-sighted finance of immediate gain to a longer and larger vision, with better direction of social energies and economies; in a word, to Social Finance. There are many signs that there are investors already looking for this: and the working world, already so far reached by urban co-operation, is also awakening towards its rural forms.

WITH these biotechnic and geotechnic outlooks, our customary political and abstract conceptions, of "the State and the Individual" become concretely biological as regards their nature, and biotechnically constructive, i.e., geotechnic, as regards their policy. This, indeed, current political programmes have begun substantially to show; thus pointing to a change from the too abstract conception of "Progress" to that of Evolution, of Life; and this actively, in the concrete, for people, work, and place together. But is not this a real Transition from the mechanical politics of party-countings and the opportunist politics of Ins and Outs? And towards policy on constructive lines readily realisable?

AGAIN such constructive conceptions, purposes, and applications carry with them a veritable Re-Education; and that of the best since with heart, hand and head together—in course of which, just as with Madame Montessori's children, "the three R's" hitherto specialised on, to dullness, under current misinstruction-bureaucracies are acquired far faster, and to better purpose. And as constructive changes mostly arise from individual pioneering—say Horace Plunkett's for salient example, yet these carried out by plain pleasant folk to whom he appeals—and who thus learn to organise themselves—have we not here plainly a strong element of democracy in its best

sense ; since producing its own administrations, with economy accordingly, no less, perhaps even more, than do urban co-operators already. Such administrators are mostly unpaid, save when whole-time is needed, and then modestly ; while also the State-bureaucracy itself is improved, even to efficiency—witness the Irish Congested Districts Boards, among older examples.

AGAIN, this constructive work can no longer be shelved, as National or Imperial—grand terms, which mostly cover metropolitan over-centralisation. First of all it is local ; but not merely “provincial,” in the supercilious metropolitan sense. It is regional and civic ; and so it becomes really national in time ; witness Danish rural co-operation, for best known type.

ALL these manifold (yet, as we now see, inter-related) activities, and their associated ideas and ideals, are manifestly abating not only the statism of the older order from which we are emerging, but its excessive individualism too. Has it not long been the weakness of socialism, like too many older faiths, to have mainly concentrated upon its prophetic books, and thus left too few to labour towards realising in real life whatever is best in them ? However, in every Danish or other village active in its co-operations, do we not see the rise of a true social grouping, a true beginning of Etho-Polity ; since thus truly *eupsychic*—that is, increasingly earnest in goodwill, eager for fuller knowledge, and even arousing to art—in short seeking the essential ideals, of good, beautiful and true ; and increasingly finding them. Thus, the high level of Danish agriculture, and of its organisation, is contemporary with notable progress in the fine arts, in sciences and their applications, in literature and its criticism, in philosophy, and in morals ; as is surely nowadays common knowledge : so we can next see how these are integrated in, by, and from, the evolution of homely labour and life. Thus a peculiarly able and observant woman, of eminent dramatic experience and productivity, returning from a summer’s participation in a Danish folk-school, came back rejoicing with her discovery of the growing eminence of Danish arts, even to sculpture, as clearly associated with the returning beauty of her peasant youth, in such vital conditions for mind and body together. After all, what are the ideals of Olympus and Parnassus ? Those of body and mind at best.

ONE main field of our scheme still remains to be considered—that of establishing Peace, despite ever-increasing world-equipment towards the ever-threatening Super-War. With all and due respect to the League of Nations—for it is only those who ignore its records who can despair of it—its labours are still, and no doubt as yet almost inevitably, within the older world of politics ; and thus, more towards postponing and palliating its persistent dangers than precluding them.

For that war is inherent—not in human nature—but in the predominant social system, and more or less in each and all its fields of struggle for existence, is surely becoming more and more undeniably plain. For in a system ever more and more dominantly mechanistic, and thus with no adequate idea or ideal of Life, who but Death can be its essential master?

BUT here we have been outlining a succeeding order, one of thinking and doing, in keeping with the advancement of life in evolution; and so, as we can already see clearly in progress, towards a harmonious and co-operative working system of action and thought. And these in continual interaction; not only increasing goodwill, but activating it, to Help-will. So why not be preparing—and soon even entering on—veritable Peace wars, with their yearly and seasonable campaigns of this new order; no longer of mortal injury, but of nobler rivalries, towards Life's enhancement and achievement; and so culminating in the victory best worth winning, that not in war, but over war itself.

OF course one knows, indeed through life, all the usual cynical criticisms and pessimist arguments against such "utopian" idealisms. These are indeed both logical and convincing—to those of the conventionally established order of things and thoughts; since this is militant, statist, nationalistic, even to increasingly imperial and megalopolitan megalomaniacs, and ever evolving new devilries of terrifying (because terrified) armaments; and these not only super-mechanistic, but world-poisonous, even to air, waters, and earth alike. Still, we can but all the more "seek peace and ensue it"—organise it, equip it, too; and this towards a scale why not as great as that of war? In our recent "Coal" books we claimed, on behalf of the nascent profession of regional and city planners, that it is ready to deal, rapidly and economically, with the urgent question of unemployment, and this through far more than motor-road making. Why not, indeed, increasingly deal with the yet vaster problems of Mis-employment—and among these with those of Re-employment—even of armies, so transforming them from their ever-threatening worst mis-employment of all? How the Bulgarians have indeed begun this constructive employment of their youth of military age, and how the Danes are discussing the like, is, or should be, common knowledge: so, indeed, all the seeming Utopianism of the present paper and its predecessors is based on observation. It is only the unobservant, or the cynic, who fails to know that though this year's leafage is so far already failing in this prevalent summer drought, that of next year is already months old, because formed in bud since the opening of each leaf of this year, now a whole season ago.

THREE points more, and we have done. First, though the above line of argument fitly set out with biotechnic labour and thought, and

traced the congruence of other elements of a better social system along with it, this treatment does not neglect—but all the more plainly indicates—the fact that whoever is of goodwill may also plainly start from any other part of this system, which may be more familiar or congenial to him, and thus find his way to co-operate with the others.

SECONDLY, if we are thus making a step in clearness, and towards better understanding of social evolution, and how to advance it, we have here Mr. Wells' OPEN CONSPIRACY, and all the more open ; and along with this there is place for similar consideration of other " utopias "—towards Eutopia.

FINALLY, and most practically of all, we are asked to answer the question—How convince others, and enlist them? The above example, of the town-planners waiting for employment, is but an indication that a vital engineering is increasingly ready. But what of the great public and its leaders? Well, the public were lately voters, and with embarrassing abundance of choice of would-be leaders. Why not now mobilise such of these as we can reach? The successfully elected will be busy enough ; but as for the unsuccessful—so obviously rich in goodwill also—why now leave them unemployed? Why not mobilise them, towards carrying out in real life, of region and city, something at least—and why not more and more—of the social service they so lately were offering? And as to the voters, too, why need they be unemployed till the next election, be this far or near? In the present balance of parties, may not the needs and opportunities of social service, the values and potentialities of social science, be now made more intelligible, and more attractive, than they have ever been before? Have not many voters, and these women probably even more than men, been seriously thinking, and even inquiring—" Who will show us any good? " So why not more of definite attempts towards answer to such questioning?—and even towards sociological and social organisation of its vast resources of unemployed goodwill? Indeed, why not here, in this Society to begin with, since so well fitted to be its non-party clearing house?

P.S. Since the above paper was read, various encouraging responses have come in, and from very different quarters. This not only (e.g.) from unsuccessful parliamentary candidates, but even successful ones too, among the few members who see that politics need the help of all the sciences, and of sociology certainly not least among these. This, however, only more strongly brings out to our little group—of which the individuals are over-worked and scattered—the need of active co-operation from those who can afford some time to aid us in the task of relating the different elements of social progress, at present too much separately pursued, by such definite linkages as these papers suggest. There is of course as yet " no money in this " ; yet it is none the less clearly the beginning of a veritable web of

social, regional and civic co-operations, and even of vitally progressive "cross-fertilisations," for much of the best that is being thought and done in different countries as well, albeit also as yet too separately. Our various beginnings—as at Leplay House in London, the Outlook Tower in Edinburgh, and at the Collège des Ecosais at Montpellier—despite their small numbers and resources, and their own difficulties of survival accordingly, are thus at present widening out their contacts with kindred endeavours; and finding these, albeit also struggling ones, more numerous, more sympathetic and yet also more complementary, than in former years they had realised. So now they invite correspondence towards such further linkages, such fuller co-operations as may be. And—in contrast to most social appeals—they do not as yet ask for subscriptions in money, but for volunteers—and of course of part-time in most cases, though naturally whole-time will be welcomed; and for such periods as maybe.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

READERS of the REVIEW hardly need to be reminded of our reiterated appeals for closer co-operation between the few groups who seriously labour for synthesis, in a world so highly specialised as to be indifferent to integrative interests. But for effective co-operation between the sparse and scattered groups of synthetic aim there is urgent need for the aid of volunteers such as Professor Geddes pleads for.

THORSTEIN VEBLEN: by J. A. Hobson.

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, whose death in California occurred last August, will rightly rank as the most considerable thinker in the field of economics that America has yet produced. His most important work has consisted in rescuing economics from the detached position to which several generations of the classical tradition had relegated it, and treating it in the light of modern psychology and biology, as a section of the science and art of human conduct. For this task he enjoyed two qualifications of particular importance. Born of Norwegian emigrant stock, and reared on a Minnesota farm, when the West was young, he brought that naive curiosity of the intelligent farm-lad to bear upon the rapidly improvised artificialities of city life and work, which has inspired so much of the best thought in American sociology. For though we speak of Veblen as an economist, he is perhaps better regarded as sociologist. For all his writings, from his "Theory of the Leisure Class," in 1899, to his "Absentee Ownership," are based upon an interpretation of history, which, though in a sense dominantly economic, gives an important co-operative place to all the other instincts, interests and activities which go to make up the total life of individuals and societies. Moreover, like Adam Smith, his earlier academic training, at Johns Hopkins and Yale, lay in the general field of philosophy, including much orderly reading in anthropology and history.

To these origins was coupled an exceptionally alert, penetrating and fearless mind, utterly recalcitrant to academic traditions and customary thinking. His approach to the habits, thoughts and valuations of the complex economic society of the rising American city was that of a curious and suspicious animal, scenting everywhere the novel and the strange, and bringing some instinctive faculty of understanding and assessment to bear upon them. This disinterested (or as he termed it "idle") curiosity enabled him to discover and express wonderfully interesting and subtle meanings in the accepted commonplaces of his age and country. Herein lay the essential quality of that humour, sometimes kindly, sometimes mordant, which gave a baffling quality to his books of revelation. "The plainer was a piece of commonsense, the more universally accepted, the more conscious did Veblen find it, and the further back in human culture did he go for an explanation" writes Mr. Wesley Mitchell in *THE NEW REPUBLIC*. The essential humour of this method doubtless served as a protection for the disconcerting doctrines which emerged from such studies. There is, however, no ground for thinking that Veblen's style was in any conscious sense artificial. His mind simply worked that way, and a certain ponderousness of expression, which makes some of his writings difficult, was merely the defect of this quality of the true Veblen.

"THE Theory of the Leisure Class" contained in embryo all the most distinctive thinking of his later works. It is a dramatic presentation of the self assertive and predacious instincts of man, as expressed in terms of modern material and cultural civilisation. In primitive society, the honorific occupations were fighting and hunting, and the prestige-giving trophies were skulls and slaves. In modern society honorific occupations are more numerous and complex, implying industrial and financial controls over other men, and their prestige lies in the ostentatious luxury and conspicuous leisure performed by themselves, their families and their dependents. Moral and intellectual valuations conform to the requirements of this honorific status, which demands elaborate rituals of bounty and culture for the effective display of its power and magnanimity. In the region of culture, the idle curiosity stamps valuations upon the arts and sciences, in accordance with certain canons of inutility and aptness for conspicuous display, tending to place on a lower level those activities of mind which bear immediate and obvious utility. In a word, the evolution both of the material and immaterial arts of civilisation is explained in terms of the instinct of personal prestige.

THE serious pursuit of this theme carries him into exceedingly interesting explanations of the evolution of industry, on the one hand, economic theory, on the other. Perhaps the most penetrating analysis is to be found in his "The Plan of Science in Modern Civilisation" (first published 1919), where he formally displaces the crude hedonism of the classical economics by showing how the instinctive urges of man, selected in conformity with the economic requirements of his society and its industrial arts, mould his general habits of thought and feeling and construct his dominant theories and valuations, social, æsthetic, moral, religious and intellectual. Here Veblen draws very near to the Le Play School, though his stress upon the conditions of display and leadership somewhat dwarf the wider interpretations of the common life. Most instructive is his comparison between the agricultural life with its canons derived from the course of "natural phenomena," procreation, birth, growth and decay, and the modern life of city industry where the machine not only sets the plan but moulds the mind. The general theory of man's conduct is thus stated: "His canons of validity are made for him by the cultural situation: they are habits of thought imposed on him by the scheme of life current in the community in which he lives: and under modern conditions the scheme of life is largely machine-made" (p. 17).

His close analysis of current economic teaching in this volume gives a far more convincing exposure of capitalist theory than is contained in any of the Marxian or other avowedly socialistic treatises. For it shows that the main source of economic inequality and oppression is not to be found in the monopoly of land or material capital, but in

the control, and utilisation for personal gain, of the new technical knowledge and the new environmental and social opportunities. Nor is it now the capitalist-employer who represents the culmination of economic power, but the trafficker in vendible capital, the financial magnate. More and more in his later works Veblen comes to concentrate upon the distinction between the business man and the financier, or, as he expresses it, in the title of one of his later and most brilliantly written little volumes, "The Engineer and the Price System." The most complete statement, however, of his later doctrine is found in his "Absentee Ownership" (first published 1923). Here the happenings of the great War cause him to consider the relations between modern business enterprise and the politics of States, including war. As usual his method is historical, and the early story of the national State is exhibited as "a competitive enterprise of war and politics, in which the rival princely or dynastic establishments, all or several, each sought its own advantage at the cost of any whom it might concern" (p. 22).

"By habituation through these bleak centuries of State-making, this national integrate of hate, mischief and distrust has been ground into the texture of civilised life and thought, until it has become one of the sovereign facts in the established order of law and morals in all the civilised nations. So that when, presently, under the pressure of altered material circumstances, and consequent altered habits of life, a phase of democratic institutions set in, the ancient habitual solidarity of national conceit, fear, hate, contempt and servility was carried over intact and unabated into the ideals of the democratic commonwealth, where it is still treasured as the essential substance of citizenship" (p. 25). This carrying on of the dynastic sentiment into democracy is closely connected with the modern needs of profitable economic exploitation. Imperialism is the grandiose expansion of nationalism directed mainly by the need for foreign markets, on the one hand, control of the tropical and undeveloped areas, in order to supply foods for congested Western populations and materials for their labour, on the other, to furnish outlets for the surplus manufactured products which the new technique can supply in prodigal abundance. But international rivalry and economic competition, though by their waste and bloodletting they may slow down the evolution of economic disorder, do not provide a remedy. The competitive system within the industries of the highly industrialised nations is visibly displaced by amalgamation, rationalisation and kindred organising processes, which signify an increasing measure of central financial control. In short, the financial magnate is strengthening his grip over the capitalist-employer and his managerial staff, and the Price System, which the former imposes to secure his highest gain, requires a withholding of the full powers of efficient production. Hence

under-consumption, unemployment, disorganisation of labour and related poverty and disorder. Veblen shows much skill in his analysis of the processes of financiering, so as (a) "to inflate the money-earning capacity of a business, a concession or right or other marketable entity; (b) to capitalise in paper securities this earning power at the top of its curve; (c) to 'unload on the public,' which means converting these paper securities into legal tender, actual or potential, by ingenious combinations of the Banking System, the Stock Exchange, and the Press; (d) to invest the proceeds in securities calculated to yield an ample and steady income to 'absentee owners.'" (SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, January, 1925.)

THIS process Veblen describes as "financial sabotage," and apparently he thinks nothing can be done about it. For there is nothing illegal in these practices and no disposition of politicians to make them illegal. Probably the optimism of Americans resents this disparagement of their institutions. At any rate, Veblen has never received any adequate recognition of his great and original contributions to sociology and economics in his own country. In Britain none of his work, not even his "Leisure Class," is widely known, though Messrs. Allen & Unwin published a few years ago four or five of his volumes, including those cited in this article.

COMMUNICATIONS.

MEMORIAL TO PROFESSOR L. T. HOBHOUSE.

THE recent death of Professor Leonard Hobhouse came as a shock to his friends, who had looked forward to his having a good many years of further work and of development of the unique position which he has held in the study of the social sciences. We feel sure that many of those who directly or indirectly have come into contact with his work will wish to help in the establishment of some Memorial Fund with which his name may be permanently associated, and which may be used to assist in the perpetuation of his influence.

WE accordingly invite subscriptions to such a fund. We hope that those who subscribe may leave us, who sign this appeal, as a Committee representative of the many sides of life which Professor Hobhouse touched, to frame a scheme for the Memorial, and to settle at a later date whether any fund raised can be used best for a lectureship, a scholarship or the publication of studies in the social sciences.

SUBSCRIPTIONS may be sent to Dr. G. P. Gooch, 76 Campden Hill Road, W.8, who has agreed to act as Treasurer of the fund.

S. ALEXANDER.
W. H. BEVERIDGE.
VICTOR BRANFORD.
H. A. L. FISHER.
MORRIS GINSBERG.
G. P. GOOCH.
J. L. HAMMOND.
J. A. HOBSON.

GILBERT MURRAY.
PERCY NUNN.
HERBERT SAMUEL.
C. P. SCOTT.
HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH.
ARTHUR STEEL-MAITLAND.
GRAHAM WALLAS.
BEATRICE WEBB.

COOLEY'S IDEA OF METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.

IN supplement to the abstract and estimate of the work of the late Professor C. H. Cooley, which appeared in the July number of the REVIEW, the following citations may be made from a Memoir on Cooley which Professor Ellwood contributes to the September number of SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH :

" COOLEY's greatest contribution to sociological methodology is to be found in the paper on 'The Roots of Social Knowledge' (AM. JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, July, 1926). In this paper he shows definitely and once for all the great differences between the social and the physical sciences and the inadequacy of the method of the latter for the former ; he also vindicates the right of the social sciences to be called sciences, even though their method is very different from that of the physical sciences. He points out that 'the distinctive trait of spatial knowledge is that it is mensurative, that of social knowledge is, that it is dramatic.' As the former depends upon distinctions among our sensations of material objects, 'the latter is based ultimately upon perceptions of the intercommunicating behaviour of men and the experience of the processes of mind that go with it.' Hence 'human knowledge is both behaviouristic and sympathetic.' There is, therefore, no standardised objective measure to which we can subject it.

"Strictly speaking, there are no yardsticks in social knowledge, no elementary perceptions of distinctively social facts that are so alike in all men, and can be so precisely communicated, that they supply an unquestionable means of description and measurement." Therefore, "the first step toward clear thinking about social or human knowledge as compared with material or spatial knowledge, is to recognise that the former rests eventually upon sympathetic understanding of the acts of men, and can never be exact or mensurative in the sense that material knowledge can be." Would-be social scientists who seek to dodge the mental and emotional processes in which society consists, to circumvent them, to find them superfluous, arrive only at pseudo-science. This method in the end will not work, Cooley tells us, for these phenomena are nature's; if we are to have a social science, it must advance through them, not around them. "The study and measurement of behaviour, the outside of life, is a fruitful and promising method, but the idea of a human science consisting wholly of such study, without sympathetic observation of the mind, is, I think, only mystification." Yet Cooley does not object to a behaviouristic method in the social sciences provided it realises and acknowledges its limitations, as leaving out after all that which chiefly distinguishes human life from physical processes, namely, creative mental synthesis. In general, final interpretation must include sympathetic introspection, since it is "a normal and common process without which we could know very little about life."

PROFESSOR COOLEY believed, however, that fundamental agreement upon meanings in sociology can be made more precise by the careful use of language and thus transmission and accumulation of social knowledge exact enough for practical purposes is possible. He says the human mind participates in social processes in a way that it does not in any other processes. It is itself a sample, a phase of those processes, and is capable under favourable circumstances, of so far identifying itself with the general movement of a group as to achieve a remarkably just anticipation of what the group will do. Thus he tells us that sociology is not only a science and a philosophy but looked at from the point of view of constructive imagination it is also an art. It needs liberation from outworn theological and metaphysical assumptions and the rise of a technical group of adequately-trained scholars, but it also needs continued development of factual theory, springing from observation and capable of being verified or refuted by the closer study of social facts and experience.

COMTE AFTER SEVENTY YEARS.

WRITING under the above title in the admirable *POSITIVIST YEAR BOOK*,* Dr. McQuilkin Degrange of Dartmouth College, U.S.A., traces the growth of recent thought in the wake of Comte's philosophy of life and contemporary society. Dr. Degrange says "all that I shall do is to present a few selections from writers of acknowledged prominence in present-day thought and show how the conceptions they express—in all cases but one without any reference to, and almost certainly without knowledge of, Comte's writings—could have been familiar to any reader of Comte alone, into whose system they fit without the slightest difficulty."

*Les Presses Universitaires de France, 49 Boulevard St. Michel, Paris: English Representative, W. Hartley Bolton, 6 Darley Drive, West Derby, Liverpool.

"LET me begin with a citation in which the influence of Comte is clearly acknowledged. It comes from the pen of one of the most noted modern historians, Ferrero. Writing in the *LONDON ILLUSTRATED NEWS* of April 16, 1927, p. 688, he says: 'In the massive pages of the great Positivist, there sleeps in a long sleep, awaiting probably the right hour of awakening, a doctrine which our epoch has neither accepted nor refuted, as if it were afraid of finding, after serious examination, that it were true. What does this doctrine say? For three centuries, the spirit of the West has only produced critical doctrines; from all these critical doctrines revolutions have been born, producing in their turn more audacious doctrines, which have engendered yet more radical revolutions. From one doctrine to another the Western World is marching towards an anarchy which feeds on sophisms and would make the problem of order and authority almost insoluble.'

"COMTE'S doctrine has a pessimistic character; which, perhaps explains its mediocre success. It seeks to prove that the nineteenth century had taken a wrong turn, and that it was advancing towards a catastrophe, unless it were converted to the doctrines of the philosopher in time so that authority might be reconstituted on solid foundations. One cannot quite understand in reading the works of the great philosopher, why, during the last three centuries, all the critical and destructive doctrines have triumphed, unless we assume a mysterious delirium in a part of humanity."

"BUT what depth and what power are contained in that doctrine! In the last pages of the *COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE*, there are pages on modern society, inspired by that doctrine, which have always seemed to me to contain some of the most vivid truths that have been written in our time. And they help us to understand, despite certain hiatuses, even the strange suicide which the European Imperialism of the nineteenth century is carrying out before our astonished eyes."

"STILL in the field of history, what has the recent flood of books on universal history to surprise the reader of the third volume of the *POLITIQUE POSITIVE*? Mr. H. G. Wells has discovered the Future, and Professor Breasted the New Past, but where is the novelty of these discoveries, or what have they of instruction for the readers of him who declared that the proper sequence of epochs is the past, the future and the present?"

"AND who but Comte, seventy years ago, insisted on the importance of the Middle Ages? And when Mr. de Wolfe, the historian of Scholasticism, declares that the makers of that period were two in number, the church and feudalism, what has he done but repeat the words of Comte?"

"HEAR next the words in which Mr. George Sarton, the internationally known historian of science and editor of *ISIS*, summarising his meditations on the history of the Occident, states his views as to the historical functions of the Greek, the Roman, and the Christian worlds: 'The clash between Greek ideals and various oriental religions ended with the triumph of Christianity. It was a distinct gain from the point of view of scientific research. This might be considered a third tempering of mankind. The Greeks had taught the nobility of scientific study and that the pursuit of disinterested knowledge is the greatest purification; the Romans had urged the necessity of applying knowledge to immediate needs; the Christians were now insisting that if we have not charity it profits us nothing. The Greeks laid stress upon truth and beauty; the Romans upon strength and usefulness; the Christians upon love.' What else did Comte say of these three epochs seventy years ago?"

"AND in concluding these brief citations in the historical field, let me urge upon Positivists the work of Mr. Robert Briffault, whose volume *THE MAKING OF HUMANITY* gives expression with eloquence and fulness of modern knowledge to ideas that are familiar to all of them."

"TURNING to the case of sociology, I think little need be said. There are those for whom A. D. means Anno Darwini and the year 1, the year of the publication of the *ORIGIN OF SPECIES*. For them, of course, Comte can be only of historial interest. But it is not so easy to consign a man to what they call the dustbins of the past, especially when but one half of his work has received attention. Here, for example, comes Mr. Victor Branford with the proposal that 'all the post-Comtian sociologies, not demonstrably continuous with the "preliminary" sciences, be written off the balance sheet of philosophical reckoning.' Is there need of mentioning the latest name in the field of sociology, the late Vilfredo Pareto, whose work cannot be understood except in the light of the *POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY*."

"HERE, in another field, is the case of what is coming to be called 'mental medicine.' This is what the late W. H. R. Rivers wrote: 'Another principle which is now meeting with general acceptance in psychological medicine is that functional nervous and mental disorders depend essentially on disturbance of the instinctive and emotional or affective aspects of the mind.' And he goes on to say: 'The salient features of the medicine of to-day is that these psychical factors are no longer allowed to play their part unwittingly, but are themselves becoming the subject of study, so that the present age is seeing the growth of a rational system of psycho-therapeutics. One feature of this system, which is already becoming clear, is that it must take account of agencies that have until now been held to be the function of the priest rather than the physician.' Well, let the reader turn to the letters that Comte wrote to Dr. Audiffrent and see whether these ideas are novelties of the present day or views more than seventy years old."

"FOR my last instance, I go to the field of what has come to be called psycho-analysis. I have no intention of asserting that Comte seventy years ago had the idea of psycho-analysis in its detailed modern form, with all its apparatus of terms and methods of greater or less repute. He was much too great a man to have been guilty of the narrowness and the metaphysical absurdities that mar the present theory. But I do insist that the essential elements of what is called psycho-analysis exist in the pages of the *POLITIQUE POSITIVE*, where, in the third chapter of the fourth volume Comte uses the phrase 'the analysis of the soul.' Let us hear Dr. Bernard Hart in this connection. There is no greater authority: 'Drever has remarked "that though perceptual experience is more and more overlaid by the higher mental processes, it always underlies them and, though control of primitive impulse becomes more and more complex, it is always a control by that which draws its controlling force, ultimately and fundamentally, from primitive impulses, never a control *Ab extra*."' What less did Comte say when he asserted in his later works that feeling is the fundamental motive force of our existence?—when he discovered the science he called 'Morals' was above and beyond sociology in the hierarchic scale?"

"AND Hart goes on to say in his own person: 'Pursuing this line of thought it may be said that if we are to dissect mental processes into constituent parts and to trace back the driving forces to their elements, the latter must presumably consist of something like the primitive instincts. Similarly, if we accept an evolutionary standpoint, we must build up man's activities

from elements to be observed in lower animals, and sex and self-preservation would constitute the chief founts from which energy would be ultimately derived. It is therefore not impossible or even improbable that a conception will finally be achieved in which the manifold activities of man are reduced to primitive forces, and found to be the result of permutations and combinations amongst those forces."

"HAS the writer of these lines advanced further than the last chapter of the first volume of the *POLITIQUE POSITIVE*, now more than seventy years old, the chapter where Comte insists that man's fundamental instincts are those only that he shares with the higher animals; or, than the Cerebral Table, where the primitive forces that prompt the manifold activities of man are analysed and presented in schematic form? Has he gone as far as the fourth volume of the *POLITIQUE*, where Comte has clearly stated that this investigation can follow only and not precede the making of sociology?"

"HAVE I not then the right to assert that Comte, so far from being an historical figure only, is in many ways in advance of the most advanced investigators of to-day? Is it not a commonplace of scientific thought that method alone is the deciding factor in scientific investigation? And it is precisely here that Comte is pointing the way."

"NOT that I think Comte has said the last word on this or any other subject. Comte, it is all too often forgotten, was at heart neither a philosopher nor a scientist. He was a Renewer, a Renewer of life and thought. All his intellectual labours had this end in view. His philosophy and his sociology were made with this purpose and with this purpose only. Yet this purpose required him to make a review of all modern thought and to reduce it to order, to make of it a system into which new conceptions could be put and judged in their relation to thought as a whole. Here is Comte's significance. Regardless of errors in details and failure to foresee the details of theories to arise seventy years later, Comte provides a system in which new conceptions can find their appropriate place and setting, and in which each of the leading ideas cited above can find its proper *cadre*."

A CRITICAL VIEW OF "THE OPEN CONSPIRACY."*

THE spirit which animates *The Open Conspiracy* group is a conviction that the social world is not what it ought to be and a resulting desire to help to alter it. The "Open Conspiracy" therefore is to be judged by the adequacy of its outlook on the social situation.

THE life of early man was overshadowed by a sense of littleness and helplessness in the face of nature. In the history of thought concerning human happiness and destiny, two views are very apparent. One view, whose extremest forms are exemplified in Stoic and Oriental thought, is confidence in the ability of man to find harmony by adapting himself to the world; by simplifying his needs and wanting little, man can make the world satisfy him. In Christianity the feeling of helplessness in the face of circumstance was rationalised by the postulate of another life, in which the satisfactions unattainable in this life by means of personal adjustment could find fulfilment. The other view, which arose as mankind grew in knowledge and power,

*An address to a Group that meets at Leplay House for the study of Mr. Wells' "Open Conspiracy."

and in inspiration and aspiration to control circumstance, is that man can mould the world to his unadjusted self, i.e., adjust the world to his desires. This view in its extremer form is exemplified by the notion that political action is competent to right what is wrong with the world.

IN reality, of course, neither view is sufficient in itself. On the one hand the material development of existence is absolutely essential, while on the other hand, without a right personal attitude no alteration in material circumstance will make life either what men, in their ignorance, desire it, or what it would suit men best to have it. Now, in the "Open Conspiracy" Wells ranges himself with the political action school, and his six points do not reveal an adequate diagnosis of the social situation. The modern discontent with social circumstance is something deeper than discontent with economic conditions. The following passage from Tawney reveals something of the nature of the modern criticism of the social order: "The burden of our civilisation is not merely, as many suppose, that the product of industry is ill-distributed, or its conduct tyrannical, or its operation interrupted by bitter disagreements. It is that industry itself has come to hold a position of exclusive predominance among human interests, which no single interest, and least of all the provision of the material means of existence, is fit to occupy. Like a hypochondriac who is so absorbed in the processes of his own digestion that he goes to the grave before he has begun to live, industrialised communities neglect the very objects for which it is worth while to acquire riches in their feverish preoccupation with the means by which riches can be acquired." ("The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society," pp. 183-184.) The same criticism is expressed, less articulately, in the Youth Movements, as also in the cults for Simple Life, Back to Nature, &c., which are a prominent feature in the current revolt against accepted values.

"BEFORE man made us citizens, Great Nature made us men," wrote Lowell. It is felt that civilisation has developed in a manner which estranges man from Nature, denies him outlets for self-expression and self-realisation, and frustrates his desires for the satisfaction of healthy urges which are rooted in his make-up as a vital, functioning psycho-physical organism. A world from which poverty, war and even diseases shall have been banished is seen to be not enough,—as Shaw, in "Major Barbara," saw that in the sleek, well-paid Undershaft employees there were still souls to be socially saved. There is required, it is seen, a new orientation in the individual outlook, a personal revolution as well as a politico-social revolution,—not after the latter or even alongside it, but in advance, in order that it may the better realise what it is really worth while to effect. The remarkable revival of interest in religion—at first sight extraordinary at a time when there was never more unbelief—is another sign of civilised humanity's intuition that the current goals of ambition are not really first things.

Is it possible, however, for man to mistake his desires? "That whole classes of mental functions and faculties may fall into temporary disrepute is abundantly evidenced by history, which makes it no less clear that the attempt to suppress a part of the being, to live without it, as though it did not exist, is never permanently successful. Sooner or later the outlawed elements take their revenge, the order of their banishment is rescinded, and a new philosophy of life becomes popular—a philosophy which gives to previously despised and outlawed elements their due place in the scheme of things." (Aldous Huxley: "Proper Studies.") Such a period was the Renaissance, when the rediscovered wisdom of the ancients revealed the narrowness of mediæval life. Such is the present moment, when science is

revealing new horizons. Now, at such a moment, when civilised mankind is trying to probe behind the material foundations of life by which it has set so much store, and discern the things that really bring contentment with existence, Wells, in his "Open Conspiracy," puts before us a material objective. In his book the new criticism of the social order has no recognition. Taking his summary (on p. 113), of "essential requirements," his six points are: (a) that forms of government must be changed in time; (b) without Peace civilisation is in peril; (c) the need for the communalisation of at least credit, transport, and staple industries; (d) the desirability for world control of population, epidemic disease, &c.; (e) the need for a certain standard of material comfort and personal freedom; (f) the guiding enthusiasm of life for social reformers should be the striving to bring about these five objects, and that all spare energy should be consecrated to that end, plus (these almost in parenthesis) "the advancement of human knowledge, capacity and power."

To the last point he appends a restatement of the idea of immortality, unsatisfying to those who yearn for personal survival and without moving power for those who affirm themselves agnostic. Deprived of his belief in personal immortality the individual is bidden to regard himself a cog in a wheel, and to find the prime satisfaction of life in the expenditure of surplus energy upon the promotion of changes which he cannot hope to live to see. In short, Wells here presents humanity with a programme almost completely preoccupied with changes in the material basis of civilisation. No account is taken of the natural man, with his longings and needs, and their innumerable frustrations; and the individual appears to be regarded more as a disembodied intelligence than a living, vibrating, affectable organism. Wells offers to Open Conspirators no vital satisfactions, no new personal spiritual freedoms, no release from the thrall of mass dictation, such as the new outlook is beginning to set before the social malcontent. His disregard of the subjective aspect of life, his failure to find a place for consideration of the causes of prevalent attitudes of mind, his neglect to give weight to the cardinally important rôle of psychological science in throwing light on the processes of social thinking—processes which at present are extraordinarily unfitted to enable mankind to rise above its difficulties—combine to render his book very inadequate as a bible for social reform.

THE *Open Conspiracy* is pressed upon us as a religion, but it is open to argument that in so doing the fundamental character of religion is misconceived. If religion is in essence concerned with the emotional attitude of man towards the world and cosmos, then the new questioning of the worthwhileness of current values and the new seeking for the fundamental satisfactions of living are essentially religious. And just as much so Wells, in identifying religion with enthusiasm for and devotion to the advancement of politico-material change, has missed the essence of religion.

IF Wells is found inadequate by reason of his restricted outlook, his programme, even so far as it goes, is far from being beyond criticism. Not only does he expect too much from political action and allow too little for the influence of personal revolution in facilitating political change, but he is too premature in his dogmatism respecting "essential requirements"; while long before we have knowledge enough he is prepared to map out a course of action to which he requires the *Open Conspiracy* to commit itself.

IN MIND IN THE MAKING, (a book which Wells commends in the highest terms in the Foreword which he has contributed to the English edition),

James Harvey Robinson remarks: "It is premature to advocate any wide sweeping reconstruction of the social order, although experiments and suggestions should be encouraged. What we first need is a change of heart and a chastened mood which will permit an ever-increasing number of people to see things as they are, in the light of what they have been and what they might be." . . . "We are in the midst of the greatest intellectual revolution that has ever overtaken mankind. Our whole conception of mind is undergoing a great change. We are beginning to understand its nature, and as we find out more, intelligence may be raised to a recognised dignity and effectiveness which it has never enjoyed before. An encouraging beginning has been made in the case of the natural sciences, and a similar success may await the studies which have to do with the critical estimate of man's complicated nature, his fundamental impulses and resources, the needless and fatal repressions which these have suffered through the ignorance of the past, and the discovery of untried ways of enriching our existence and improving our relations with our fellow-men."

AGAIN, one might quote the following representative passage from a contemporary scientific thinker (G. B. S. Haldane, in *The Realist* for July, 1929): "Science can do something far bigger for the human mind than the substitution of one set of beliefs for another, or the inculcation of scepticism regarding accepted opinions. It can gradually spread among humanity as a whole the point of view that prevails among research workers, and has enabled a few thousand men and a few dozen women to create the science on which modern civilisation rests. For if we are to control our own and one another's actions as we are learning to control nature, the scientific point of view must come out of the laboratory and be applied to the events of daily life. It is foolish to think that the outlook which has already revolutionised industry, agriculture, war, and medicine, will prove useless when applied to the family, the nation, or the human race. . . . But until the scientific point of view is generally adopted, our civilisation will continue to suffer from a fundamental disharmony. Its material basis is scientific, its intellectual framework is pre-scientific. The present state of the world suggests that unless a fairly vigorous attempt is made in the near future to remedy this disharmony, our particular type of civilisation will undergo the fate of the cultures of the past. Those who consider that it is worth saving should realise the kind of effort which is necessary, and the kind of opposition which that effort will encounter."

IF these criticisms of Wells' "Open Conspiracy" be allowed, then the practical question for the Group formed for its study is whether, having come together animated by a desire to understand the social situation and contribute towards its improvement, it should not find in Wells (through all his writings on social subjects rather than through the "Open Conspiracy") an inspiration rather than a trail blazer, and reconstitute itself, under another name, with the fullest latitude to explore the social situation.

R. WELLBYE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF CHILDHOOD : by P. H. Furfey. London : The Macmillan Co. 1929. (10s.)

THIS book makes a rapid survey of the Child Problem of America, and offers also a more or less extensive study of the Solutions. The scene of action is so vast, and the work of the different states is so various that, at the first glance, the reader is more or less appalled by its scope and nature. But the writer does make a helpful selection of material and succeeds in giving an idea of the movement that is actually in progress in the States.

THE earlier chapters deal with the health of the pre-school, and elementary school child, and in both fields the activities of Local and of Federal Government has brought great advances within recent years. In fact, during the past twenty years the movement has grown so rapidly that the expectation of life has risen in America from 48 to 54 years. Only 6 foreign countries have such a high life-rate.

ONE to Six is "the neglected age" in America as in all countries. Nor does it appear that the great spread of research clinics for the study of young children of 1 to 5 or 6 years old is going to affect the situation very seriously in the course of the coming years. It is true that one cannot prophesy about a vast country that moves so rapidly as America. One terrible fact is bravely recorded. Of 4,832 children between the ages of 2 and 7 only four per cent. were found to be entirely free from physical defect. In the light of present findings it is impossible to deny that this figure may be comparable with those of our own pre-school children. Yet we may state here that our method of dealing with large numbers of children in a big open-air nursery school indicates that, bad as our plight may be, an antidote has already been, not merely tried, but found to be effective in England. This remedy is not yet applied in America. Her Nursery-Schools are in the main, small experimental schools for the study of groups of children belonging to the professional class. The time may soon come when America will open large Nursery Schools of the open-air type for the children of the millions. She will then, presumably, be in a position to staff them with trained observers. But even this will not guarantee the general training on which success must ultimately depend.

THE standardisation of health and intelligence was begun in France and England, but it was developed in America—more especially during and since the Great War. This promising means for the winning of knowledge will doubtless be perfected in America. Throughout this book and throughout the history of the movement in the New World there is perhaps some tendency to underrate social and salvage work as a mode, and perhaps the most effective of all, in winning new means and methods of research and observation. The first facts are arresting, and are not the less so because the call for fine measurements is not pressing or even necessary. Any large nursery-school doing efficient work in any congested area will whisk the cloak off our long-hidden and long misrepresented social and home-life, and its harvest. When America settles down to this work, and not till then, she will become the great clearing-house of the world. At present she seems to be spending enormous means and time on the study of the obvious.

IN discussing the School Child the writer sometimes falls, like his British cousin, into the snare of the specialist. He very properly discusses the height of school rooms and the colour of walls, but his remarks on Ventilation, and on the means provided to give practical application to any teaching of Hygiene are singularly inadequate, and certainly give us no lead at all on

these questions. Yet America is in the forefront of the nations as regards personal Hygiene. Here, again, her methods and ways of looking at things are strangely exclusive.

THE schools for well-to-do children are furnished, in many places, with luxurious baths, and provide an abundance of hot and cold water. In this they lead the Old Country. Often they follow England only too literally. For in spite of the promising start made in the nineties to introduce School-bathing, no hot water is provided yet in the slum school-areas even of London. Still England made a start—in the nineties.

EVEN in details America follows very often the Old Country. The rural workers of America are still sweating little children 7, 8 and 10, in North Dakota, and South Carolina. But in Virginia, Kentucky and the Connecticut Valley the children have as yet found no Lord Shaftesbury to be their Saviour. The light of the English Reformer of the 19th Century has yet to reach the forlorn child farm-labourer of the Northern Pacific Coast. Meantime the reformer pins his faith to Federal legislation. Mr. Furfey believes that this is the easiest road to follow.

EVEN when Federal laws are passed, however, they are still subject to the judgment of a Supreme Court. Thus we are told that as late as 1922 the Revenue Act (passed in the interest of child factory workers) was declared to be "unconstitutional." Child-sweating goes on, over vast areas in the New World.

THE chapter on the subnormal child gives a fair summary of the efforts made in the past 30 years to deal with the "defective." It does justice to the work of Binet, though America has not rested content with the effort of this French reformer. Another Frenchman, Seguin, is less generously treated. It is hardly realised that the author of "the physiological method" is the real father of all our "modern" methods in infant education. He never, in justice be it said, claimed to restore, create, or even to increase the intelligence. He simply tried to use and exercise it. But a great cloud rests upon the work of this reformer—and more especially on its results. A volume is needed to put all this in its reality, its true perspective.

THE best chapters in the book are probably those that deal with Religion, and this is the more obvious because so many modern writers falter at the threshold of the religious questions, or treat it as a mere obstacle to be ignored or removed. The present writer faces it as Reality—and gives it the supreme place in all human education.

So this book in spite of a certain lack of intimate knowledge rises clear of all mere superficial judgment. Its limitations are less those of judgment than of experience.

MARGARET McMILLAN.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE RIGHT OF WAR: by Don Luigi Sturzo. Translated by Barbara Carter, Lic. de L. (Paris). With a Foreword by G. P. Gooch, D.Litt., F.B.A. pp. 293. London: Allen & Unwin. 1929. (10s.)

THE author of this book, we are informed, was born in Sicily, and was ordained a priest in 1894. From 1899 to 1903 he was Professor of Political Economy, Philosophy and Sociology in Caltagirone, where also he held for fifteen years the office of Mayor. In 1919 he created the Popular Party there, which "remained for seven years the bulwark of the fight for parliamentary government, till the triumph of Fascism brought its dissolution."

For the last four years he has been living in England as an exile. He is already favourably known to English readers by his interesting book on *ITALY AND FASCISMO*, which was brought out in English with a preface by Professor Gilbert Murray. His attitude towards Mussolini, whom he compares to Lenin, is very definitely hostile. The present book is of a more detailed and philosophical character. It is rightly characterised by Mr. Gooch as "thoughtful and powerful." It is divided into four parts: Part I. deals with "the International Community," giving an historical account of the development of international relations from the earliest times to the present. Part II. discusses "War in the Present International System." Part III. deals with "Theories of War." The theories referred to are (a) the theory of the Just War; (b) the theory of War for the reason of State; (c) the theory of the Bio-sociological War, which may be either Imperial or Nationalist. Reference is made to the views of Machiavelli, Hugo Grotius, Hegel, Treitschke, and others. The discussion of these is followed by a statement of the writer's own view, which is formulated in the following terms: "War comes about inasmuch as it belongs to a determined social structure. And inasmuch as it belongs to a determined social structure war cannot but be deemed legitimate, provided that the formalities and conditions have been fulfilled that correspond to the general conscience of the time and place, to custom, and to previous agreements." He adds (p. 210) that "since these factors change and evolve, so the general conscience, of which historical institutions and their particular forms are reflections, change and evolve likewise." On the basis of this view, the legitimacy of various wars is discussed. With reference to the Great War, in particular, the following statements are made: "No one can deny the illegitimacy of the Austro-Hungarian war on Serbia, at any rate from the moment that the latter had shown herself prepared to admit arbitration in questions diminishing her sovereignty. No one can deny the untimeliness of the Russian mobilisation. No one can deny the flagrant illegality of the violation of Belgian neutrality by the very State that was one of its guarantors. No one, finally, can assert that the general conscience of Europe was in favour of war. The war was thus illegitimate for various reasons."

"THE value of our theory," he contends, "lies in utilising all the various moral, political, economic, and social currents, in so far as at a given moment in the historical process they become psychologically effective and form an historic synthesis." And, on the basis of this view, he proceeds to consider whether war can be eliminated. His general contention is "that a true state of necessity never arises in the relations between civilised States." He points out (p. 228) that there are already at least limited forms of unity between organised and relatively independent communities in which the right of war is explicitly repudiated. He refers, more particularly, to "the two great federo-State organisms within which war as a legal institution may be said to have been eliminated, viz., the United States and the British Commonwealth. We have an inter-State union, Pan-American, under which wars of aggression are outlawed, and compulsory arbitration is to be organised. We have the Covenant of the League of Nations which, while it does not eliminate the right of war, limits it both substantially and formally and denies it in spirit, so that the Permanent Court of International Justice arose as a natural consequence, and the system of arbitration clauses is spreading. . . . Finally, we have a collective declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, and an engagement not to have recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes, as in the Kellogg Pact." It is admitted (p. 238) that an attitude of this kind cannot at present be expected to be universally adopted. "The free and simultaneous renunciation of all

war by all States is practically impossible ; no authority in the world can oblige such a renunciation unless a favourable public opinion has been formed able to impose it on the authorities of every State. But the way to form such a public opinion lies in the actual realisation of disarmament and the renunciation of all war on the part of such a group of bold and courageous States." Reference is made, in this connection, to the gradual way in which Slavery has been eliminated in civilised States.

THE author next proceeds to discuss various special difficulties in international relations at the present time. But these involve too many complications to be capable of satisfactory treatment in a review. It must suffice to state that the suggestions of Professor McDougall and M. de Juvenel are sympathetically referred to, and that Don Sturzo concludes hopefully with the declaration that " whatever the oscillations of policies and of single States, policies are already caught in the international machine, and are affected by the ideal of the abolition of war. Once the peoples have entertained this ideal as something possible it can never fade from their minds and hearts. Even when war-fever and national passions are seething, there will be parties and responsible men who will rise up and oppose any eventual war in the name of a concrete reality, the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, and the Arbitration Pacts ; in the name of an ideal, *the International and No More War*."

I THINK it will be generally admitted that Don Sturzo's book contains one of the most carefully balanced statements—perhaps *the* most carefully balanced—that have yet been made on this extremely important problem ; and it has been very well rendered into English.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE WESTERN WAY : by Frederic J. Stimson. London : Scribner's Sons. 1929. (12s. 6d.)

It is Mr. Stimson's object in this book to supply a qualitative analysis of democratic government in the West : " qualitative " because other studies have concerned themselves rather with the structure of government. Thus writing of Lord Bryce and his MODERN DEMOCRACIES, Mr. Stimson says : " He recounts the form and functioning of democracy in all modern republics but makes no attempt at their sociology, their civilisations as affected by the institution of democracy, the present quality and aims of their governments." It was a subject which Bryce in 1920 characterised to the author as being " too vast," but it is to the encouragement then given by him that we owe the present work.

THE evidence of self-conscious democracy is to be found in its statutory law and, illustrating his argument from a wide and detailed knowledge both of American and European legislation, Mr. Stimson sets out to establish that democracy has abandoned the principle for which it was founded, that the early democratic ideal of personal liberty has been surrendered for the definitely accepted principle of State control. " It has shown itself quite as—nay, more—indifferent to the cardinal principles, careless of the liberty rights, at least when any ethical or beneficial object is in view, as any autocratic government could be."

HE reviews democracy in its relations with Labour and Property, in its dealings with revolt of class or combinations and with women. Of the latter he says : " They will cheerfully change the Constitution whenever it crosses their path . . . and they love centralised power." It is in this tendency to centralise government and in the enacting of " Mandarin " laws which create boards of officials who are beyond or above the courts that Mr. Stimson finds great danger to the principle of personal liberty.

BUT if there are perils in democratic government it is the only practicable system to-day, and in his second part Mr. Stimson turns to a consideration of the future. Rejecting socialism as a philosophy, although not excluding State ownership in specific instances, he emphasises that democracy must not remain content with a "civilisation of contrivances" and mere creature comforts. It must ascertain rather those things or enjoyments which are of value—in Ruskin's sense—and create a greater diversity of needs so that "from the very welter of our material possessions we Americans emerge higher of brow and loftier of soul." He urges that in the educational system more thought should be given to the highest for "a civilisation is gauged, human progress is made not by the mass but by the top few."

It is in the economic sphere and with her gift of goodwill to men that America has contributed to the world's progress. "Having given to the world the possibility of a full life, we must still look to the Old World to see what that full life is."

G. C. G.

THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN ACTION: by J. F. Steiner.
New York: Holt & Co. 1928. (\$3.)

WHERE are hidden the springs of community health? Can the growth of a community be consciously guided and controlled? These are the two main questions suggested by a study of "The American Community in Action."

ADOPTING the case-study method now commonly used in the literature of individual psychology and of personal social work, Mr. Steiner has brought together the stories of very varying communities written from personal knowledge by students of sociology. As in individual psychology, the emphasis has tended to be on deviations from health and possible causes of disease rather than on the stable yet progressive and healthy community. It is easier to analyse the abnormal and unhealthy in the community as in the individual than to locate and describe the mysterious springs of health and discover how and whence come harmony and ease and poise. Thus, while we are left with little doubt that too rapid or ill-balanced growth, undue conservatism, bitter personal rivalries and jealousies and a factional spirit are dangerous to the community, we find it less easy to decide why certain small communities, not specially favoured economically or geographically, have grown in unity and social consciousness, have been able to adapt themselves to changing conditions, and have retained their sense of uniqueness and the affection of those of their sons and daughters who have sought out wider spheres of action elsewhere.

YET if the causes of well-being are not defined, the method of approach to each of these studies suggests that the writers are convinced that health is not so much dependent on social machinery as on the mode of being, the quality and direction of the vital force of the community. There is here comparatively little discussion of government or administration and much of "the attitudes and sentiments of the people, their conflicts, prejudices, customs and traditions."

WHILE there is no theorising about the existence or nature of the community, there is a tacit assumption that it is a living organism, in which there is a necessary connection between the well-being and harmony of the groups which make it up and the health of the whole; and this presentation convinces by its concreteness and by the first-hand observation which makes it possible. Nor do the writers imagine that only the simple forms of organism can be healthy. It is true that Mr. Steiner recognises that communities of moderate size can most easily be studied, but diversity and even

disorganisation and temporary group conflict are looked on as possibly hopeful signs of progress, necessary in view of the common tendency to conservatism, and dangerous only when the conflict is so bitter or widespread as to destroy the stability of the community itself. In the same way, change is welcomed rather than feared, and social institutions are judged primarily by their readiness to adapt themselves to changing conditions and to revise their methods and policies in accordance with changing needs. Leaders, groups or churches without this power of adaptation are a dead hand on the living community and hinder its free growth.

MUCH of the material used in these studies is historical in the sense that it is a study of forces which have been and continue to be vital. There is no cleavage between past, present and future, but stock, environment, power of throwing up leaders, the quality of the leadership and the methods of group formation are described as forces which continuously influence the manner of reaction to new ideas and economic changes.

MR. STEINER points out that in thus laying the emphasis on the psychic nature or personality of the community, on the community in action, rather than on present social conditions, the community study differs radically from the social survey. The latter has thrown a flood of light on local conditions and problems and has led to the diagnosis of social ills such as poverty, conditions leading to disease, and hence to efforts to remedy wrong and to fill in the gaps in social provision. The community study is a more intimate piece of social research into the nature of the community as displayed in action, which may have less immediate practical results, but which is essential as a prelude to any attempt to influence its growth and methods of adaptation.

WHAT is sought is a technique for community improvement, by which a more rational and orderly development can be facilitated. Mr. Steiner is modest in his claims for past achievements in this sphere. The complex nature of the community makes it difficult "to view it in its proper perspective and explain its growth and present status," and still more difficult to "devise unifying machinery." At present little more has been achieved than "loosely correlated efforts to deal with various community problems."

WHETHER more can be done is a question of vital interest. Whatever view is taken of the relative importance of the community and the individual—and these studies throw light on their mutual influence and especially remind us of the formative part played by individuals and families in community building—it cannot be a matter of indifference that so many unhealthy communities continue to exist. The stagnant, unprogressive community without leadership or self-consciousness, the communities from which economic disaster has forced away the best of the young men and which have sunk into factionalism and denominational and political bitterness, are dangerous to the wider society of which they form a part. Probably they cannot be fundamentally changed by paternalism or by new social machinery alone, although some of the examples given in Mr. Steiner's book suggest that the success of a common effort to make some necessary social provision may lead to greater solidarity.

THE first step towards progress may come through a growing realisation that communities exist, that for practical purposes they must be looked on as entities of which social and economic groups are but constituent parts, which are developing individuality through action, and which are subject to diseases and therefore need a physician. Because it conduces to such a realisation *THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN ACTION* is to be commended to the attention of social students.

HILDA JENNINGS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY : by Alice Raven. Heffer, Cambridge. 1929. pp. IX., 145. (3/6.)

THIS book, although small, is practical, and assuredly *un livre de bonne foy*. Miss Raven begins by a brave essay to analyse the mind into its component "atoms." She distinguishes, after the manner of McDougall, such elements as primary emotions, complex emotions, sentiments, and so on. Emotions like "tender feeling," "negative self-feeling" have their allotted place, recalling not infrequently the "proclivities" and "propensities" of phrenology. Examples of complex emotions are *scorn* (which Miss Raven holds to be a compound of the primary emotions, anger and disgust), and *awe* (which is admiration plus fear), and so forth. There is some vagueness here in apportioning responsibility, and Miss Raven does not seem to be always consistent. Thus—on pp. 46, 47, 54 *inter alia*—she ascribes everything an individual does to environmental factors acting on inherited mental make-up, temperament, or disposition. She speaks of "a constitutional mental laziness" as being "related on the physical side to an easily exhausted nervous system," and, again, of "temperamental fears" as being "related to some physical inferiority" (where "related to" can only mean "caused by.") In these and similar passages she would appear to preach an altogether determinist doctrine, but further reading of her book will soon show that this is by no means the conclusion of the whole matter. Following the analysis of the mind's components, we find still other principles introduced by Miss Raven, such as "the power urge," but especially a principle which she variously calls the ego, the individual, and the psyche or soul; this latter group of terms apparently all refer to the sentient conscious Organism, which now, as the argument of the book proceeds, comes to play—and we think rightly—an increasingly important rôle; from this point we are introduced to the relations between Organism and Environment, and here Miss Raven seems to be on firmer ground and to speak more from practical experience than in the more analytic earlier chapters of her book. This applies especially to her remarks on abnormal psychological development, on fears, repressions, the flight from reality, &c. What she says on education and on re-education (the treatment of neurasthenics) is all much to the point. Thus she reminds us that a bad heredity often involves a bad environment for the child (presence of ill-balanced parents). "Ease in parenthood is obtained by never facing the real problem of treating children as independent human beings." The teacher, says Miss Raven, has certainly to aim primarily at bringing out the best that is in a child, but certainly also she must encourage the child "to face its own inferiority" and therefore not to shirk "subjects which do not appeal to it." ("Who shall say whether the self-confidence acquired through the constant play of will in relation to an ideal will not stand the test of reality more surely than the self-confidence based on natural "superiority" rather than on the facing of one's own "inferiority?") For, "in the world of psychic conditions there is no such condition as native inferiority" (*pace* Miss Raven's earlier statements !)

"THE nineteenth century seems to have given birth to an ease-loving generation. . . . The love of ease breeds pessimism and fatalism. Men will not make the moral effort . . . they prefer to say that they are the sport of the gods" (e.g., *Cedipus* ascribes his troubles to the "machinations of a devil.") "In order to become capable of reacting effectively on the environment, the individual must make use of his experience. He must learn from the discipline of life, and not be afraid of passing on to each new stage of added responsibility." "A dogging fear constantly besets the steps of the constitutional neurotic. His gifts and talents give him a strong power

urge; at the same time, in order to satisfy this power urge, he will need to make that effort against which the weaker part of him rebels." "Self-pity is an excuse for shirking the difficulties of life, being a disguised desire for help from other people, instead of a healthy self-reliance based on personal effort." The individual's feeling of inferiority is "the result of his disinclination to face reality and to win the self-confidence which comes to any man from the consciousness that he has done all that in him lies to ensure success." "He must drop self-pity and start out on the path of effort, whatever the pain that his hitherto unfaced inferiority may cost him. Perhaps some personal influence may be needed to give him the initial impulse."

In the present volume Miss Raven has purposely restricted herself to "individual" psychology. While much is said about the child's (and the "childlike" neurotic's) relations with the various members of his family, we are not told much concerning the normal relations that should subsist between an adult and his civic milieu; at most we hear of the latter as a somewhat abstract "herd," or again, it may become, as in the Greek tragedies, simply an "impossible" situation, towards which the individual can at best oppose an attitude of Stoic determination or *apatheia*—nothing can really be "made" of it. But such social environments are of course abnormal, or at least subnormal. In ordinary life the genius loci is as important as the genius or "psyche" of the individual, and both must develop together. The complete practical psychologist will study both, in order to help in their joint development.

WITHIN these limitations—largely self-imposed—Miss Raven has produced a useful and thought-compelling little book.

A. J. BROCK.

PROGRESS AND RELIGION: AN HISTORICAL ENQUIRY: by Christopher Dawson. London. Sheed & Ward. 1929. 10s. 6d.

LIKE all Mr. Christopher Dawson's writings, this book is written throughout at a high level of thought, scholarship, and historical interpretation. It is timely also, and so deserves attention from the widening public it addresses. Its essential theme is that of the increasing disillusionment with the long traditional concept and optimism of PROGRESS, viewed alike in its eighteenth century and later political expressions, and in the mechanistic advances of the industrial age. Mr. Dawson reviews this movement and concept of PROGRESS in his opening chapters. He traces its history through the 18th and 19th centuries down to these present days. He notes too the by-products of the movement and its reactions, always with an admirable balance of appreciation and criticism. Next (in Chapters IV., V., VI. and VII.) comes an erudite but simple and comprehensive account of religious origins and developments, leading up to a more specific criticism (Chapters VIII. and IX.) of the orthodox concept of Progress as the pseudo-spiritual accompaniment of a wholesale secularisation of Western Civilisation. Mr. Dawson makes us see the cult of Progress growing up in our modern world as a kind of religion adapted to the needs of an age that had subordinated human to mechanical ideas and ideals.

FINALLY (Chapters IX. and X.) the author makes his plea for a renewal of that traditional culture which characterises the Catholic religion at its best, and which he maintains is capable of restoring to Western Civilisation its lost or degraded spiritual values. "Philanthropy," he says, "social reform, scientific organisation—all require the dynamic which Christianity provides. The progressive intellectualisation of the material world by science must be co-ordinated with the progressive spiritualisation of human

nature by religion. This harmony has never been fully achieved though both factors have contributed to form European culture." And, moreover, the international unity needed for an era of peace, he affirms, can only be reached through the harmonising impulses and aspirations of Christianity. "The ultimate goal," he well says, "is not a superstate but a spiritual society."

THERE can be no doubt that this new book of Mr. Christopher Dawson's will confirm and enhance the reputation which his first book, *THE AGE OF THE GODS*, brought him for a very rare combination of qualities. Historic insight and encyclopædic knowledge, critical analysis and synthetic survey, sympathetic understanding and constructive imagination, a clear style and vivid phrasing—all these qualities are conspicuous in this new book of Mr. Dawson's as in his previous one. It is an outstanding contribution to the interpretation of contemporary social evolution; and contains, besides, a notable theory of the great transition from the archaic civilisations to the world religions of spiritual quest. To both these aspects of Mr. Dawson's book we hope to return in a later issue of the *REVIEW* with a detailed appreciation (and also some criticism) of each.

V. B.

THE REBEL PASSION: by Katherine Burdekin. London. Thornton Butterworth & Co. 1929.

THE "Rebel Passion" is *Pity*: and the story is a record of the simple life, yet vivid visions of a gentle monk of Glastonbury, who is shown scene after scene of history; always with something which calls out his revolt from oppressions and his pity for their outcomes; yet on the whole, despite ups and downs, expressing something of the progress of the world up to our own times at their best, and indeed beyond; since with hopeful overcomings of their evils in a spirit of hope and reconciliation. It is thus a notable contrast from the too simply mechanical, or at least mainly material, Utopias so much more characteristic of recent times, to have this essentially ethico-social presentment; one widely and deservedly appealing to a very varied public, as from the many pilgrims to Glastonbury and kindred shrines of the religions past and present, yet also to the general reader, and even supplying a welcome relief to the student of our still mostly prosaic sociology.

P. G.

THE SCIENCE OF PUBLIC WELFARE: by Robert Kelso. Holt & Co. New York. 1928. pp. 422. \$3.50.

MR. KELSO undertakes to "assemble, to analyse and to appraise the knowledge we now have regarding the broad question of the public welfare." Chapter VIII deals with the work of voluntary societies, which, in America, surpasses, at least in quality, that of public agencies. The treatment is very brief, and there is nothing to show if Mr. Kelso is acquainted with the position in any detail. Pointed reference is made to some outstanding difficulties:

THE public administrator, too often a functionary of mean abilities and small outlook, is apt to feel his official character and look with uncompromising scorn upon the private agency which has nothing better than a permissive standing in the community.

PPRIVATE activities are hampered in various ways:

A THIRD limitation of private activity arises out of the lack in many instances of sufficient capital funds to guarantee continuity of service. . . .

FINALLY, the private agencies are so far isolated from each other in their several lines of effort, so disintegrated as a co-ordinated force working for social betterment, that each must unavoidably follow the policy of cut-and-try.

IN a short volume attempting to cover an enormous field of investigation we must expect to find under the ordinary headings much information that is already available. Be it observed, however, that it is always here set forth with admirable lucidity, point, vigour and candour. What the United States owes to England is freely admitted, and no claims are made to superiority in American work which, we think, might fairly have been made in many directions.

It is obvious that his study of public welfare administration has been enriched by an unusual knowledge of law, but to those who are acquainted with the writings of the late Miss Mary Richmond, the following statement will cause no little surprise :

THE new profession of social service is abysmally ignorant of the philosophy of the law, and in consequence has at best a warped conception of the public welfare.

THIS seems worth quoting :

" . . . the social fabric is so hard to keep sweet and clean that the burden of keeping his small share of it in a commendable state is placed, and tends daily more and more to be placed, squarely upon the individual's own shoulders. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Social necessity is saying to-day that in many instances ignorance of the facts is no excuse either. As the pressure of living face to face in congested population swarms becomes greater and greater, the sheer necessity of getting along peaceably together and of protecting our society from disease and destruction by the elements or by ill-disposed individuals, requires that we set up rough and ready rules of justice."

THE results of the recent development of psychiatric social work in the United States are regarded as tantamount to a rediscovery of the individual :

. . . It is this same enlightenment regarding differences in individuals and their varying capacities for citizenship that is revolutionising our social institutions, changing our law, revamping our social work, rebuilding our systems of education and tempering the severity of our judgments of conduct.

WE commend every line of the two chapters on Charitable Trusts (pp. 66-88). He sketches out (p. 87) seven headings under which the Government of the future will require proof from any intended charities that they will be a boon and not a bane. He concludes :

TYPHOID in milk and water we are coming already to recognise as a dread from which eternal vigilance alone can deliver us. The untold harm that may come from mistaken encouragement of the unfit ; from pauperisation through misplaced charity ; from discouragement of family responsibilities through sympathy untempered by reason—these intangible but potent likelihoods of unsupervised and irresponsible charities are still beyond our ken. The time is near in the science of public welfare when this realisation too will dawn upon us.

IN Mr. Kelso's opinion " we are outgrowing the old practice of massing and classing humanity for purposes of identification, or relief, or correction." So far as this country is concerned this process of greater individualism in treatment is not apparent. We seem rather to be advancing further and further with the practice.

WHEN the British Government introduces some vast scheme of social legislation, the public has nothing to compare it with, takes it for granted, like the weather, and staggers on under the burden of it. The American citizen on the other hand can compare a whole array of variations on the same theme in the provisions of numerous independent state legislatures.

IN discussing the rights of the father there is this acute observation (p. 420) : OUR only qualification of the extreme exercise of such rights has been our laws forbidding disturbance of the peace, assault, and neglect of family support *where he has a job and income sufficient*.

SOCIAL workers in this country have been, and still are, continually baffled in their efforts on behalf of neglected children, by the simple plea that the father is out of work. No magistrate seems to know how to deal with this situation.

J. C. PRINGLE.

RACE ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN: by Bruno Lasker. New York : Holt & Co. (\$4.)

It is very evident to the onlooker of States-American life that a growing wealth and a vast potentiality of resources has not solved human social difficulties and trials. States-America is a more definite object lesson of the failure of mere wealth to meet human desires than even was pre-war wealthy Britain, or Canada-America or Australia as they were then seeking to work out the proletarian earthly paradise. This mistake of overstressing the economic attitude lies as a subconscious apprehension behind most modern States-American writers, and they are wise in this apprehension.

THE extraordinary ease and luxury of the States-American woman's life has not caused her to love motherhood more and fear it less, or more deeply honour marital bonds; and, as far as what is called racial-suicide and what may be spoken of as spiritual-suicide are concerned, Goldsmith was nearer the truth than he ever suspected when he urged that that land is ill-served, if in it, wealth accumulates and real manhood and real womanhood decay. It is slowly dawning upon economists that there is a real alternative to paradise in the pushing of a one-sided economic claim. And to the reviewer of the above volume, one of its characteristic notes is this hesitancy to define any topic of study more than vaguely, and at the same time to feel a fear that without such definition he, and other social thinkers, will go astray. It is as if he were to say to his readers, "We have all claimed too much or too little by our definitions and the economists are our latest failures, yet it is upon these definitions that we ought to build." This is a truly modern States-American attitude.

MR. LASKER is more fearful than he ought to be of defining race. He takes such terms as "race" and "national" qualities a little too much for granted and ignores a kindred, but more individual, subject temperament and the still more individual idiosyncrasy. The general impression Mr. Lasker leaves on the careful reader is that the term "race" is a kind of "complex" of imaginary causes of hostilities and that it has arisen out of misunderstandings and from different rates of mental growth and jealousies and can be, by skilful education, smoothed away into the nothingness from whence it came. But can a nothingness become a "somethingness"?

THE suggestion that the disliking of Jews is really due to their maturing more quickly than other peoples he quotes with partial approval, and evidently he has considered the idea carefully, but it is very obvious in a school where "Jews" and "Gentiles" mix together that antagonisms are not explainable on any unequal-age-development theory. Indeed, older boys are usually admired by younger ones, so that if the Jews mature earlier, as they probably do, this should be a cause of liking not disliking and envy of Jewish supremacy.

THE book indeed reveals, and is characteristic, of the States-American attitude as the "melting-pot" aim is accepted as ideal. Thus fear, cruelty, combativeness, ridicule, condescension, rivalry, class consciousness, are all given under *Part I.* as the race attitudes of children, and under *Part II.* his claim is largely that children absorb adult attitudes (though he does not explain how such attitudes arise) and these attitudes are emotional, institutionalised, deferential and divisional antagonisms, and in *Part IV.* the final part of the volume, his wish to modify race attitude is really to obliterate race, he sees the race-attitude and the race-prejudice as one and the same mental position. But are they?

THE reviewer sees this assumption as the book's chief and most serious defect. Had the book been called **RACE-ANTAGONISMS AND THEIR AMELIORATIONS IN CHILDREN**, it would have been truer to the general purpose of the

author, but even then the question that is raised in the reader's mind is, "Is there a better way than by sinking or obliterating differences"?

No one can read Gosse's *FATHER & SON* and not realise the clash of temperaments. Here is no socially reared antagonism but inevitable divergences of character which demand mutual sympathies and understandings to avoid embittering experiences. And although sex antagonisms are probably much more artificially engineered than racial ones, and future historians will certainly not give indiscriminating praise to the political woman's movement, yet it is a real difficulty of married life that husband and wife only seldom enter discerningly into each other's psychological "make-up."

THE real weakness of the book is that *it is so negative*. What are the native or inherent qualities of the civilisations of the yellow-race; what are like qualities of the African black; how does the American-Indian differ from each, and the Asiatic-Indians from each other and the other three; and since to "know-oneself" is so difficult how do we "pale-faces" appear to each of the other groups? A study on these lines would give at least some positive results and then would come suggestions as to how to reconcile, without destroying, racial differences exactly as the time must come when artistic, practical and theoretical, scientific and religious temperaments will be reconciled, and no longer as so often nowadays, thwart and scorn each other. The reviewer would have liked some attempt to define how temperamental likings pick out more individual characteristics and national likings pick out social qualities and racial likings pick out the most general of all. It is perhaps questionable to assume that the child's and the adult's race attitudes are the same.

Do black people really like the dark skin and think the fair skin sickly and lacking in definition? Is there a natural preference of white-skinned people to fairness and light colouring? Do Japanese and Chinese feel their colour is preferable to either? And if these preferences are discovered are we able to keep apart our preferences and æsthetic judgments or must they be confused together? One desires an affirmative as well as a negative study of race.

THESE remarks are made in no disparagement of Mr. Lasker's attitude. On the contrary, it seems to the reviewer that Mr. Lasker has tried hard to write impartially on the lines of Moton's conciliatory *FINDING A WAY OUT* rather than on those of the Stoddard School, on the one side, and the Du Bois School on the other. And it is this kindly impartiality, appealing as it does to the reviewer which makes him wish Mr. Lasker had considered *both* attitudes of race and not simply the antagonistic and subordinating one. *Eugenics* as a study was for a time divided into *Negative and Positive Inquiries*. The subject of Race needs a like division. Undoubtedly there is much hostile race feeling which needs humanising and broadening almost out of existence, Mr. Lasker is specially concerned with this outlook and he is a temperate and wise exponent. But to seek to whittle away our distinctive individual characteristics (in sex, science, art, music, literature and industry) seems to be the special aim and hope of the modern politician and even, alas, social student, and one feels it is also Mr. Lasker's aim as regards race. Will Mr. Lasker write a companion volume, not as now upon race-antagonisms which are to be obliterated but upon fine race attitudes which are to be encouraged to be fulfilled? The reviewer has no hesitation in recommending Mr. Lasker's work, if the above reservations are kept steadily in view, and he ventures to hope that Mr. Lasker will himself enforce them in a new volume drawing again upon such a wide field of research as is the United States of America, and in the same quiet conciliatory style which distinguishes his present volume.

J. LIONEL TAYLER.

MIDDLETOWN, A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE: by R. S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd. Constable & Co. and Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1929. 18s. 6d.

As a contribution to the literature of community study this volume is of quite extraordinary interest. It is the record of a field study in contemporary anthropology, the subject of which is not a tribe in Central Australia or New Guinea, but a community in the Middle West of the United States of America. The authors, together with a team of three assistants, spent eighteen months, during 1924 and 1925, in "Middletown," a community of about 35,000 inhabitants, generally speaking representative of contemporary American life in the Middle West, for the purpose of studying objectively its social life and organisation in the same spirit in which the cultural anthropologists make similar studies among primitive peoples.

ASSUMING a universal culture pattern, the authors have adopted the six-fold classification of social activity, set forth by Rivers in his *SOCIAL ORGANISATION*, as the ground plan of their investigation. Thus, they have studied the inhabitants of "Middletown": (1) getting a living, (2) making a home, (3) training the young, (4) using leisure in various forms of play, art and so on, (5) engaging in religious practices, and (6) engaging in community activities. A section of the volume is devoted to each of these major life-activities. In each case an attempt has also been made to use "as a ground-work for the observed behaviour of to-day the reconstructed and, in so far possible, equally objectively observed behaviour of 1890." As a study of social development the work is not altogether satisfactory, but the comparisons over the thirty-five-year period are in many cases very interesting and suggestive, and they certainly add to the value of the work.

It is significant of the inherent difficulty of any study of a community as a social unit that the investigators in "Middletown," despite the relative homogeneity of the population and the absence of any special problems, have found it impossible to describe even the carrying on of its major life-activities in terms of the city as a unit. Throughout the work the data has been dealt with so as to illuminate the outstanding characteristics of two social groups:—the business classes (including professional people), and the working classes. The investigators claim that this grouping, though in many ways unsatisfactory, is in accordance with a fundamental social cleavage in the town. It is probable, however, that this grouping is too simple and that it hides many social groupings which would call for investigation in a complete study. There is always a danger of forgetting that where the community as a whole, or any large group within it, is referred to as if it were unitary in thought and behaviour the terms "community" and "group" so used, are, as the writers of this work admit, only shorthand symbols representing a diversity of individuals.

SPACE does not permit discussion of the extremely interesting results of the "Middletown" enquiries which are set out in detail in this volume. Striking conclusions are reached in each section of the work, none more so than those relating to the mechanisation of work and play, and the dominance of the dollar-getting motive in Middle West society. The volume is very readable, though it is overweighted occasionally by the labouring of the obvious.

A. D. K. OWEN.

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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW	July, August, September.
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE	July, August.
JOURNAL OF HEREDITY	June, July.
JOURNAL OF LONDON SOCIETY	August, September.
JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY	July.
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY	July.
MAN	August, September.
MONIST	July.
MUSÉE SOCIAL	July, August.
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW	July, August, September.
OPEN COURT	June, July, August.
OKONOMI OG POLITIK	August.
PROGRESS	Summer.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS	August.
QUEST	July.
REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE	April-June.
REVUE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE BRUXELLES	February-March-April, May-June-July.
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE	May-June.
REVUE SCIENTIFIQUE (ACADEMIE DES SCIENCES D'UKRAINE)	Parts 2-3, 1928.
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI	June-July, August.
SBORNIK (ANNALS OF THE CZECH ACADEMY OF AGRICULTURE)	Vol. 4 : Part II.
SCIENTIA	July-August, September.
SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE	July.
SOCIAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS	March, April, May, June, July, August, September.
SOCIAL SERVICE REVIEW	July, August, September.
SOZIAL UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE	Vol. 22 : Part 1.
TÁRSADALOMTUDOMÁNY	May-August.
UKRAINE	Part 34.
VE'ETNIK	Vol. 5 : Parts 6-7.
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV	July.
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VÖLKERPSYCHOLOGIE UND SOZIOLOGIE	Parts 2 and 3.

